Abstract: Boot integrity of a storage platform is verified by comparing observed boot data values with expected boot data values stored in a secure remote cloud. The boot data values include hashes of software that runs at each stage of a boot sequence, e.g., BIOS, bootloader, kernel, and runlevel programs. The observed boot data values may be provided by a TPM using an AIK and nonce. If the observed boot data values fail to match the expected boot data values then a boot integrity service running on the storage platform limits functionality such as by disabling IO services, disabling remote data replication, enabling a diagnostic service, enabling a data collection service, disabling access by non-service accounts, and protecting a management database.

Abstract: A system that relates to the technical field of sewage purification includes microalgae culturing pond and constructed wetland that are connected in series. A microalgae capturing filler is arranged in the microalgae culturing pond, algae-containing water obtained from microalgae capturing filler is communicated with the constructed wetland for oxygen transfer and forming algal-bacterial mutualistic symbiosis for strengthened pollutant removal, and part of captured microalgae is introduced into an anoxic denitrification functional area away from a surface in constructed wetland by flow guide pipe.

Abstract: Systems and methods provide validation of hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). An attestation certificate stored to the IHS specifies authenticated instructions for operation of a hardware component of the IHS. This attestation certificate is endorsed by a self-signed root attestation certificate. An identity certificate, also stored to the IHS, specifies an identity of the hardware component and is endorsed using an embedded keypair of the hardware component. The root attestation certificate is validated to ensure it corresponds to the hardware component specified in the identity certificate, where this validation confirms that a public key included in the identity certificate is identical to a public key included in the attestation certificate.

Abstract: A data service periodically monitors parameters of a computing system and periodically transmits metrics related to the monitored parameters to an AI service over a secure channel. The AI service uses a Time Series Classification model trained on training data that results from simulated row-hammer attacks to a computing system. The AI service processes the metrics using the trained Time Series Classification model. If the Time Series Classification model determines that the received metrics correspond to a row-hammer attack, the AI services transmits an attack confirmation message to the computing the data service. A remediation action is implemented responsive to receiving the attack confirmation message.

Abstract: A system for secure booting of an information handling system stores a Root of Trust private key in a hardware security module (HSM). A HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility receives inputs such as bin files for each firmware volume associated with a boot sequence. The HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility loads the correct extensions for the firmware volume, generates a certificate signing request (CSR) and generates a certificate based on the CSR. The certificates can be provided to a boot sequence for processing in a trusted firmware implementation without a certificate creation utility consuming the Hardware Root of Trust private key as a file that could be compromised.

Abstract: Systems and methods provide validation of hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). An attestation certificate stored to the IHS specifies authenticated instructions for operation of a hardware component of the IHS. This attestation certificate is endorsed by a self-signed root attestation certificate. An identity certificate, also stored to the IHS, specifies an identity of the hardware component and is endorsed using an embedded keypair of the hardware component. The root attestation certificate is validated to ensure it corresponds to the hardware component specified in the identity certificate, where this validation confirms that a public key included in the identity certificate is identical to a public key included in the attestation certificate.

Abstract: Boot integrity of a storage platform is verified by comparing observed boot data values with expected boot data values stored in a secure remote cloud. The boot data values include hashes of software that runs at each stage of a boot sequence, e.g., BIOS, bootloader, kernel, and runlevel programs. The observed boot data values may be provided by a TPM using an AIK and nonce. If the observed boot data values fail to match the expected boot data values then a boot integrity service running on the storage platform limits functionality such as by disabling IO services, disabling remote data replication, enabling a diagnostic service, enabling a data collection service, disabling access by non-service accounts, and protecting a management database.

Abstract: A constructed wetland system enhanced by immobilized laccase, it includes wetland plants, a matrix layer and a water distribution system, the wetland plants growing on the matrix layers, the matrix layer including a laccase catalyst and gravel, the laccase catalyst and gravel are distributed at intervals in a modular manner in a ratio of 1:5, the water distribution system is arranged on both sides of the matrix layer. The laccase catalyst is prepared by using a co-immobilization technology. The system improves the removal effect of hard-to-degrade organic matter in wastewater, and solves the problems of toxicity and stress of the hard-to-degrade organic matter existing in the prior art and the problems of matrix adsorption saturation.

Abstract: A system for secure booting of an information handling system stores a Root of Trust private key in a hardware security module (HSM). A HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility receives inputs such as bin files for each firmware volume associated with a boot sequence. The HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility loads the correct extensions for the firmware volume, generates a certificate signing request (CSR) and generates a certificate based on the CSR. The certificates can be provided to a boot sequence for processing in a trusted firmware implementation without a certificate creation utility consuming the Hardware Root of Trust private key as a file that could be compromised.

Abstract: The rotation of a pneumatic tire is monitored by a self powered tire revolution counter. A piezoelectric (“piezol”) element is mounted in the tire in a manner so as to be subjected to periodic mechanical stresses as the tire rotates and to provide periodic pulses in response thereto. The output of the piezo element is utilized by revolution counting circuitry to count rotations of the tire, as well as by power circuitry to power the revolution counting circuitry.