Abstract: An apparatus comprising a processor unit comprising circuitry to generate, for a first network host, a request for an object of a second network host, wherein the request comprises an address comprising a routable host ID of the second network host and an at least partially encrypted object ID, wherein the address uniquely identifies the object within a distributed computing domain; and a memory element to store at least a portion of the object.

Abstract: Techniques and mechanisms for a victim cache to operate in conjunction with a skewed cache to help mitigate the risk of a side-channel attack. In an embodiment, a first line is evicted from a skewed cache, and moved to a victim cache, based on a message indicating that a second line is to be stored to the skewed cache. Subsequently, a request to access the first line results in a search of both the victim cache and sets of the skewed cache which have been mapped to an address corresponding to the first line. Based on the search, the first line is evicted from the victim cache, and reinserted in the skewed cache. In another embodiment, reinsertion of the first line in the skewed cache includes the first line and a third line being swapped between the skewed cache and the victim cache.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing a secure address translation service. An embodiment of a system includes memory for storage of data, an IOMMU coupled to the memory, and a host-to-device link to couple the IOMMU with one or more devices and to operate as a translation agent on behalf of one or more devices in connection with memory operations relating to the memory, including receiving a translated request from a discrete device via the host-to-device link specifying a memory operation and a physical address within the memory pertaining to the memory operation, determining page access permissions assigned to a context of the discrete device for a physical page of the memory within which the physical address resides, allowing the memory operation to proceed when the page access permissions permit the memory operation, and blocking the memory operation when the page access permissions do not permit the memory operation.

Abstract: A method comprises identifying a first page in a computer readable memory communicatively coupled to the apparatus that has been marked as being stored in memory as plaintext even if accessed using cryptographic addresses, the first page in the computer readable memory comprising at least one encrypted data object, and set a page table entry bit for the first page to a first value which indicates that at least one memory allocation in the first page has been marked as being stored in memory as plaintext even if accessed using cryptographic addresses.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device having a processor, a memory, an input/output (I/O) device, and a filter logic. The filter logic is configured to receive a first key identifier from the processor, wherein the first key identifier is indicative of a shared memory range includes a shared key identifier range to be used for untrusted I/O devices and receive a transaction from the I/O device, wherein the transaction includes a second key identifier and a trust device ID indicator associated with the I/O device. The filter logic is further configured to determine whether the transaction is asserted with the trust device ID indicator indicative of whether the I/O device is assigned to a trust domain and determine, in response to a determination that the transaction is not asserted with the trust device ID indicator, whether the second key identifier matches the first key identifier.

Abstract: In one embodiment, an application executing on a host node allocates a memory address of a remote node. The application selects, based at least in part on device capability information for the host and remote nodes, one of the host node or the remote node to encrypt application data, and configures the selected node to encrypt the application data based on a key and a pointer to the memory address of the remote node.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device, which further includes a processor, a memory, a trusted execution environment (TEE), one or more input/output (I/O) devices, and an I/O subsystem. The I/O subsystem includes a device memory access table (DMAT) programmed by the TEE to establish bindings between the TEE and one or more I/O devices that the TEE trusts and a memory ownership table (MOT) programmed by the TEE when a memory page is allocated to the TEE.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing a secure address translation service. An embodiment of a system includes a memory device to store memory data in a plurality of physical pages shared by a plurality of devices, a first table to map each page of memory to an associated bundle identifier (ID) that identifies one or more devices having access to a page of memory, a second table to map each bundle ID to page access permissions that define access to one or more pages associated with a bundle ID and a translation agent to receive requests from the plurality of devices to perform memory operations on the memory and determine page access permissions for requests received from the plurality of devices using the first table and the second table.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing a secure address translation service. An embodiment of a system includes memory for storage of data, an IOMMU coupled to the memory, and a host-to-device link to couple the IOMMU with one or more devices and to operate as a translation agent on behalf of one or more devices in connection with memory operations relating to the memory, including receiving a translated request from a discrete device via the host-to-device link specifying a memory operation and a physical address within the memory pertaining to the memory operation, determining page access permissions assigned to a context of the discrete device for a physical page of the memory within which the physical address resides, allowing the memory operation to proceed when the page access permissions permit the memory operation, and blocking the memory operation when the page access permissions do not permit the memory operation.

Abstract: Methods, apparatus, systems and articles of manufacture are disclosed for anomalous memory access pattern detection for translational lookaside buffers. An example apparatus includes a communication interface to retrieve a first eviction data set from a translational lookaside buffer associated with a central processing unit; a machine learning engine to: generate an anomaly detection model based upon at least one of a second eviction data set not including an anomaly and a third eviction data set including the anomaly; and determine whether the anomaly is present in the first eviction data set based on the anomaly detection model; and an alert generator to at least one of modify a bit value or terminate memory access operations when the anomaly is determined to be present.

