Abstract: A method including: establishing an internal swarm intelligence network including security agent modules of a plurality of interconnected network nodes of a local computer network, collecting data related to the respective network nodes, sharing information based on the collected data in the established internal swarm intelligence network, and using the collected data and information received from the internal swarm intelligence network for generating and adapting models related to the respective network node nodes. In case a new threat is identified, the threat is verified and contained, a new threat model is generated and the generated new threat model is shared. The security alert and/or the generated new threat model is transmitted to a security service network for enabling the security service network to share the received security alert and/or the new threat model.

Abstract: The present disclosure describes a computer-implemented method that includes: populating a metadata shell database with one or more hash values, wherein: each hash value corresponds to a verified installation of a database system, and the metadata shell database is maintained within a locked-down environment on an enterprise network; and monitoring metadata information of one or more database systems on the enterprise network based on periodically accessing metadata information of one or more database systems; and determining whether a database system on the enterprise network has been compromised based on a hash value of the metadata information of the database system and the one or more hash values from the metadata shell database.

Abstract: A method of detecting manipulation of data on a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, and a device performing the method. In an aspect, the method includes detecting manipulation of data on a CAN bus to which the device is connected. The method comprises detecting that bus impedance is below a threshold bus impedance value, detecting whether or not CAN node arbitration currently may occur on the CAN bus upon detecting that the bus impedance is below the threshold bus impedance value, and if not determining that an attempt to manipulate data on the CAN bus has occurred.

Abstract: Techniques to provide visualizations of possible malicious incidents associated with an event on a host device may include causing presentation of graphics of a process or thread in a user interface. Information about detected events may be transmitted to a computing device that generates the visualizations for presentation to an analyst to verify the malicious incidents. Based on patterns and information conveyed in the visualizations, the computer device or host device may take action to protect operation of the host device caused by the event.

Abstract: A network security computing system includes a steganographic communications analysis engine monitoring incoming and outgoing messages on a secure computing network. The steganographic communications analysis engine identifies a pattern of file transfers between a first computing device on the secure computing network and an internal or external message recipient. When a pattern is identified, the steganographic communications analysis engine quarantines an associated computing device from the secure network. The steganographic communications analysis engine analyzes files transferred between the computing device and the recipient for indications of steganographic information and causes display, based on an identified indication of steganography, an indication that the computing device had been compromised by command and control malware.

Abstract: Systems and method of detecting and blocking malicious attacks on a computer network, including: receiving, by a memory constrained gateway in communication with the computer network, a communication request from at least one device, identifying the type of the at least one device based on the received communication request, verifying that the device is of an allowed type from a predetermined list of allowed device types, checking at least one signature of the received communication request of the allowed device to detect malicious signatures, and blocking communication requests from devices with at least one malicious signature.

Abstract: System, device, and method of determining cyber-attack vectors and mitigating cyber-attacks.

Abstract: Embodiments of the present disclosure provide a method and a device for cross-domain strong logically isolation and secure access control in the Internet of Things (IoT). The method includes the following. When one IoT gateway receives the identity authentication request, the IoT gateway sends the identity authentication request to all IoT gateways in the domain excluding that IoT gateway. When all IoT gateways in the domain receive the identity authentication request, all IoT gateways verify separately whether the identity authentication request is legal. After a certain IoT gateway obtains the identity authentication result, a distributed consensus procedure is initiated. The IoT gateways in the domain reach a consensus on the identity authentication result through a distributed consensus mechanism, and the identity authentication result is written and stored to a block of a blockchain.

Abstract: A mechanism for building decentralized computer applications that execute on a distributed computing system. The present technology works within a web browser, client application, or other software and provides access to decentralized computer applications through the browser. The present technology is non-custodial, wherein a public-private key pair, which represents user identity, is created on a client machine and then directly encrypted by a third-party platform without relying on one centralized computing system.

Abstract: Methods, non-transitory computer readable media, network traffic manager apparatuses, and systems that assist with detecting changes to a firmware software components, and configuration parameters includes obtaining an executable file comprising a basic input-output system firmware and software component data of a hardware component at run-time. A hash value for the obtained executable file at the run-time is identified. The identified hash value is compared with a stored hash value associated with the obtained executable file to determine when the obtained executable file is unmodified, wherein the stored hash value was determined at a build time of the hardware component. The obtained executable file of the hardware component is executed when the obtained executable file is determined to be unmodified.

