Abstract: A novel compiler is described. The compiler is able to view source code of the application in its entirety and can do so from the inside. Unlike other tools which examine the forensic data from an application crash after the fact, from the outside, the compiler of the present invention can provide novel data on function call stacks and function profiles during runtime. The application may be stopped immediately during runtime to prevent further or potential damage, but the forensic data that is collected is focused and can be used to show where vulnerabilities exists in the application and how they were exploited. Hashes are taken of function call stacks and used as unique identifiers or thumbprints which can be used to reduce the volume of forensic data that needs to be analyzed after an attack.

Abstract: A novel compiler is described. The compiler is able to view source code of the application in its entirety and can do so from the inside. Unlike other tools which examine the forensic data from an application crash after the fact, from the outside, the compiler of the present invention can provide novel data on function call stacks and function profiles during runtime. The application may be stopped immediately during runtime to prevent further or potential damage, but the forensic data that is collected is focused and can be used to show where vulnerabilities exists in the application and how they were exploited. Hashes are taken of function call stacks and used as unique identifiers or thumbprints which can be used to reduce the volume of forensic data that needs to be analyzed after an attack.

Abstract: A novel compiler is described. The compiler is able to view source code of the application in its entirety and can do so from the inside. Unlike other tools which examine the forensic data from an application crash after the fact, from the outside, the compiler of the present invention can provide novel data on function call stacks and function profiles during runtime. The application may be stopped immediately during runtime to prevent further or potential damage, but the forensic data that is collected is focused and can be used to show where vulnerabilities exists in the application and how they were exploited. Hashes are taken of function call stacks and used as unique identifiers or thumbprints which can be used to reduce the volume of forensic data that needs to be analyzed after an attack.

Abstract: A novel compiler is described. The compiler is able to view source code of the application in its entirety and can do so from the inside. Unlike other tools which examine the forensic data from an application crash after the fact, from the outside, the compiler of the present invention can provide novel data on function call stacks and function profiles during runtime. The application may be stopped immediately during runtime to prevent further or potential damage, but the forensic data that is collected is focused and can be used to show where vulnerabilities exists in the application and how they were exploited. Hashes are taken of function call stacks and used as unique identifiers or thumbprints which can be used to reduce the volume of forensic data that needs to be analyzed after an attack.

Abstract: A network connection between an app on a mobile device and a remote server is either enabled or denied based on whether a security wrapped app can verify that the connection is with a known and trusted server. The wrapped app uses a socket interception layer injected into the app code along with a trust store, also part of the wrapped app to determine whether a network connection attempted by the app should be allowed. The layer buffers relevant function calls from the app by intercepting them before they reach the device operating system. If the layer determines that a network connection is attempted, then it snoops the negotiation phase data stream to discern when the server sends a certificate to the app. It obtains this certificate and compares it to data in the trust store and makes a determination of whether the server is known and trusted.

Abstract: A VPN gateway device is able to assign, manage, and terminate a large volume of connections from apps executing on devices, enabling a large scale per-app VPN mobile environment. When a mobile device user opens an app on a mobile device, a VPN gateway transmits a unique IP address to the app. The gateway also transmits an app federation cookie to the app. The app shares the app federation cookie with a second app. The VPN gateway then assigns the second app the same unique IP address. The gateway then transmits a range of ports to the first app. The app uses a port in the range of ports for data transmission from the device to the VPN gateway. The gateway receives a data transmission from the first app via a VPN and determines that the data transmission originated from the first app based on the source port.

Abstract: A VPN gateway device is able to assign, manage, and terminate a large volume of connections from apps executing on devices, enabling a large scale per-app VPN mobile environment. When a mobile device user opens an app on a mobile device, a VPN gateway transmits a unique IP address to the app. The gateway also transmits an app federation cookie to the app. The app shares the app federation cookie with a second app. The VPN gateway then assigns the second app the same unique IP address. The gateway then transmits a range of ports to the first app. The app uses a port in the range of ports for data transmission from the device to the VPN gateway. The gateway receives a data transmission from the first app via a VPN and determines that the data transmission originated from the first app based on the source port.

Abstract: A network connection between an app on a mobile device and a remote server is either enabled or denied based on whether a security wrapped app can verify that the connection is with a known and trusted server. The wrapped app uses a socket interception layer injected into the app code along with a trust store, also part of the wrapped app to determine whether a network connection attempted by the app should be allowed. The layer buffers relevant function calls from the app by intercepting them before they reach the device operating system. If the layer determines that a network connection is attempted, then it snoops the negotiation phase data stream to discern when the server sends a certificate to the app. It obtains this certificate and compares it to data in the trust store and makes a determination of whether the server is known and trusted.