Abstract: A voting method includes receiving identity-based information, vote data and a passphrase for a voter, encrypting the vote data using a symmetric key, generating second identity-based information for the voter, and generating an identity-based public key using at least the second identity-based information and a voting system parameter. The symmetric key is encrypted using the identity-based public key and an identity-based asymmetric encryption algorithm. The encrypted symmetric key may be decrypted using a private key corresponding to the identity-based public key and an identity-based asymmetric decryption algorithm, wherein the private key is generated from at least the identity-based public key and a secret master key. The voter is provided with information that includes at least the encrypted vote data and the encrypted symmetric key, and the system retains anonymous identity information, encrypted vote data and the encrypted symmetric key as a paper audit trail.

Abstract: An electronic voting system includes a vote security device (VSD), a user interface for presenting a ballot to a voter, and an audit trail printer operatively coupled to the VSD. The printer prints an audit trail ballot only in response to verifying encrypted and/or digitally signed messages received from the VSD that indicates the voter's ballot selections. The printer is structured to allow the voter to view but not access the audit trail ballot. The voter is able to accept or reject the audit trail ballot using the user interface. If the ballot is rejected, the VSD causes the printer to print a rejection indicator on the ballot, and if the voter accepts the ballot, the VSD causes the printer to print an acceptance indicator on the ballot. A digitally signed record of the voter's ballot selections is generated and stored.

Abstract: A method of enabling a voter to vote by mail by using a secret vote code (SVC) that includes translating the SVC into a one-time code (OTC) valid only for the election, storing the OTC, and mailing to the voter a ballot, a return envelope, and a mechanism for enabling the SVC to be translated into a translated format. Further, the method includes receiving the return envelope from the voter that includes a completed ballot, the voter's signature, and the translated format, determining whether the signature obtained from the envelope matches a stored signature for the voter, obtaining a second one-time code based on the translated format and determining whether the second one-time code matches the stored one-time code. The ballot is counted only if it is determined that: (i) the signatures match, and (ii) the second one-time code matches the stored one-time code.

Abstract: Methods and systems for providing confidentiality of communications sent via a network that is efficient, easy to implement, and does not require significant key management. The identity of each node of the routing path of a communication is encrypted utilizing an identity-based encryption scheme. This allows each node of the routing path to decrypt only those portions of the routing path necessary to send the communication to the next node. Thus, each node will only know the immediate previous node from which the communication came, and the next node to which the communication is to be sent. The remainder of the routing path of the communication, along with the original sender and intended recipient, remain confidential from any intermediate nodes in the routing path. Use of the identity-based encryption scheme removes the need for significant key management to maintain the encryption/decryption keys.

Abstract: A portion of the signed message in an ECPVS is kept truly confidential by dividing the message being signed into at least three parts, wherein one portion is visible, another portion is recoverable by any entity and carries the necessary redundancy for verification, and at least one additional portion is kept confidential. The additional portion is kept confidential by encrypting such portion using a key generated from information specific to that verifying entity. In this way, any entity with access to the signer's public key can verify the signature by checking for a specific characteristic, such as a certain amount of redundancy in the one recovered portion, but cannot recover the confidential portion, only the specific entity can do so. Message recovery is also provided in an elliptic curve signature using a modification of the well analyzed ECDSA signing equation instead of, e.g. the Schnorr equation used in traditional PV signature schemes.

Abstract: A system, method, and medium, the method including receiving parameter information associated with a mailer, associating the parameter information with a mailing, receiving statistical information, the statistical information including historical performance data of at least one carrier, determining a delivery sequence for the mailing based on the received mailer parameter information and the statistical information, and outputting the determined delivery sequence for the mailing.

Abstract: An electronic voting system includes a vote security device (VSD), a user interface for presenting a ballot to a voter, and an audit trail printer operatively coupled to the VSD. The printer prints an audit trail ballot only in response to verifying encrypted and/or digitally signed messages received from the VSD that indicates the voter's ballot selections. The printer is structured to allow the voter to view but not access the audit trail ballot. The voter is able to accept or reject the audit trail ballot using the user interface. If the ballot is rejected, the VSD causes the printer to print a rejection indicator on the ballot, and if the voter accepts the ballot, the VSD causes the printer to print an acceptance indicator on the ballot. A digitally signed record of the voter's ballot selections is generated and stored.

Abstract: A method and system for generating and printing an indicium, such as a postal indicium, on an object such as a mail piece. Other printed material, such as an address block, on the object is scanned, and the scanned image is processed to abstract characterizing information descriptive of the other printed material. Alternatively, the image to be processed can be obtained by filtering the original image wit a print/scan filter which simulates printing and scanning processes. The characterizing information can be text-based or image-based. Image-based characterizing information can be measurements of word lengths, counts of outliers in images of characters, or descriptions of the shape of the other printed material. The characterizing information is combined with other information, such as postal information and the combined information is then cryptographically authenticated with a digital signature or the like. An indicium representative of the authenticated information is then printed on the object.

Abstract: A vote-by-mail return envelope that includes a pouch portion for containing the ballot and a stub portion on which the voter applies his/her signature and method for processing are provided. Each portion of the envelope contains a respective barcode that identifies the respective portion. When the envelope is received at the vote-counting location, the stub is separated from the pouch, thereby separating the voter's signature, name, etc. from the ballot. The signature is then verified from the stub, and subsequent processing of the pouch uses the pouch barcode identifier as a link to the stub barcode identifier and/or to the result of the signature verification, to determine whether the ballot in the pouch is eligible for counting or whether some remedial procedure is necessary.

