Abstract: A computer architecture (100) and a method for adapting and executing (200) a computer program therefore, is provided. A value is computed by processing the instructions comprised in a basic block of the program in accordance with a first mathematical function (208). An instruction comprising an original address is modified, using a second mathematical function (214) taking the value as input, to comprise a modified address. In this manner, a fault attack during execution of the computer program will cause a disturbance of the control flow, thereby making such an attack unlikely to succeed.

Abstract: In a system, a server provides a digital signal processing function ƒ to an executing device in an obfuscated form. The function ƒ includes a function cascade of signal processing functions ƒi, 1?i?N (e.g., FC1(x)?ƒN? . . . ?ƒ1(x)). The server includes a processor for selecting a set of 2N invertible permutations pi, 1?i?2N; calculating a set of N functions gi, where gi is functionally equivalent to p2i?1?ƒi?p2i?1, for 1?i?N; and calculating a set of N?1 functions hi, where hi is functionally equivalent to p2i?1?1?p2i?2, for 2?i?N. The server equips the executing device with an execution device function cascade that includes yN?hN?yN?1?hN?1? . . . ?y1, where y1, . . . , yN are function parameters (e.g., ED1(y1, . . . , yN)?yN?hN?yN?1?hN?1? . . . ?y1), and provides the functions g1, . . . gN to the executing device. The executing device obtains the functions g1, . . .

Abstract: A computer architecture (100) and a method for adapting and executing (200) a computer program therefore, is provided. A value is computed by processing the instructions comprised in a basic block of the program in accordance with a first mathematical function (208). An instruction comprising an original address is modified, using a second mathematical function (214) taking the value as input, to comprise a modified address. In this manner, a fault attack during execution of the computer program will cause a disturbance of the control flow, thereby making such an attack unlikely to succeed.

Abstract: Embodiments include a system, wherein a server provides a cryptographic function F to an execution device in an obfuscated form. The function F composes output of a plurality of the mapping tables Ti (0?i?n; n?1) using an Abelian group operator. A processor chooses tables O and C such that C[x] O[x]=0, x Di and creates tables T?i, 0?i?m; n?m?n+1, where for 0?i?n, each Table T?i represents the respective corresponding table Ti and at least one table T?o1, 0?o1?n, being formed through an Abelian composition of To1 and O, and at least one table T?c1, 0?c1?m, c1?oj; being formed through an Abelian composition that includes C.

Abstract: In a system, a server provides a digital signal processing function ƒ to an executing device in an obfuscated form. The function ƒ includes a function cascade of signal processing functions ƒi, 1?i?N (e.g., FC1(x)?ƒN? . . . ?ƒ1(x)). The server includes a processor for selecting a set of 2N invertible permutations pi, 1?i?2N; calculating a set of N functions gi, where gi is functionally equivalent to p2i?1?ƒi?p2i?1, for 1?i?N; and calculating a set of N?1 functions hi, where hi is functionally equivalent to p2i?1?1?p2i?2, for 2?i?N. The server equips the executing device with an execution device function cascade that includes yN?hN?yN?1?hN?1? . . . ?y1, where y1, . . . , yN are function parameters (e.g., ED1(y1, . . . , yN)?yN?hN?yN?1?hN?1? . . . ?y1), and provides the functions g1, . . . gN to the executing device. The executing device obtains the functions g1, . . .

Abstract: In a system 300, a server 310 provides a cryptographic function F to an execution device in an obfuscated form. The function F composes output of a plurality of the mapping tables Ti(0?i?n; n?1) using an Abelian group operator . A processor 312 chooses tables O and C such that C[x]O[x]=0, ?x±Di and creates tables T?i, 0?i?m; n?m?n+1, where for 0?i?n, each Table T?i represents the respective corresponding table T,j and at least one table T?o1, 0?01, ?n, being formed through an Abelian composition of To1 and O, and at least one table T?c10?c1,?m, c1#oj, being formed through an Abelian composition that includes C. Means 314 are used for providing the tables T?i, to the executing device. The executing device 320 includes means 324 for receiving the tables and a processor 322 for forming a function F? that is functionally equivalent to the cryptographic function F by an Abelian composition of the tables T?i.

Abstract: In a system (600), a server (610) provides a digital signal processing function ƒ to an executing device (620) in an obfuscated form. The function ƒ includes a function cascade of signal processing functions ƒ1, 1?i?N to formula (I). The server includes a processor (612) for selecting a set of 2N invertible permutations pi, 1?i?2N; calculating a set of N functions g, where g, is functionally equivalent to formula (II) for 1?i?; and calculating a set of N?1 functions h, where h, is functionally equivalent to formula (III) for 2?i?N. The server includes means (614) for equipping the executing device with an execution device function cascade that includes formula (IV), where y1, . . . , yN are function parameters to formula (V), and means (616) for providing the functions g1, . . . gN to the executing device. The executing device includes means (626) for obtaining the functions g1, . . .

Abstract: A method of enhancing the security of a protection mechanism used in a product. When information (115) regarding a vulnerability in the protection mechanism is received from a person (100), the person (100) is given a reward (145) for supplying the information (115). The reward (145) comprises a portion of profits made on the product in a time period ranging from the moment of receiving the information (115) until a moment at which the information (115) becomes public knowledge.