Abstract: Proxy networks enable a source to send traffic to one or more targets through a set of nodes operating as proxies. However, proxy networks are typically nonselective (often by design), and do not enable a source to specify properties of the nodes selected as proxies to send traffic to the target. Presented herein are proxy network techniques that enable sources to specify node properties in a target request, and that utilize a set of node managers for respective subsets of nodes. For a target request specifying selected node properties, the node managers may select as proxies nodes having the node properties specified in the target request. Additionally, the techniques presented herein promote the flexibility of the proxy network (e.g., adding groups of nodes, expanding the variety of nodes and node properties, and sending various forms of traffic using any protocol to various topics on behalf of many and various sources).

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificate authority may be presented to a client in order to assert a trust level of a certificated item, such as a message or a web page. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificate authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult to determine, particularly for an individual client. Presented herein are techniques for advising clients of the reputations of respective certificate authorities by evaluating the certificates issued by such certificate authorities, such as the number and types of domains certified by the certificate; the number and pattern of certificates issued for the domain; and the certification techniques used to issue the certificates. Such evaluation enables a determination of a certificate authority trust level that may be distributed to the clients in a certificate authority trust set.

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificate authority on behalf of a domain is presented to a client in order to verify the identity of the domain. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificate authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult for an individual client to determine. Presented herein are techniques for advising clients of the trustworthiness of respective certificate authorities by evaluating the certificates issued by such certificate authorities for suspicious indicators, such as hashcode collisions with other certificates and public key re-use.

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificating authority may be presented to a client in order to assert a trust level of a certificated item, such as a message or a web page. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificating authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult to determine, particularly for an individual client. Presented herein are techniques for providing a certificating authority trust service that collects and evaluates certificates submitted to clients by certificating authorities, and advises the clients of a certificating authority trust level for respective certificating authorities (e.g., determined as a consensus of the evaluated certificates issued by the certificating authority).

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificate authority may be presented to a client in order to assert a trust level of a certificated item, such as a message or a web page. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificate authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult to determine, particularly for an individual client. Presented herein are techniques for advising clients of the reputations of respective certificate authorities by evaluating the certificates issued by such certificate authorities, such as the number and types of domains certified by the certificate; the number and pattern of certificates issued for the domain; and the certification techniques used to issue the certificates. Such evaluation enables a determination of a certificate authority trust level that may be distributed to the clients in a certificate authority trust set.

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificate authority on behalf of a domain is presented to a client in order to verify the identity of the domain. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificate authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult for an individual client to determine. Presented herein are techniques for advising clients of the trustworthiness of respective certificate authorities by evaluating the certificates issued by such certificate authorities for suspicious indicators, such as hashcode collisions with other certificates and public key re-use.

Abstract: In many information security scenarios, a certificate issued by a certificating authority may be presented to a client in order to assert a trust level of a certificated item, such as a message or a web page. However, due to a decentralized structure and incomplete coordination among certificating authorities, the presence and exploitation of security vulnerabilities to issue untrustworthy certificates may be difficult to determine, particularly for an individual client. Presented herein are techniques for providing a certificating authority trust service that collects and evaluates certificates submitted to clients by certificating authorities, and advises the clients of a certificating authority trust level for respective certificating authorities (e.g., determined as a consensus of the evaluated certificates issued by the certificating authority).

Abstract: Proxy networks enable a source to send traffic to one or more targets through a set of nodes operating as proxies. However, proxy networks are typically nonselective (often by design), and do not enable a source to specify properties of the nodes selected as proxies to send traffic to the target. Presented herein are proxy network techniques that enable sources to specify node properties in a target request, and that utilize a set of node managers for respective subsets of nodes. For a target request specifying selected node properties, the node managers may select as proxies nodes having the node properties specified in the target request. Additionally, the techniques presented herein promote the flexibility of the proxy network (e.g., adding groups of nodes, expanding the variety of nodes and node properties, and sending various forms of traffic using any protocol to various topics on behalf of many and various sources).