Abstract: For end-to-end encryption of a virtual cloud network, a VPN tunnel from a customer device is terminated at a host network headend device using encryption keys secured in hardware and managed by the customer. The network headend device can be a card in a bare-metal server with one or more network virtualization devices. The network headend device is configured to receive a first key provisioned by a customer; receive a first data packet sent from a device of the customer; and decrypt the first data packet using the first key to obtain information. A network virtualization device is configured to receive the information from the network headend device; ascertain that the information is to be sent to a virtual machine in a virtual cloud network; ascertain that data in the virtual cloud network is configured to be encrypted; and encrypt the information with a second key to generate a second data packet before routing the second data packet to the virtual machine.

Abstract: A network interface card, such as a SmartNIC, is used to provide encryption, such as network encryption virtual function (NEVF), for a virtual machine, so that a customer can control network keys in a virtual cloud network. The NEVF includes a memory device (e.g., SRAM) and a crypto processor (e.g., a crypto core). The memory device stores a crypto key. The crypto processor uses the crypto key to encrypt data to and from a virtual machine in the virtual cloud network. A key management system can be used to securely transfer crypto keys to the NEVF. Having one NEVF per virtual machine can enable a customer to manage the crypto key for a virtual cloud network.

Abstract: For end-to-end encryption of a virtual cloud network, a VPN tunnel from a customer device is terminated at a host network headend device using encryption keys secured in hardware and managed by the customer. The network headend device can be a card in a bare-metal server with one or more network virtualization devices. The network headend device is configured to receive a first key provisioned by a customer; receive a first data packet sent from a device of the customer; and decrypt the first data packet using the first key to obtain information. A network virtualization device is configured to receive the information from the network headend device; ascertain that the information is to be sent to a virtual machine in a virtual cloud network; ascertain that data in the virtual cloud network is configured to be encrypted; and encrypt the information with a second key to generate a second data packet before routing the second data packet to the virtual machine.

Abstract: The present embodiments relate to a keystore service for encryption for a computing device of a cloud computing system. The computing device of the cloud computing system can receive a key identification, an encrypted key encryption key, an identity of a client device, and a request from the client device to store the key identification and the encrypted key identification key. The computing device can verify, based at least in part on the identity, an authority of the client device to store the key identification and encrypted key encryption key. The computing device can transmit, based at least in part on the verification, the key identification, the encrypted key encryption key, and request to store the key identification and the encrypted key encryption key to a keystore.

Abstract: A cloud-based security solution that provides a robust and secure framework for managing and enforcing security policies related to various resources managed in the cloud is disclosed. The cloud-based security solution is implemented by a security zone policy enforcement system in a cloud service provider infrastructure. The system receives a request to perform an operation on a resource and determines a compartment associated with the resource. The system determines that the compartment is associated with a security zone and determines a set of one or more security zone policies applicable to the resource. The system then determines that the operation on the resource is permitted based on the set of one or more security zone policies and responsive to determining that the operation on the resource is permitted, allows the operation to be performed on the resource.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for a computing infrastructure for configurable-quality random data are disclosed. A storage medium stores program instructions that when executed on a processor designate some servers of a provider network as members of a pool of producers of random data usable by random data consumers. The instructions, when executed, determine a subset of the pool to be used to supply a collection of random data intended for a random data consumer, and one or more sources of random phenomena to be used to generate the collection of random data. The instructions, when executed, initiate a transmission of the collection of random data directed to the random data consumer.

Abstract: A network interface card, such as a SmartNIC, is used to provide encryption, such as network encryption virtual function (NEVF), for a virtual machine, so that a customer can control network keys in a virtual cloud network. The NEVF includes a memory device (e.g., SRAM) and a crypto processor (e.g., a crypto core). The memory device stores a crypto key. The crypto processor uses the crypto key to encrypt data to and from a virtual machine in the virtual cloud network. A key management system can be used to securely transfer crypto keys to the NEVF. Having one NEVF per virtual machine can enable a customer to manage the crypto key for a virtual cloud network.

Abstract: Aspects of the present application relate to systems, methods and non-transitory computer readable media for network virtualization in a rack-based switch. The method can include sending a communication from a first virtual machine (“VM”) instantiated on a first host machine to a first network virtualization Top of Rack (“ToR”) switch. The first network virtualization ToR can include a peripheral component interconnect express (“PCIe”) switch coupled to a plurality of host-side Ethernet ports, a virtualization device communicatingly coupled to the PCIe switch, which virtualization device can include a plurality of virtualization functions, and a switching ASIC coupled to the virtualization device and to a network-side Ethernet port. The method can include forming the communication into an Internet Protocol (“IP”) packet with a first virtualization function of the virtualization device, and sending the IP packet to a second VM with the switching ASIC.

Abstract: For end-to-end encryption of a virtual cloud network, a VPN tunnel from a customer device is terminated at a host network headend device using encryption keys secured in hardware and managed by the customer. The network headend device can be a card in a bare-metal server with one or more network virtualization devices. The network headend device is configured to receive a first key provisioned by a customer; receive a first data packet sent from a device of the customer; and decrypt the first data packet using the first key to obtain information. A network virtualization device is configured to receive the information from the network headend device; ascertain that the information is to be sent to a virtual machine in a virtual cloud network; ascertain that data in the virtual cloud network is configured to be encrypted; and encrypt the information with a second key to generate a second data packet before routing the second data packet to the virtual machine.

