Abstract: A client node (CN) requests content from an access node (AN). Rule set ACR_CN is provided to CN and AN and ACR_AN is used by AN. A request sent by CN in violation of ACR_CN may be blocked and cause AN to block subsequent requests from CN that would be allowed per ACR_CN. A request blocked according to ACR_AN but not ACR_CN is blocked but subsequent requests may still be allowed according to ACR_CN and ACR_AN. Authenticated distribution of the ACR_CN and ACR_AN may be performed in cooperation with a controller using authenticated tokens (AT).

Abstract: A client node (CN) requests content from an access node (AN). Rule set ACR_CN is provided to CN and AN and ACR_AN is used by AN. A request sent by CN in violation of ACR_CN may be blocked and cause AN to block subsequent requests from CN that would be allowed per ACR_CN. A request blocked according to ACR_AN but not ACR_CN is blocked but subsequent requests may still be allowed according to ACR_CN and ACR_AN. Authenticated distribution of the ACR_CN and ACR_AN may be performed in cooperation with a controller using authenticated tokens (AT).

Abstract: A client node (CN) requests content from an access node (AN). Rule set ACR_CN is provided to CN and AN and ACR_AN is used by AN. A request sent by CN in violation of ACR_CN may be blocked and cause AN to block subsequent requests from CN that would be allowed per ACR_CN. A request blocked according to ACR_AN but not ACR_CN is blocked but subsequent requests may still be allowed according to ACR_CN and ACR_AN. Authenticated distribution of the ACR_CN and ACR_AN may be performed in cooperation with a controller using authenticated tokens (AT).

Abstract: A client node (CN) requests content from an access node (AN). Rule set ACR_CN is provided to CN and AN and ACR_AN is used by AN. A request sent by CN in violation of ACR_CN may be blocked and cause AN to block subsequent requests from CN that would be allowed per ACR_CN. A request blocked according to ACR_AN but not ACR_CN is blocked but subsequent requests may still be allowed according to ACR_CN and ACR_AN. Authenticated distribution of the ACR_CN and ACR_AN may be performed in cooperation with a controller using authenticated tokens (AT).

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: A computer system splits data to be transmitted into a plurality of reliable connections which are multiplexed through a smaller number of unacknowledged connections, such as connections that do not require acknowledgment and which may be VPN tunnels. A receiver then demultiplexes data received to obtain data flows over the reliable connections and transmits separate acknowledgements for each reliable connection. The computer system demultiplexes the acknowledgments and provides them to the corresponding reliable connections, which then retransmit any unacknowledged data. Delivery controllers executing on the computer system may be coupled to corresponding controllers executing on the receiver, with traffic between the delivery controllers (payload and acknowledgments) being multiplexed over one or more unacknowledged connections. In some embodiments, acknowledgments may be transmitted over a connection that is not multiplexed over the unacknowledged connections.

Abstract: The present invention concerns a network terminal, and method in a broadband terminal for upgrading a firmware, said terminal comprising an interface to a network and a non volatile memory adapted to store only one version of the firmware, the firmware comprising a first firmware and a second firmware, the method comprising, at the terminal, the step of erasing the first firmware from the non volatile memory, downloading a rescue firmware to the non volatile memory from a server located on the network, the rescue firmware being adapted to allow the terminal to download the firmware from the server, rebooting the terminal with the second firmware and the rescue firmware, downloading a new version of the first and second firmware from the server to the non volatile memory, erasing the rescue firmware from the non volatile memory, and rebooting the terminal with the new version of the first and second firmware.

Abstract: The present invention concerns a network terminal, and method in a broadband terminal for upgrading a firmware, said terminal comprising an interface to a network and a non volatile memory adapted to store only one version of the firmware, the firmware comprising a first firmware and a second firmware, the method comprising, at the terminal, the step of erasing the first firmware from the non volatile memory, downloading a rescue firmware to the non volatile memory from a server located on the network, the rescue firmware being adapted to allow the terminal to download the firmware from the server, rebooting the terminal with the second firmware and the rescue firmware, downloading a new version of the first and second firmware from the server to the non volatile memory, erasing the rescue firmware from the non volatile memory, and rebooting the terminal with the new version of the first and second firmware.