Abstract: In general, some embodiments described herein relate to using agile or dynamic addresses for multicasting that may be difficult or impossible for a malicious actor to predict. Such agile addresses may prevent a malicious actor from attacking a single static multicast address and may prevent the architecture of the multicast network from propagating the attack. Data sent to invalid (e.g., expired, revoked, and/or otherwise depreciated addresses) can be filtered out and dropped from the network. For example, a first group key associated with a first time period can be calculated based on a first shared secret and a second group key associated with a second time period can be calculated based on a second shared secret. At any given time at least one group key can be an accepted group key. When a multicast address includes a currently accepted group key, the data can be sent to a group.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein relate to a method that can include receiving, at a first time, first data for routing to a group. The first data can be sent to the group via a first multicast address that is based, at least in part, on a first key associated with a first time period and derived from a first shared secret. At a second time, second data for routing to the group can be received. The second data can be sent to the group via a second multicast address that is different from the first multicast address. The second multicast address can be based, at least in part, on a second key associated with a second time period and derived from a second shared secret.