Abstract: A cloud-based security solution that provides a robust and secure framework for managing and enforcing security policies related to various resources managed in the cloud is disclosed. The cloud-based security solution is implemented by a security zone policy enforcement system in a cloud service provider infrastructure. The system receives a request to perform an operation on a resource and determines a compartment associated with the resource. The system determines that the compartment is associated with a security zone and determines a set of one or more security zone policies applicable to the resource. The system then determines that the operation on the resource is permitted based on the set of one or more security zone policies and responsive to determining that the operation on the resource is permitted, allows the operation to be performed on the resource.

Abstract: A device is provisioned and authorized for use on a network. The device may generate a cryptographic key and provide a digital certificate the cryptographic key, a hardware identifier, and attribute information and provide such information to an authorization host as part of the provisioning process. The authorization host may use attribute information to determine whether to authorize the device for use on the network, and whether the generated cryptographic key should be trusted for use on the network.

Abstract: Approaches are described for enabling a host computing device to store credentials and other security information useful for recovering the state of the host computing device in a secure store, such as a trusted platform module (TPM) on the host computing device. When recovering the host computing device in the event of a failure (e.g., power outage, network failure, etc.), the host computing device can obtain the necessary credentials from the secure store and use those credentials to boot various services, restore the state of the host and perform various other functions. In addition, the secure store (e.g., TPM) may provide boot firmware measurement and remote attestation of the host computing devices to other devices on a network, such as when the recovering host needs to communicate with the other devices on the network.

Abstract: Anomalous behavior in a multi-tenant computing environment may be identified by analyzing hardware sensor value data associated with hardware events on a host machine. A privileged virtual machine instance executing on a host machine acquires hardware sensor values and causes the values to be compared to other hardware sensor value data that may be indicative of anomalous behavior; for example, various threshold values, patterns, and/or signatures of hardware counter values generated by analyzing and correlating hardware event counter data. In this manner, potential anomalous behavior on an instance may be determined without having to access customer data or workloads associated with the instance.

Abstract: A processor on a host machine can concurrently operate a standard virtual machine manager (VMM) and a security VMM (SVMM), where the SVMM has a higher privilege level and manages access to a hardware TPM or other trusted source on the host machine. Such a configuration prevents a compromised VMM from gaining access to secrets stored in the hardware TPM. The SVMM can create a virtual TPM (vTPM) for each guest VM, and can seal information in each vTPM to the hardware TPM. A guest VM or the standard VMM can access information in the corresponding vTPM only through the corresponding SVMM. Such an approach enables the host to securely implement critical security functionality that can be exposed to customers, and provides protection against leakage of customer secrets in case of a security compromise.

Abstract: A device is provisioned and authorized for use on a network. The device may generate a cryptographic key and provide a digital certificate the cryptographic key, a hardware identifier, and attribute information and provide such information to an authorization host as part of the provisioning process. The authorization host may use attribute information to determine whether to authorize the device for use on the network, and whether the generated cryptographic key should be trusted for use on the network.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for datacenter power management optimization are disclosed. Metrics, including workload data, thermal measurements and the like are collected from numerous endpoints within a datacenter. System profiles of a plurality of servers, and application workload profiles for various workloads, are stored. Based on analysis of collected metrics, power optimization operations comprising either workload scheduling operations, power configuration change operations, or both, are initiated.

Abstract: A trusted computing host is described that provides various security computations and other functions in a distributed multitenant and/or virtualized computing environment. The trusted host computing device can communicate with one or more host computing devices that host virtual machines to provide a number of security-related functions, including but not limited to boot firmware measurement, cryptographic key management, remote attestation, as well as security and forensics management. The trusted computing host maintains an isolated partition for each host computing device in the environment and communicates with peripheral cards on host computing devices in order to provide one or more security functions.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for securing client-specified credentials at cryptographically-attested resources are described. An indication is obtained that resources deployed for execution of a compute instance of a multi-tenant computing service at an instance host of a provider network meet a client's security criteria. An encrypted representation of credentials to be used at the compute instance to implement operations on behalf of a client is received at the instance host. The credentials are extracted from the encrypted representation using a private key unique to the instance host, used for the operations, and then removed from the instance host without being saved in persistent memory.

Abstract: A graph of a plurality of resources in a computing environment is generated, with the graph associating a first resource of the plurality with a second resource of the plurality. Based at least in part on measurements obtained at a point in a test computing environment that corresponds to a point in the computing environment, a graph representing the relationship between the first resource and the second resource is generated. A threat model identifying potential risks to the computing environment is created from the graph.

Abstract: Approaches are described for enabling a host computing device to store credentials and other security information useful for recovering the state of the host computing device in a secure store, such as a trusted platform module (TPM) on the host computing device. When recovering the host computing device in the event of a failure (e.g., power outage, network failure, etc.), the host computing device can obtain the necessary credentials from the secure store and use those credentials to boot various services, restore the state of the host and perform various other functions. In addition, the secure store (e.g., TPM) may provide boot firmware measurement and remote attestation of the host computing devices to other devices on a network, such as when the recovering host needs to communicate with the other devices on the network.