Abstract: A method for controlling application enabling includes receiving from a user an indication of data for sharing and an indication of one or more recipients with which to share the data. A multidimensional zone is determined based on the indication of the data and the indication of the one or more recipients. A request from the user to enable an application via a computing device is detected. Data permission requirements of the application are accessed, and a multidimensional coordinate is determined based on the data permission requirements of the application. The multidimensional zone is compared to the multidimensional coordinate, and the user is notified via the computing device of the comparing of the multidimensional zone to the multidimensional coordinate. An affirmation of the request is received from the user via the computing device, and the application is enabled responsive to the affirmation of the request.

Abstract: A control device includes a controller configured to instruct a mitigation device executing a defending process against an attack on a network to execute the defending process in response to reception of a defending request indicating a request for executing the defending process. When predetermined specific data included in the received defending request is valid, the controller instructs the mitigation device to execute the defending process at an earlier timing after the reception of the defending request than when the specific data is not valid or the specific data is not included in the defending request.

Abstract: An information handling system may include a host system and a management controller configured to provide out-of-band management of the information handling system. The management controller may be configured to: receive, via a management bus of the management controller, a user login request for access to a first user account associated with the management controller; determine a second user account corresponding to the first user account, wherein the second user account is associated with a security policy; and provide the user access to the management controller via the first user account, wherein a privilege level of the provided access is based on a set of privileges associated with the second account.

Abstract: A computer implemented method of protecting a portion of a computer network from malware attack, the computer network including a network connected devices organized into hierarchical subnets modelled by a tree data structure in which each subnet is represented as a node in the tree, each node having a connection to parent node save for a root node, the method including performing protective actions on devices in subnets associated with a first subset of nodes to provide protection against the malware, prioritizing devices in the subnets associated with a second subset of nodes so as to provide a barrier of subnets protected against the malware to impede the propagation of the malware to devices in subnets associated with each of the first subset of nodes.

Abstract: A system includes at least one web server, a storage, and a suspicious access attempt detector. The at least one web server is configured to receive and process a plurality of access attempts from a plurality of user devices over a network, and to provide access attempt information corresponding to the plurality of access attempts to a storage, wherein access attempt information for each respective access attempt comprises an access signature corresponding to the respective access attempt. The suspicious access attempt detector configured to: obtain the access attempt information corresponding to the plurality of access attempts from the storage; analyze the access attempt information corresponding to the plurality of access attempts to detect suspicious access attempts out of the plurality of access attempts, wherein analyzing the access attempt information is based on respective access signatures corresponding to the plurality of access attempts; and output a result of the detection.

Abstract: The present disclosure generally relates to a system and method for defending a utilities system against cyber-physical attacks associated with anomalies in a physical process operative in the utilities system. The defense system comprises: a set of sensors for collecting physical data associated with the physical process; a set of controller devices for monitoring process states of the physical process based on the physical data from the sensors; a set of verification devices for monitoring the physical process based on the physical data from the sensors, the physical data enabling the verification devices to detect the anomalies based on a set of invariants predefined for the physical process; and a set of actuators controllable by the controller devices or verification devices to remedy the anomalies and regulate the physical process, thereby defending the utilities system against the cyber-physical attacks.

Abstract: Lateral movement between networked computers is detected, and automatically and efficiently assessed by a detection tool to distinguish innocent activity from cyberattacks. By correlating log data about logins and network traffic, the detection tool produces network node sets corresponding to individual movements. If a chain can be built from node sets matching an event sequence pattern that tends to be used by attackers, then the detection tool reports the chain as an illicit lateral movement candidate. Detection patterns define illicitness grounds such as consistency of data transfer sizes, shortness of login intervals, use of suspect protocols, chain scope, and the presence or use of administrator credentials. Detection responses may then isolate computers, inspect them for malware or tampering, obtain forensic images for analysis, tighten exfiltration filtering, and otherwise mitigate against ongoing or future cyberattacks.