Abstract: Public key security control (PKSC) is provided for a cryptographic module by means of digitally signed communications between the module and one or more authorities with whom it interacts. Authorities interact with the crypto module by means of unsigned queries seeking nonsecret information or signed commands for performing specified operations. Each command signed by an authority also contains a transaction sequence number (TSN), which must match a corresponding number stored by the crypto module for the authority. The TSN for each authority is initially generated randomly and is incremented for each command accepted from that authority. A signature requirement array (SRA) controls the number of signatures required to validate each command type. Upon receiving a signed command from one or more authorities, the SRA is examined to determine whether a required number of authorities permitted to sign the command have signed the command for each signature requirement specification defined for that command type.

Abstract: Public key security control (PKSC) is provided for a cryptographic module by means of digitally signed communications between the module and one or authorities with whom it interacts. Authorities interact with the crypto module by means of unsigned queries seeking nonsecret information or signed commands for performing specified operations. Each command signed by an authority also contains a transaction sequence number (TSN), which must match a corresponding number stored by the crypto module for the authority. The TSN for each authority is initially generated randomly and is incremented for each command accepted from that authority. A signature requirement array (SRA) controls the number of signatures required to validate each command type. Upon receiving a signed command from one or more authorities, the SRA is examined to determine whether a required number of authorities permitted to sign the command have signed the command for each signature requirement specification defined for that command type.

Abstract: Public key security control (PKSC) is provided for a cryptographic module by means of digitally signed communications between the module and one or authorities with whom it interacts. Authorities interact with the crypto module by means of unsigned queries seeking nonsecret information or signed commands for performing specified operations. Each command signed by an authority also contains a transaction sequence number (TSN), which must match a corresponding number stored by the crypto module for the authority. The TSN for each authority is initially generated randomly and is incremented for each command accepted from that authority. A signature requirement array (SRA) controls the number of signatures required to validate each command type. Upon receiving a signed command from one or more authorities, the SRA is examined to determine whether a required number of authorities permitted to sign the command have signed the command for each signature requirement specification defined for that command type.

Abstract: The capabilities of a cryptographic module are controlled by a crypto configuration control (CCC) register that is initialized by one or more self-signed commands that are preformulated and signed with the digital signature key of the crypto module itself. The crypto module accepts a self-signed command only if the self-signature can be validated using the signature verification key of the module. In one implementation, the final configuration is determined by a single self-signed command. In another implementation, a first self-signed command is used to create an temporary configuration that allows one or more initialization authorities to issue additional commands fixing the final configuration. The self-signed commands are maintained separately from the crypto module and are distributed to the end user either physically or electronically.

Abstract: A system and method for dispatching logical central processing units (CPUs) among physical CPUs in a multiprocessor computer system having multiple logical partitions, wherein the cryptographic facilities may not be interchangeable. According to the present invention, the logical CPUs are dispatched among the physical CPUs according to either an affinity, floating, or disabled scheduling method. The affinity scheduling method is used when the crypto facilities are not interchangeable or when non-interchangeable crypto functions are performed. The floating scheduling method is used when the cryptographic facilities are interchangeable and interchangeable crypto functions are performed. The disabled scheduling method is used when the logical CPU is not authorized to issue cryptographic instructions.

Abstract: A facility for making dynamic changes to a system master key without stopping the system, and without loss of integrity to ongoing cryptographic operations. A version number is generated and associated with the current master key. A dynamic change is made to the master key, resulting in the then current master key becoming the old master key, and a "new" current master key (with a new version number) being placed into operation. Subsequent cryptographic requests using a supplied key enciphered under the old master key are identified by means of a supplied version number associated with the supplied key. This identification triggers a reencipher operation, reenciphering the supplied key under the now current master key--after which the cryptographic operation proceeds. Unique patterns are generated to verify the contents of the master key registers, and to authorize normal use of the cryptographic facility, and issuers of key-change operations.