Abstract: The present disclosure generally relates to managing user profiles. An example method includes, at a computer system in communication with a display generation component and an input device: receiving, via the input device, a user input including a request to access a first restricted media item; and in response to the user input: in accordance with a determination the user input is a voice input and the voice input corresponds to a user profile authorized to access the first restricted media item using voice inputs, initiating playback of the first restricted media item; and in accordance with a determination the user input is a voice input and the voice input does not correspond to a user profile authorized to access the first restricted media item using voice inputs: forgoing initiating playback of the first restricted media item; and causing display, at the display generation component, of a validation user interface.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: A nodal communication network of a process control or factory automation system includes nodes that are highly versatile (HV) field devices storing respective tag identifications. A DHCP server assigns respective endpoint identifications to nodes that connect to the network. A network node manager manages a mapping database that stores associations of tag identifications of network nodes with the assigned endpoint identifications, and a state database that stores updated states of the network nodes. A DNS server responds, in conjunction with the network node manager, to requests for endpoint identifications to allow nodes to be discovered within the network. An HV device node is a data source that establishes and maintains (sometimes simultaneously) respective communication sessions over the network with one or more other nodes that are consumers of the data generated by the HV devices, and data delivered via the communication sessions may be used to control an industrial process.

Abstract: A nodal communication network of a process control or factory automation system includes nodes that are highly versatile (HV) field devices storing respective tag identifications. A DHCP server assigns respective endpoint identifications to nodes that connect to the network. A network node manager manages a mapping database that stores associations of tag identifications of network nodes with the assigned endpoint identifications, and a state database that stores updated states of the network nodes. A DNS server responds, in conjunction with the network node manager, to requests for endpoint identifications to allow nodes to be discovered within the network. An HV device node is a data source that establishes and maintains (sometimes simultaneously) respective communication sessions over the network with one or more other nodes that are consumers of the data generated by the HV devices, and data delivered via the communication sessions may be used to control an industrial process.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are techniques for automatically distributing device identification amongst components of a process control loop in a process plant while the loop is communicatively disconnected from the plant's back-end environment or control room. A field device's identification is stored in a memory of a component of the loop (which may be the field device or a proxy) and is used for commissioning the field device. While the loop remains disconnected, the field device's identification is distributed to the memory of another component of the loop and used for commissioning a portion of the loop including the field device and the another component. Additional distribution to other components for commissioning other loop portions is possible. Distribution may be triggered by the completion of certain commissioning activities, the establishment of communicative connections between components, and/or other conditions.

Abstract: An I/O-abstracted configuration is defined for a field device that has not yet been assigned or allocated to communicate via a particular I/O device or I/O network within a plant, and this configuration is stored in a device placeholder object in a back-end environment of the plant. Thereafter other objects, modules, applications, user interfaces, etc., that are to execute in the back-end environment of the plant to communicate with the field device during on-line operation of the plant may be designed, built, configured, and tested using the device placeholder object without any actual communications with the field device and without assigning the device placeholder object to a particular I/O channel or I/O network.

Abstract: Techniques for performing two-factor authentication in a process plant include receiving, at a user interface device, a first type of identification information for a user from an identification device or a physical trait of the user. The user interface device also receives a second type of identification information for the user from knowledge-based information provided by the user. The user interface device then determines that each type of identification information corresponds to the same authorized user within the process plant. When both types of identification information are for the same authorized user, the user is granted access to the user interface device. Accordingly, the user may execute functions on the user interface device to perform operations on a plant asset which is connected to the user interface device.

Abstract: A system tag identifying a device of a process control loop is determined/derived from a unique identifier of the device while the loop is communicatively disconnected from a process plant's back-end environment or control room. The system tag may be stored at the device itself or at a proxy that is disposed in the field of the process plant (e.g., at another component of the loop). One or more commissioning activities that include the device are performed in the field using the device's system tag, and at least some of the field commissioning activities may be automatically triggered based on the derivation of system tag. Upon the loop being communicatively connected to the back-end environment of the plant, the device's system tag known to the loop in the field is synchronized with the device's system tag known to the back-end of the process plant.

Abstract: An I/O-abstracted configuration is defined for a field device that has not yet been assigned or allocated to communicate via a particular I/O device, and the field device (and optionally portions of the process control loop of which the field device is a part) is commissioned based on contents of its I/O-abstracted configuration. The field device's I/O-abstracted configuration is stored in an instance of a device placeholder object, which may be common to multiple types of devices and multiple types of I/O. A property of the device placeholder object may be exposed based on the value entered for another property, and the device placeholder object may store abstracted values as well as explicit or discrete values that are descriptive of the field device and its behavior. Upon I/O-assignment or allocation, values held in the device's I/O-abstracted configuration may be transferred to or otherwise synchronized with the device's as-built configuration.

