Abstract: Systems and methods for encryption/decryption based on liveness-verified biometric data that cannot be stolen/spoofed. In various embodiments, the disclosed systems and methods facilitate encryption/decryption of data through controlling access to keys via liveness-verified biometric data. Liveness-verified biometric data may, in various embodiments, be derived from facial features, fingerprints, voice recognition, DNA, etc. Generally, if the liveness and identity of the requesting individual cannot be verified, then the individual will not be permitted to encrypt/decrypt data using the disclosed systems and methods.

Abstract: A system for biometric enrollment can include a server including a processor configured to receive an uncovered face image of a subject. The processor can generate a first fixed-size representation (FXR) based on the uncovered face image and a covered face image based on the uncovered face image. The processor can generate a second FXR based on the covered face image. The processor can enroll the subject associated with the uncovered face image by storing the first FXR and the second FXR in a data store.

Abstract: Systems and methods for enhanced hash transforms are disclosed. In particular embodiments, biometric data is concatenated with non-biometric data for generating a fixed-sized vector, and furthermore performing various permutations and projections on the vector. The resulting vector may be stored in a registry, and a corresponding key may be generated and provided to the user associated with the biometric data. The hash transformation may be a lossy process, such that the resulting hash includes less bytes than the initial biometric data, and a hash reversal fails to generate an exact copy of the original biometric data.

Abstract: Systems and processes for improved processing of biometric data may include a hash controller including a processor, a server, and a registry. The hash controller can receive biometric information, such as a biometric scan, and apply an EGH transformation to convert the biometric information into an irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable EgHash. The EGH transformation can include blending biometric information with non-biometric information and permuting the biometric representation for additional security. The permuted biometric representation can be projected based on a randomly generated matrix and the output permuted to obtain an EgHash. The resultant EgHash can be lossy such that the EGH transform causes an irreversible loss of biometric information between the original biometric information and the EgHash. The EgHash can be compared and retrieved at speed and scale by the processor to support operations including, but not limited to, verification, identification, and database deduplication.

Abstract: Systems and processes for improved processing of biometric data may include a hash controller including a processor, a server, and a registry. The hash controller can receive biometric information, such as a biometric scan, and apply an EGH transformation to convert the biometric information into an irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable EgHash. The EGH transformation can include blending biometric information with non-biometric information and permuting the biometric representation for additional security. The permuted biometric representation can be projected based on a randomly generated matrix and the output permuted to obtain an EgHash. The resultant EgHash can be lossy such that the EGH transform causes an irreversible loss of biometric information between the original biometric information and the EgHash. The EgHash can be compared and retrieved at speed and scale by the processor to support operations including, but not limited to, verification, identification, and database deduplication.

Abstract: Systems and processes for improved processing of biometric data may include a hash controller including a processor, a server, and a registry. The hash controller can receive biometric information, such as a biometric scan, and apply an EGH transformation to convert the biometric information into an irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable EgHash. The EGH transformation can include blending biometric information with non-biometric information and permuting the biometric representation for additional security. The permuted biometric representation can be projected based on a randomly generated matrix and the output permuted to obtain an EgHash. The resultant EgHash can be lossy such that the EGH transform causes an irreversible loss of biometric information between the original biometric information and the EgHash. The EgHash can be compared and retrieved at speed and scale by the processor to support operations including, but not limited to, verification, identification, and database deduplication.

Abstract: Systems and methods for account access/identity verification based on access to a third party account. In various embodiments, the disclosed system facilitates access to a particular account via verification of the identity of the accessing user through control of a third party account. That is, in one embodiment, the system allows a user to access an account if the user can prove that he/she also has access to another account (e.g., via providing a code to the system that was transmitted to the other account).

Abstract: A biometric enrollment system can include a processor and a data store that stores one or more TPS templates and a sample population. The processor can be configured to receive a reference template associated with a subject, generate a cohort set based on a plurality of templates from the sample population, and perform a one-to-many comparison process on the reference template and the cohort set, wherein an output of the one-to-many comparison process comprises one or more cohort vectors. The processor can normalize the one or more cohort vectors to obtain one or more normalized cohort vectors, and can apply a lossy transformation to the one or more normalized cohort vectors. An output of applying the lossy transformation can comprise one or more transformed, privacy-secured (TPS) templates that are stored in the database.

Abstract: A method can include receiving identity data from a computing device. The method can include verifying that the identity data is associated with a live subject. The method can include generating a privacy-secured token based on the identity data. The method can include generating a randomized unique user identifier (RUUI). The method can include storing the privacy-secured token and the RUUI in association at a first registry. The method can include transmitting the RUUI to the computing device. The method can include configuring metadata of a cryptographic asset to include the RUUI. The cryptographic asset may be associated with a second registry, and the second registry may be associated with a blockchain environment.

Abstract: Systems and methods for enhanced hash transforms are disclosed. In particular embodiments, biometric data is concatenated with non-biometric data for generating a fixed-sized vector, and furthermore performing various permutations and projections on the vector. The resulting vector may be stored in a registry, and a corresponding key may be generated and provided to the user associated with the biometric data. The hash transformation may be a lossy process, such that the resulting hash includes less bytes than the initial biometric data, and a hash reversal fails to generate an exact copy of the original biometric data.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: Systems and processes for improved processing of biometric data may include a hash controller including a processor, a server, and a registry. The hash controller can receive biometric information, such as a biometric scan, and apply an EGH transformation to convert the biometric information into an irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable EgHash. The EGH transformation can include blending biometric information with non-biometric information and permuting the biometric representation for additional security. The permuted biometric representation can be projected based on a randomly generated matrix and the output permuted to obtain an EgHash. The resultant EgHash can be lossy such that the EGH transform causes an irreversible loss of biometric information between the original biometric information and the EgHash. The EgHash can be compared and retrieved at speed and scale by the processor to support operations including, but not limited to, verification, identification, and database deduplication.

Abstract: Systems and methods for identity authentication based on liveness-verified biometric data that cannot be stolen/spoofed. In various embodiments, the disclosed systems and methods facilitate access to SaaS platforms, transactions, and/or physical assets via identity authentication based on comparison of liveness-verified biometric data (e.g., data that has been verified as derived from the correct actual live individual to avoid bad actors spoofing the data to gain access—in one embodiment, as one factor in a two factor authentication schema) to pre-verified identity data. Liveness-verified biometric data may, in various embodiments, be derived from facial features, fingerprints, voice recognition, DNA, etc. Generally, if the liveness and identity of the requesting individual cannot be verified, then the individual will not be permitted access.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: The present system may be deployed in various scenarios to provide proof of liveness (also referred to herein as “liveness verification”) of an image without interaction of the subject of the image. The liveness verification process generally comprises imperative analysis and dynamic analysis of the image, after which liveness of the image may be determined.

Abstract: Systems and methods for account access/identity verification based on access to a third party account. In various embodiments, the disclosed system facilitates access to a particular account via verification of the identity of the accessing user through control of a third party account. That is, in one embodiment, the system allows a user to access an account if the user can prove that he/she also has access to another account (e.g., via providing a code to the system that was transmitted to the other account).

Abstract: Systems and methods for encryption/decryption based on liveness-verified biometric data that cannot be stolen/spoofed. In various embodiments, the disclosed systems and methods facilitate encryption/decryption of data through controlling access to keys via liveness-verified biometric data. Liveness-verified biometric data may, in various embodiments, be derived from facial features, fingerprints, voice recognition, DNA, etc. Generally, if the liveness and identity of the requesting individual cannot be verified, then the individual will not be permitted to encrypt/decrypt data using the disclosed systems and methods.