Abstract: Embodiments disclosed herein describe computing private set intersection (PSI) between various parties using delegation to other devices and in one round of interaction (request and response). The various parties involved and their associated computing devices are referred to herein as participants. The protocol is forward-secure and completely hides the data of participants from an eavesdropper. Because the protocol only uses a single round of interaction, it is more efficient and does not require each participant to have servers that remain online continuously.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for issuing assets and/or asset tokens using zero-knowledge proofs (“ZKPs”). An issuance system may receive a command to issue an asset. The issuance system may determine that issuing the assets would not violate administrator-defined or network-defined rules that may govern the types of assets and/or the quantity of assets that the issuance system may issue. The issuance system may then issue the assets and generate a ZKP corresponding to the issuance and indicating adherence to the rules while concealing information related to the asset token, such as the types of assets and/or quantity of assets. The issuance system may publish the ZKP to a blockchain so that verifier nodes may confirm that the issuance system adhered to the rules while still preventing access to the underlying issuance information.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed herein describe computing calculations based on two overlapping private sets between various parties. To conduct the calculation, an intersection of the overlapping private sets data lists is conducted without revealing the underlying data. A homomorphic encryption is conducted on the intersecting data elements to allow them to be compared.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed herein describe computing calculations based on two overlapping private sets between various parties. To conduct the calculation, an intersection of the overlapping private sets data lists is conducted without revealing the underlying data. A homomorphic encryption is conducted on the intersecting data elements to allow them to be compared.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed herein describe computing private set intersection (PSI) between various parties using delegation to other devices and in one round of interaction (request and response). The various parties involved and their associated computing devices are referred to herein as participants. The protocol is forward-secure and completely hides the data of participants from an eavesdropper. Because the protocol only uses a single round of interaction, it is more efficient and does not require each participant to have servers that remain online continuously.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed herein describe computing private set intersection (PSI) between various parties using delegation to other devices and in one round of interaction (request and response). The various parties involved and their associated computing devices are referred to herein as participants. The protocol is forward-secure and completely hides the data of participants from an eavesdropper. Because the protocol only uses a single round of interaction, it is more efficient and does not require each participant to have servers that remain online continuously.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for issuing assets and/or asset tokens using zero-knowledge proofs (“ZKPs”). An issuance system may receive a command to issue an asset. The issuance system may determine that issuing the assets would not violate administrator-defined or network-defined rules that may govern the types of assets and/or the quantity of assets that the issuance system may issue. The issuance system may then issue the assets and generate a ZKP corresponding to the issuance and indicating adherence to the rules while concealing information related to the asset token, such as the types of assets and/or quantity of assets. The issuance system may publish the ZKP to a blockchain so that verifier nodes may confirm that the issuance system adhered to the rules while still preventing access to the underlying issuance information.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for performing transactions or atomic swaps using zero-knowledge proofs (“ZKPs”). A first system may propose a transaction between with a second system. The first system may generate a first ZKP indicating that the first system has possession of an asset desired by the second system and that the first system is committing the asset to the transaction. The second system may also similarly generate a second ZKP. These ZKPs may be encrypted and exchanged. The second system may receive an encrypted version of the first ZKP, perform a decryption using a key specific to the second system, and verify the ZKP. When the parties verify the ZKPs, this confirms that each party has committed the requested asset and that the transaction may proceed. The transaction may be committed to a blockchain.