Abstract: During commissioning activities of a process plant, a device placeholder object that stores an I/O-abstracted configuration of a particular field device within the plant is created and stored in a device in the back-end environment of the plant and a further configuration file is stored in or for the particular field device in the field equipment environment of the plant. The device placeholder object, which will eventually be associated with the particular field device, and the field device configuration file are used to perform separate commissioning activities in each of these plant environments before the field devices are configured to communicate with a process controller via a particular I/O network within the plant. Thereafter, a binding application performs a discovery process to detect the I/O communication path through which each field device is connected to the back-end environment.

Abstract: Techniques for automatically testing an entire process control loop, such as after components and portions of the loop have been commissioned separately, or after run-time operation begins, enable the process control loop to be tested without an operator in a back-end environment of a process plant coordinating with an operator in a field environment of the process plant to supply inputs and/or generate various conditions at the loop. Instead, a single operator performs a single operation to initiate an automatic loop test, or in some implementations, no user input is needed to initiate and/or perform the automatic loop test. Automatic loop testing includes automatically causing a field device to operate in a plurality of test states and determining whether resultant loop behaviors are expected behaviors. Multiple loops may be tested concurrently or distinct in time. An automatic loop test result is generated and may be presented via a user interface.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: A smart process control switch can implement a lockdown routine to lockdown its communication ports exclusively for use by devices having known physical addresses, enabling the smart process control switch to prevent new, potentially hostile, devices from communicating with other devices to which the smart process control switch is connected. Further, the smart process control switch can implement an address mapping routine to identify “known pairs” of physical and network addresses for each device communicating via a port of the smart process control switch. Thus, even if a new hostile device is able to spoof a known physical address in an attempt to bypass locked ports, the smart process control switch can detect the hostile device by checking the network address of the hostile device against the expected network address for the “known pair.

Abstract: During commissioning activities of a process plant, a device placeholder object that stores an I/O-abstracted configuration of a particular field device within the plant is created and stored in a device in the back-end environment of the plant and a further configuration file is stored in or for the particular field device in the field equipment environment of the plant. The device placeholder object, which will eventually be associated with the particular field device, and the field device configuration file are used to perform separate commissioning activities in each of these plant environments before the field devices are configured to communicate with a process controller via a particular I/O network within the plant. Thereafter, a binding application performs a discovery process to detect the I/O communication path through which each field device is connected to the back-end environment.

Abstract: An I/O-abstracted configuration is defined for a field device that has not yet been assigned or allocated to communicate via a particular I/O device, and the field device (and optionally portions of the process control loop of which the field device is a part) is commissioned based on contents of its I/O-abstracted configuration. The field device's I/O-abstracted configuration is stored in an instance of a device placeholder object, which may be common to multiple types of devices and multiple types of I/O. A property of the device placeholder object may be exposed based on the value entered for another property, and the device placeholder object may store abstracted values as well as explicit or discrete values that are descriptive of the field device and its behavior. Upon I/O-assignment or allocation, values held in the device's I/O-abstracted configuration may be transferred to or otherwise synchronized with the device's as-built configuration.

Abstract: An I/O-abstracted configuration is defined for a field device that has not yet been assigned or allocated to communicate via a particular I/O device or I/O network within a plant, and this configuration is stored in a device placeholder object in a back-end environment of the plant. Thereafter other objects, modules, applications, user interfaces, etc., that are to execute in the back-end environment of the plant to communicate with the field device during on-line operation of the plant may be designed, built, configured, and tested using the device placeholder object without any actual communications with the field device and without assigning the device placeholder object to a particular I/O channel or I/O network.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are techniques for automatically distributing device identification amongst components of a process control loop in a process plant while the loop is communicatively disconnected from the plant's back-end environment or control room. A field device's identification is stored in a memory of a component of the loop (which may be the field device or a proxy) and is used for commissioning the field device. While the loop remains disconnected, the field device's identification is distributed to the memory of another component of the loop and used for commissioning a portion of the loop including the field device and the another component. Additional distribution to other components for commissioning other loop portions is possible. Distribution may be triggered by the completion of certain commissioning activities, the establishment of communicative connections between components, and/or other conditions.