Abstract: Technologies for secure device configuration and management include a computing device having an I/O device. A trusted agent of the computing device is trusted by a virtual machine monitor of the computing device. The trusted agent securely commands the I/O device to enter a trusted I/O mode, securely commands the I/O device to set a global lock on configuration registers, receives configuration data from the I/O device, and provides the configuration data to a trusted execution environment. In the trusted I/O mode, the I/O device rejects a configuration command if a configuration register associated with the configuration command is locked and the configuration command is not received from the trusted agent. The trusted agent may provide attestation information to the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment may verify the configuration data and the attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing a secure address translation service. An embodiment of a system includes DRAM for storage of data, an IOMMU coupled to the DRAM, and a host-to-device link to couple the IOMMU with one or more devices and to operate as a translation agent on behalf of one or more devices in connection with memory operations relating to the DRAM, including receiving a translated request from a discrete device via the host-to-device link specifying a memory operation and a physical address within the DRAM pertaining to the memory operation, determining page access permissions assigned to a context of the discrete device for a physical page of the DRAM within which the physical address resides, allowing the memory operation to proceed when the page access permissions permit the memory operation, and blocking the memory operation when the page access permissions do not permit the memory operation.

Abstract: An apparatus comprising a processor unit comprising circuitry to generate, for a first network host, a request for an object of a second network host, wherein the request comprises an address comprising a routable host ID of the second network host and an at least partially encrypted object ID, wherein the address uniquely identifies the object within a distributed computing domain; and a memory element to store at least a portion of the object.

Abstract: A method comprises identifying a first page in a computer readable memory communicatively coupled to the apparatus that has been marked as being stored in memory as plaintext even if accessed using cryptographic addresses, the first page in the computer readable memory comprising at least one encrypted data object, and set a page table entry bit for the first page to a first value which indicates that at least one memory allocation in the first page has been marked as being stored in memory as plaintext even if accessed using cryptographic addresses.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device having a processor, a memory, an input/output (I/O) device, and a filter logic. The filter logic is configured to receive a first key identifier from the processor, wherein the first key identifier is indicative of a shared memory range includes a shared key identifier range to be used for untrusted I/O devices and receive a transaction from the I/O device, wherein the transaction includes a second key identifier and a trust device ID indicator associated with the I/O device. The filter logic is further configured to determine whether the transaction is asserted with the trust device ID indicator indicative of whether the I/O device is assigned to a trust domain and determine, in response to a determination that the transaction is not asserted with the trust device ID indicator, whether the second key identifier matches the first key identifier.

Abstract: Techniques and mechanisms for a victim cache to operate in conjunction with a skewed cache to help mitigate the risk of a side-channel attack. In an embodiment, a first line is evicted from a skewed cache, and moved to a victim cache, based on a message indicating that a second line is to be stored to the skewed cache. Subsequently, a request to access the first line results in a search of both the victim cache and sets of the skewed cache which have been mapped to an address corresponding to the first line. Based on the search, the first line is evicted from the victim cache, and reinserted in the skewed cache. In another embodiment, reinsertion of the first line in the skewed cache includes the first line and a third line being swapped between the skewed cache and the victim cache.

Abstract: Technologies disclosed herein provide mitigations against warm boot attacks on memory modules. For instance, in one embodiment, a non-volatile dual in-line memory module (NVDIMM) in a host computing system may detect a transition from a low-power state to a full-power state, receive a nonce value from a processor of the host computing system after the transition, verify the nonce value, and allow access to data stored on the NVDIMM based on successful verification of the nonce value. In another embodiment, an NVDIMM may be locked in response to detecting a transition from a high-power state to a low-power state in a host computing system. After a transition from the low-power state to the full-power state, the NVDIMM may obtain one or more passphrases, verify the one or more passphrases, and allow access to data stored on the NVDIMM based on successful verification of the one or more passphrases.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a read request is received from a peripheral device across an interconnect, with the read request including a process identifier and an encrypted virtual address. One or more keys are obtained based on the process identifier of the read request, and the encrypted virtual address of the read request is decrypted based on the one or more keys to obtain an unencrypted virtual address. Encrypted data is retrieved from memory based on the unencrypted virtual address, and the encrypted data is decrypted based on the one or more keys to obtain plaintext data. The plaintext data is transmitted to the peripheral device across the interconnect.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device having a processor, a memory, an input/output (I/O) device, and a filter logic. The filter logic is configured to receive a first key identifier from the processor, wherein the first key identifier is indicative of a shared memory range includes a shared key identifier range to be used for untrusted I/O devices and receive a transaction from the I/O device, wherein the transaction includes a second key identifier and a trust device ID indicator associated with the I/O device. The filter logic is further configured to determine whether the transaction is asserted with the trust device ID indicator indicative of whether the I/O device is assigned to a trust domain and determine, in response to a determination that the transaction is not asserted with the trust device ID indicator, whether the second key identifier matches the first key identifier.

Abstract: Technologies for secure device configuration and management include a computing device having an I/O device. A trusted agent of the computing device is trusted by a virtual machine monitor of the computing device. The trusted agent securely commands the I/O device to enter a trusted I/O mode, securely commands the I/O device to set a global lock on configuration registers, receives configuration data from the I/O device, and provides the configuration data to a trusted execution environment. In the trusted I/O mode, the I/O device rejects a configuration command if a configuration register associated with the configuration command is locked and the configuration command is not received from the trusted agent. The trusted agent may provide attestation information to the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment may verify the configuration data and the attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.