Abstract: Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

Abstract: Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

Abstract: Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

Abstract: Techniques and tools for quantum key distribution (“QKD”) between a quantum communication (“QC”) card, base station and trusted authority are described herein. In example implementations, a QC card contains a miniaturized QC transmitter and couples with a base station. The base station provides a network connection with the trusted authority and can also provide electric power to the QC card. When coupled to the base station, after authentication by the trusted authority, the QC card acquires keys through QKD with a trust authority. The keys can be used to set up secure communication, for authentication, for access control, or for other purposes. The QC card can be implemented as part of a smart phone or other mobile computing device, or the QC card can be used as a fillgun for distribution of the keys.

Abstract: Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

Abstract: Techniques and tools for quantum key distribution (“QKD”) between a quantum communication (“QC”) card, base station and trusted authority are described herein. In example implementations, a QC card contains a miniaturized QC transmitter and couples with a base station. The base station provides a network connection with the trusted authority and can also provide electric power to the QC card. When coupled to the base station, after authentication by the trusted authority, the QC card acquires keys through QKD with a trust authority. The keys can be used to set up secure communication, for authentication, for access control, or for other purposes. The QC card can be implemented as part of a smart phone or other mobile computing device, or the QC card can be used as a fillgun for distribution of the keys.

Abstract: Techniques and tools for quantum key distribution (“QKD”) between a quantum communication (“QC”) card, base station and trusted authority are described herein. In example implementations, a QC card contains a miniaturized QC transmitter and couples with a base station. The base station provides a network connection with the trusted authority and can also provide electric power to the QC card. When coupled to the base station, after authentication by the trusted authority, the QC card acquires keys through QKD with a trusted authority. The keys can be used to set up secure communication, for authentication, for access control, or for other purposes. The QC card can be implemented as part of a smart phone or other mobile computing device, or the QC card can be used as a fillgun for distribution of the keys.

Abstract: Techniques and tools for quantum key distribution (“QKD”) between a quantum communication (“QC”) card, base station and trusted authority are described herein. In example implementations, a QC card contains a miniaturized QC transmitter and couples with a base station. The base station provides a network connection with the trusted authority and can also provide electric power to the QC card. When coupled to the base station, after authentication by the trusted authority, the QC card acquires keys through QKD with a trusted authority. The keys can be used to set up secure communication, for authentication, for access control, or for other purposes. The QC card can be implemented as part of a smart phone or other mobile computing device, or the QC card can be used as a fillgun for distribution of the keys.