Abstract: The disclosure concerns a method implemented by a processing device. The method includes performing a first execution by the processing device of a computing function based on one or more initial parameters stored in a first memory device. The execution of the computing function generates one or more modified values of at least one of the initial parameters, wherein during the first execution the one or more initial parameters are read from the first memory device and the one or more modified values are stored in a second memory device. The method also includes performing a second execution by the processing device of the computing function based on the one or more initial parameters stored in the first memory device.

Abstract: The component comprises a first memory (MM) comprising a first portion (P1) having a content modified with a first modification entity (K1) and a second portion (P2) having a content modified with a second entity (K2), a storage means (MS) configured to store the first entity (K1) secretly, a non-volatile memory (NVM) storing an item of entity information representative of the second entity (K2) in a location (END) designated by a first indication (INDK2) contained in the said first portion of the first memory.

Abstract: The disclosure concerns a method implemented by a processing device. The method includes performing a first execution by the processing device of a computing function based on one or more initial parameters stored in a first memory device. The execution of the computing function generates one or more modified values of at least one of the initial parameters, wherein during the first execution the one or more initial parameters are read from the first memory device and the one or more modified values are stored in a second memory device. The method also includes performing a second execution by the processing device of the computing function based on the one or more initial parameters stored in the first memory device.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a countermeasure method in an electronic microcircuit, comprising successive process phases executed by a circuit of the microcircuit, and adjusting a power supply voltage between power supply and ground terminals of the circuit, as a function of a random value generated for the process phase, at each process phase executed by the circuit.

Abstract: An electric charge flow element including, on an insulating support, a stack of a first electrode, of a dielectric layer having at least one portion capable of letting charges flow by tunnel effect, and of a second electrode, wherein at least one of the electrodes is made of undoped polysilicon.

Abstract: A device for detecting a laser attack made on an integrated circuit chip comprises a bipolar transistor of a first type formed in a semiconductor substrate, that bipolar transistor comprising a parasitic bipolar transistor of a second type. A buried region, forming the base of the parasitic bipolar transistor, operates as a detector of the variations in current flowing caused by impingement of laser light on the substrate.

Abstract: A device for detecting a laser attack made on an integrated circuit chip comprises a bipolar transistor of a first type formed in a semiconductor substrate, that bipolar transistor comprising a parasitic bipolar transistor of a second type. A buried region, forming the base of the parasitic bipolar transistor, operates as a detector of the variations in current flowing caused by impingement of laser light on the substrate.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a countermeasure method in an electronic microcircuit, comprising successive process phases executed by a circuit of the microcircuit, and adjusting a power supply voltage between power supply and ground terminals of the circuit, as a function of a random value generated for the process phase, at each process phase executed by the circuit.

Abstract: A device for detecting a laser attack in an integrated circuit chip formed in the upper P-type portion of a semiconductor substrate incorporating an NPN bipolar transistor having an N-type buried layer, including a detector of the variations of the current flowing between the base of said NPN bipolar transistor and the substrate.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a countermeasure method in an electronic microcircuit, comprising successive process phases executed by a circuit of the microcircuit, and adjusting a power supply voltage between power supply and ground terminals of the circuit, as a function of a random value generated for the process phase, at each process phase executed by the circuit.

Abstract: An integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including: in the upper portion of the substrate, an active portion in which components are formed; and under the active portion and at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 ?m from the upper surface of the substrate, an area comprising sites for gettering metal impurities and containing metal atoms at a concentration ranging between 1017 and 1018 atoms/cm3.

Abstract: A method for protecting a key implemented, by an electronic circuit, in a symmetrical algorithm for ciphering or deciphering a message, including the steps of: selecting in non-deterministic fashion a pair of different masks from a set of at least four different masks, the masks having the property of representing different bit combinations, at least by pairs of bits; executing the algorithm twice by applying, to the key or to the message, one of the masks of the selected pair at each execution; checking the consistency between the two executions.

Abstract: The current signature of an electronic function is masked by controlling a current source that supplies power for the electronic function is controlled in a dynamically-varying manner. Excess current is detected and compared to a threshold. If the detected excess current meets the threshold, the operation of the electronic function is modified, for example by controlling a clock.

Abstract: A method for protecting an integrated circuit. According to the method, the start-up of all, or part, of the circuit is determined in the presence of a key which is recorded in a non-volatile manner in the circuit, following the production thereof, and depends on at least one first parameter which is present in a non-volatile manner in the circuit after the production thereof.

Abstract: A method of extraction of a key from a physical unclonable function using the states of cells of a volatile memory after a powering on, wherein: cells are read according to addresses stored in a non-volatile memory; an error-correction code corrects the read states; and, in case an error has been corrected, the address of the cell providing an erroneous state is replaced in the non-volatile memory with that of another cell providing the non-erroneous state.

Abstract: An electric charge flow element including, on an insulating support, a stack of a first electrode, of a dielectric layer having at least one portion capable of letting charges flow by tunnel effect, and of a second electrode, wherein at least one of the electrodes is made of undoped polysilicon.

Abstract: An integrated circuit including a substrate of a semiconductor material and first metal portions of a first metallization level or of a first via level defining pixels of an image. The pixels are distributed in first pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is connected to the substrate, and in second pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is separated from the substrate by at least one insulating portion.

Abstract: A method for detecting an attack in an electronic microcircuit comprises: forming the microcircuit in a substrate, forming in the substrate a first well electrically isolated from the substrate, by a second well and an embedded well, forming in the first and second wells a data processing circuit comprising a ground terminal formed in the first well and a power supply terminal formed in the second well, and activating a detection signal when a voltage at the ground or power supply terminal of the data processing circuit crosses a threshold voltage.

Abstract: A method for protecting a key used, by an electronic circuit, in a symmetrical algorithm for ciphering or deciphering a message, including the steps of complementing to one the key and the message; executing the algorithm twice, respectively with the key and the message and with the key and the message complemented to one, the selection between that of the executions which processes the key and the message and that which processes the key and the message complemented to one being random; and checking the consistency between the two executions.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a method of fabricating an integrated circuit on a semiconductor chip, the method comprising: designing an architecture of the integrated circuit comprising at least first and second standard cells implementing a same basic function; designing for the standard cell at least first and second cell layouts presenting random differences; designing an integrated circuit layout corresponding to the integrated circuit architecture; fabricating the integrated circuit according to the integrated circuit layout; using the first cell layout to implement the first standard cell in the integrated circuit layout; and using the second cell layout to implement the second standard cell in the integrated circuit layout. The method can be used for protection of an integrated circuit against reverse engineering.