Abstract: In embodiments, a method is provided for duplicating a user private key to multiple user devices so that websites and services don't need a separate public key for each user device. A Duplication Service is authorized by the user to cause the creation of the initial user private key in a user device. The Duplication Service associates the key's properties with a set of policies (e.g., using a TPM key template) that allow and restrict duplication. The process protects the user's private key from exposure to the Duplication Service with a user secret entered at a second user device to decrypt the duplicated key.

Abstract: One embodiment provides a client device. The client device includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM includes a secure controller to extend a secure hash digest with at least a portion of a data stream or a hash of the at least a portion of the data stream. Another embodiment provides a server system. The server system includes verifier logic. The verifier logic is to verify that an attestation identity key (AIK) public key associated with a received Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote corresponds to an authenticated client device.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a method includes determining a location of a system responsive to location information received from at least one of a location sensor and a wireless device of the system, associating the location with a key present in the system to generate an authenticated location of the system, and determining whether the authenticated location is within a geofence boundary indicated in a location portion of a launch control policy (LCP) that provides a geographic-specific policy. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: One embodiment provides a client device. The client device includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM includes a secure controller to extend a secure hash digest with at least a portion of a data stream or a hash of the at least a portion of the data stream. Another embodiment provides a server system. The server system includes verifier logic. The verifier logic is to verify that an attestation identity key (AIK) public key associated with a received Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote corresponds to an authenticated client device.

Abstract: One embodiment provides a client device. The client device includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM includes a secure controller to extend a secure hash digest with at least a portion of a data stream or a hash of the at least a portion of the data stream. Another embodiment provides a server system. The server system includes verifier logic. The verifier logic is to verify that an attestation identity key (AIK) public key associated with a received Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote corresponds to an authenticated client device.

Abstract: An apparatus and method are described for implementing a trusted dynamic launch and trusted platform module (TPM) using a secure enclave. For example, a computer-implemented method according to one embodiment of the invention comprises: initializing a secure enclave in response to a first command, the secure enclave comprising a trusted software execution environment which prevents software executing outside the enclave from having access to software and data inside the enclave; and executing a trusted platform module (TPM) from within the secure enclave, the trusted platform module securely reading data from a set of platform control registers (PCR) in a processor or chipset component into a memory region allocated to the secure enclave.

Abstract: In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying a master processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the master processor if the master processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example.

Abstract: In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying a master processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the master processor if the master processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a processor includes at least one core, a power management unit having a first test register including a first field to store a test patch identifier associated with a test patch and a second field to store a test mode indicator to request a core functionality test, and a microcode storage to store microcode to be executed by the at least one core. Responsive to the test patch identifier, the microcode may access a firmware interface table and obtain the test patch from a non-volatile storage according to an address obtained from the firmware interface table. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: One embodiment provides a client device. The client device includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM includes a secure controller to extend a secure hash digest with at least a portion of a data stream or a hash of the at least a portion of the data stream. Another embodiment provides a server system. The server system includes verifier logic. The verifier logic is to verify that an attestation identity key (AIK) public key associated with a received Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote corresponds to an authenticated client device.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a processor includes at least one core, a power management unit having a first test register including a first field to store a test patch identifier associated with a test patch and a second field to store a test mode indicator to request a core functionality test, and a microcode storage to store microcode to be executed by the at least one core. Responsive to the test patch identifier, the microcode may access a firmware interface table and obtain the test patch from a non-volatile storage according to an address obtained from the firmware interface table. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying a master processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the master processor if the master processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example.

Abstract: In an embodiment, at least one computer readable medium has instructions stored thereon for causing a system to cryptographically sign, at a secure platform services enclave (PSE) of a computing system and using a secure attestation key (SGX AK), a public portion of a trusted platform module attestation key (TPM AK) associated with a trusted computing base of a physical platform, to form a certified TPM AK public portion. Also included are instructions to store the certified TPM AK public portion in the PSE, and instructions to, responsive to an attestation request received from a requester at a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) associated with a virtual machine (VM) that has migrated onto the physical platform, provide to the requester the certified TPM AK public portion stored in the PSE. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a method includes determining a location of a system responsive to location information received from at least one of a location sensor and a wireless device of the system, associating the location with a key present in the system to generate an authenticated location of the system, and determining whether the authenticated location is within a geofence boundary indicated in a location portion of a launch control policy (LCP) that provides a geographic-specific policy. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: An embodiment includes an apparatus comprising: an out-of-band cryptoprocessor including secure non-volatile storage that couples to a root index, having a fixed address, and comprises first and second variables referenced by the root index; and semiconductor integrated code (SIC) including embedded processor logic to initialize a processor and embedded memory logic to initialize a memory coupled to the processor; wherein (a) the SIC is to be executed responsive to resetting the processor and prior to providing control to boot code, and (b) the SIC is to perform pre-boot operations in response to accessing at least one of the first and second variables. Other embodiments are described herein.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a method includes determining a location of a system responsive to location information received from at least one of a location sensor and a wireless device of the system, associating the location with a key present in the system to generate an authenticated location of the system, and determining whether the authenticated location is within a geofence boundary indicated in a location portion of a launch control policy (LCP) that provides a geographic-specific policy. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: In an embodiment, at least one computer readable medium has instructions stored thereon for causing a system to cryptographically sign, at a secure platform services enclave (PSE) of a computing system and using a secure attestation key (SGX AK), a public portion of a trusted platform module attestation key (TPM AK) associated with a trusted computing base of a physical platform, to form a certified TPM AK public portion. Also included are instructions to store the certified TPM AK public portion in the PSE, and instructions to, responsive to an attestation request received from a requester at a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) associated with a virtual machine (VM) that has migrated onto the physical platform, provide to the requester the certified TPM AK public portion stored in the PSE. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments of apparatuses and methods for using a trusted platform module for boot policy and secure firmware are disclosed. In one embodiment, a trusted platform module includes a non-volatile memory, a port, and a mapping structure. The port is to receive an input/output transaction from a serial bus. The transaction includes a system memory address in the address space of a processor. The mapping structure is to map the system memory address to a first location in non-volatile memory.

Abstract: In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying a master processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the master processor if the master processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a processor can enforce a blacklist and validate, according to a multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol, a device coupled to the processor. Such enforcement may prevent the device from accessing one or more resources of a system prior to the validation. The blacklist may include a list of devices that have not been validated according to the multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol. Other embodiments are described and claimed.