Abstract: A radio transmitter adjusts its radio frequency (RF) fingerprint to defeat RF fingerprinting identification without destroying the content of its transmissions. The radio transmitter comprises a frequency-upconverter configured to upconvert a baseband or intermediate-frequency signal to an RF signal, and an amplifier to amplify the RF signal to produce a transmission signal. An RF fingerprint control circuit changes the non-linear behavior of the frequency-upconverter or the amplifier in order to change the RF fingerprint. The transmitter may create RF fingerprint “personalities” to be paired with different radio protocol behaviors and subscriber terminal identification codes (e.g., MAC addresses or SMSIs) for generating different radio identities.

Abstract: In a computer network that has a plurality of nodes, a measure of trustworthiness for a particular node can be updated by other nodes that monitor the particular node's behavior. This includes collecting trustworthiness reports from the other nodes; updating the particular node's trustworthiness level based on the reports; and causing the particular node to route data in the computer network based on its trustworthiness level. The particular node's role in performing at least one of a set of functions is based on a hierarchy of trustworthiness levels, wherein the functions can include monitoring other nodes; sending alerts when anomalous behavior is detected; transmitting a free-antibody software program to a requesting node; updating defensive programs; participating in consensus-based threat analysis with other nodes; identifying threats; tagging suspicious nodes; and performing countermeasures against identified threats.

Abstract: A network node in a distributed network employs a surface immunoglobulin program to monitor other nodes in the distributed network and generate an alert upon detecting a suspicious activity; and pushes a free-antibody program to a requesting node petitioning to access the distributed network. The free-antibody program can comprise a software agent that monitors the requesting node. The free-antibody program reports detected malware and/or suspicious activity to the surface immunoglobulin program, which can enact countermeasures against the requesting node. The network node's role is based on a hierarchy of trustworthiness levels, its role comprising at least one of monitoring other nodes, sending alerts when anomalous behavior is detected, transmitting the free-antibody software program to the requesting node, updating defensive programs, participating in consensus-based threat analysis with other nodes, identifying threats, tagging suspicious nodes, and performing countermeasures against identified threats.

Abstract: A network node in a distributed network employs a surface immunoglobulin system configured to monitor other nodes in the distributed network and generate an alert upon detecting a suspicious activity; and a free-antibody system configured to push a free-antibody program to a requesting node petitioning to access the distributed network. The free-antibody program is configured to communicatively couple to the surface immunoglobulin system while monitoring behavior of the requesting node. The free-antibody program reports detected malware and/or suspicious activity to the surface immunoglobulin system, which can enact countermeasures against the requesting node.

Abstract: A first node in a wireless network retransmits a data signal. The node employs a precoder that generates transmit power values from a message to be transmitted and precodes the data signal with the transmit power values before the data signal is retransmitted. A second node receives the retransmitted signal. The second node uses a reference signal processor configured to determine the data signal and a decoder configured to remove the data signal from the received signal. The power values are estimated and processed to decode the information therefrom.

Abstract: In a wireless communication system, a secure communication link is provided by selecting a decoy data signal vector for transmission, generating a MIMO precoding matrix from a message to be sent; and multiplying the decoy data signal vector by the MIMO precoding matrix to construct a precoded signal vector. The MIMO precoding matrix produces information-bearing synthesized channel distortions in the transmitted signal. An undistorted version of the decoy data may be transmitted to an intended receiver. The receiver distinguishes between the synthesized information-bearing channel distortions and natural channel distortions to decrypt the information, while an eavesdropper would find it difficult to distinguish between natural and synthesized channel distortions in the signals it receives.

Abstract: A radio transmitter adjusts the spectral, amplitude, and/or phase characteristics of its transmissions to defeat radio fingerprinting identification without destroying the content of the transmissions. The transmitter determines a threshold of signal distortion that impedes RF fingerprint identification while providing an acceptable amount of degradation to data transmissions and then synthesizes a distortion of its unique RF fingerprint to impede identification. The transmitter may create RF fingerprint “personalities” to be paired with different radio protocol behaviors and subscriber terminal identification codes (e.g., MAC addresses or SMSIs) for generating different radio identities.

Abstract: A transmitter is configured to change its unique radio signature enough to defeat radio fingerprinting identification without destroying the content of the transmissions. The transmitter may be configured for defeating both transient-signal fingerprinting and steady-state fingerprinting. The transmitter may be configured to obfuscate transient detection. The transmitter may continuously vary spectral, amplitude, and/or phase characteristics of its transmissions to defeat radio fingerprinting. The transmitter may pair radio fingerprints with subscriber terminal identification codes (e.g., MAC addresses or SMSIs) for generating different radio identities. The transmitter may measure another transmitter's radio fingerprint, and, compensating for its own radio fingerprint, spoof the measured radio fingerprint.