Abstract: Methods and systems that provide privacy of signatures on envelopes containing ballots are provided. The envelope for returning ballots includes a flap with a window that aligns with a signature area on the envelope. The window appears opaque under normal lighting conditions, but appears transparent when illuminated with light having a predetermined wavelength. A movable signature stub is positioned on top of the signature area. The voter signs the back of the envelope on the signature stub, thereby imprinting a signature on the signature area by transferring a material from the signature stub to the signature area, and moves the signature stub. The flap of the envelope is then sealed, thereby covering the voter's signature in the signature area with the window of the envelope flap. To read the signature, light having the predetermined wavelength can be directed onto the window, thereby rendering the window transparent and the signature visible.

Abstract: Methods and systems for verification of indicia that do not require key management systems, and in which revocation of key pairs is easily performed without adding costs to the verification process are provided. Indicia are generated and authenticated utilizing an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. A key generating authority generates a private key for a PSD, distributes the private key securely to the PSD, and provides public information for use by a verification service when verifying cryptographic digital signatures generated with the private key. The corresponding public key is a string consisting of PSD information that is provided as part of the indicium. The verification service can verify the signature of each indicium by obtaining the public key string from the indicium, and utilizing the key generating authority's public information.

Abstract: A method of conducting an election including storing a signature image for each voter, providing a plurality of return envelopes, providing an indicium having a barcode on each of the return envelopes, for each of the return envelopes, associating the barcode of the indicium with a respective one of the voters, and mailing each return envelope and a ballot to the voter with which the barcode data of the indicium of the envelope has been associated. When each return envelope including a completed ballot and a written signature thereon is received, the method includes obtaining from the return envelope the written signature and the barcode of the indicium provided thereon, using the obtained barcode to access the stored authorized signature image of the voter with which the barcode is associated, and comparing the obtained written signature to the authorized signature in the accessed image.

Abstract: Methods and systems that prevent completion of postdated financial transactions until the specified future date is provided. A portion of the information necessary to complete a financial transaction is encrypted utilizing an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. The encryption key used to encrypt the information is associated with the date on which the transaction is authorized to be completed. The encrypted information is provided to the payee. The issuing bank provides a daily decryption key that allows decryption of information encrypted using the key associated with the corresponding date. Thus, only when the maturity date of the transaction has arrived will the payee or depositing bank be able to obtain the decryption key that will decrypt the encrypted information necessary to complete the transaction. Since the encrypted information can not be decrypted until the date associated with the encryption key, the financial transaction can not be completed until such date.

Abstract: A method and system for generating and printing an indicium, such as a postal indicium, on an object such as a mail piece. A digital image of other printed material, such as an address block, on the object is obtained, and the image is processed to abstract characterizing information descriptive aspects of the other printed material. The aspects can be measurements of word lengths, counts of outliers in images of characters, or descriptions of the shape of the other printed material. The characterizing information is combined with other information, such as postal information, and the combined information is then cryptographically authenticated with a digital signature or the like. An indicium representative of the authenticated information is then printed on the object.

Abstract: A method and system for protecting against side channel attacks on cryptographic systems that attempt to recover information from externally detectable signals, such as electromagnetic fields or power input variations. A system operates in accordance with the subject invention to process a message using a cryptographic protocol involving a secret key d.

Abstract: A method and system for protecting against side channel attacks on cryptographic systems that attempt to recover information from externally detectable signals, such as electromagnetic fields or power input variations. A system operates in accordance with the subject invention to process a message using a cryptographic protocol involving a secret key d. The protocol includes a step for computing the result of iteratively performing a binary operation [op] on a digital quantity G, where a secret key d is taken as an integer value, such as elliptic curve scalar point multiplication or modular exponentiation.

Abstract: Print quality is ensured in a postage meter system employing an ink system and having settable modes of printing operation by detecting the type of ink system employed in the postage meter system, setting a first mode of printing operation for the postage meter system when the detected ink system is of a first type and setting a second mode of printing operation for the postage meter system when the detected ink system is of a second type. The detected information may be communicated to a data center to obtain modes of operation for the postage meter system and other corrective actions may be implemented. The method and system are applicable to other consumable item systems employing various types of consumable items.

Abstract: Methods and systems that provide privacy of signatures on envelopes containing ballots are provided. The envelope for returning ballots includes a flap with a window that aligns with a signature area on the envelope. The window appears opaque under normal lighting conditions, but appears transparent when illuminated with light having a predetermined wavelength. A movable signature stub is positioned on top of the signature area. The voter signs the back of the envelope on the signature stub, thereby imprinting a signature on the signature area by transferring a material from the signature stub to the signature area, and moves the signature stub. The flap of the envelope is then sealed, thereby covering the voter's signature in the signature area with the window of the envelope flap. To read the signature, light having the predetermined wavelength can be directed onto the window, thereby rendering the window transparent and the signature visible.

Abstract: Systems and methods for probabilistic determination of real world events in a sensory environment such as a predicting location in a responsive environment are described. A responsive environment system includes a set of sensors for making probabilistic observations of RFID sensor tags. The system also includes a control system employing a set of possible real world events and statistical processing system for predicting a particular real world event state based upon the sensor observations. In one configuration, a Hidden Markov Model is used for the statistical processing system and may be updated based upon the prediction of the model. The responsive environment will then launch a response based upon the predicted real world event state.

Abstract: An envelope used in voting by mail includes a signature area on which the signature is affixed and a concealing portion structured to cover the signature area thereby concealing the signature. The concealing portion includes a concealing layer that is preferably positioned on top of a protective layer. The protective layer is positioned between the signature area and the concealing layer when the concealing portion covers the signature area. The concealing layer is formed from a material that is normally opaque but becomes at least partially transparent when one or more chemicals are applied to the concealing layer. The protective layer protects the signature from the one or more chemicals since the protective layer is impermeable to the one or more chemicals.