Abstract: A network node in a distributed network comprises a surface immunoglobulin system configured to monitor other nodes in the distributed network and generate an alert upon detecting a suspicious activity; and a free-antibody system configured to push a free-antibody program to a requesting node petitioning to access the distributed network. The free-antibody program can comprise a software agent configured to communicatively couple to the surface immunoglobulin system while monitoring behavior of the requesting node. The free-antibody program reports detected malware and/or suspicious activity to the surface immunoglobulin system, which can enact countermeasures against the requesting node.

Abstract: A system detects unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and deploys electronic countermeasures against one or more UAVs that are determined to be a threat. A signal detector detects radio signals communicated between a remote control unit and UAV. A feature extractor extracts signal features from the detected radio signals, and a classifier processes the detected radio signals based on its signal features and determines whether the detected radio signals correspond to a known or unknown radio protocol. A threat analyzer determines if a detected UAV is a threat based on at least one of remote-sensing data and classification(s) of the detected radio signals. When a UAV system employs an unknown radio protocol, a mitigation engine synthesizes an exploit based on corresponding extracted signal features. A response analyzer detects a response from the UAV system when an exploit is activated and may adapt the exploit based on the response. In some cases, the exploits can be configured against a UAV in autopilot mode.

Abstract: A transmitter is configured to change its unique radio signature enough to defeat radio fingerprinting identification without destroying the content of the transmissions. The transmitter may be configured for defeating both transient-signal fingerprinting and steady-state fingerprinting. The transmitter may be configured to obfuscate transient detection. The transmitter may continuously vary spectral, amplitude, and/or phase characteristics of its transmissions to defeat radio fingerprinting. The transmitter may pair radio fingerprints with subscriber terminal identification codes (e.g., MAC addresses or SMSIs) for generating different radio identities. The transmitter may measure another transmitter's radio fingerprint, and, compensating for its own radio fingerprint, spoof the measured radio fingerprint.

Abstract: In a wireless communication system, a secure communication link is provided by selecting a decoy data signal for transmission, generating a precoding matrix from a message to be sent; and multiplying the decoy data signal by the precoding matrix to produce a precoded signal. A clean version of the decoy data may be transmitted to an intended receiver. The receiver can distinguish between the information-bearing precoding and the natural random channel distortions of the transmission medium to decrypt the information, while an eavesdropper would find it difficult to distinguish between the natural channel distortions and information-bearing precoding in the signals it receives.

Abstract: In a wireless communication system, a secure communication link is provided by selecting a decoy data signal vector for transmission, generating a MIMO precoding matrix from a message to be sent; and multiplying the decoy data signal vector by the MIMO precoding matrix to construct a precoded signal vector. The MIMO precoding matrix produces information-bearing synthesized channel distortions in the transmitted signal. An undistorted version of the decoy data may be transmitted to an intended receiver. The receiver distinguishes between the synthesized information-bearing channel distortions and natural channel distortions to decrypt the information, while an eavesdropper would find it difficult to distinguish between natural and synthesized channel distortions in the signals it receives.

Abstract: A node in a first network requests a communication channel from a second network. Upon receiving a channel assignment, nodes in the first network employ the assigned channel for communicating in a manner that is transparent to the second network. A transmitting node selects a decoy data signal as a carrier signal, synthesizes data-bearing channel distortions; and distorts the carrier signal with the channel distortions prior to transmission. An undistorted version of the decoy data may be transmitted to an intended receiver. The receiver distinguishes between the synthesized data-bearing channel distortions and natural channel distortions to decrypt the data. In a MIMO system, the transmitter generates a MIMO precoding matrix from a message to be sent to the receiver and multiplies the decoy data signal vector with the MIMO precoding matrix.

Abstract: In a wireless sensor network, a local wireless network serves a plurality of sensor nodes. The local wireless network is reconfigurable for accepting a mobile computing device. The mobile computing device comprises a wireless network interface, such as a dongle, and is configured for selecting a set of sensor nodes for communications. The sensor network, a gateway, or a remote computing device may select the set of sensor nodes for communicating with the mobile computing device. A dongle may be provided for coupling the mobile computing device to the local wireless network. The dongle comprises a configuration unit for interfacing the mobile computing device with the local wireless network, an identification unit for storing user data used for user authentication, and a protection module for providing secure network access.

Abstract: Ad-hoc networks employing cooperative signal processing are configured for detecting, identifying, and visualizing radio communication networks used by an adversary, such as enemy combatants or criminals. These networks are further configured for performing a non-passive tactical response to an adversary's communication capabilities. Such ad-hoc networks are particularly useful for identifying radio communication resources, establishing radio links, and subverting an adversary's communication capabilities in environments lacking available communication infrastructure, including battlefield environments, and locations where communication infrastructure is non-existent or has been compromised by natural disasters or terrorists attacks.