Abstract: Method of mutual authentication of a controllable electronic device (DE) and of its user (USER) able to control it so that it procures him a service (DS), the device (DE) containing sensitive or confidential data (DA) and being arranged so as to—in an operational phase (OP) including a preliminary step of authentication of the user (UAP)—, execute an operation (SO) so as to procure the service (DS), including, furthermore, a prior phase of authentication of the device (SDAP), in which the authenticity of the device (DE) is verified, so that if on completion of the prior phase of authentication of the device (SDAP), the device (DE) is confirmed to be authentic, the user (USER) can execute the operational phase (OP), whilst if the device (DE) is not confirmed to be authentic, the user (USER) can prevent the execution of the operational phase (OP).

Abstract: Devices and methods for executing instructions in an automatic and secure manner include a security processor having at least a read-only memory, a random access memory, a computer capable of performing cryptographic functions, a monotonic counter management unit associated with one or more monotonic counters, is such that it does not include any other storage memory, meaning that the security processor does not store any program or external data, a public key allowing at least one initial enrolled administrator to be authenticated is stored before the first use of same in its read-only memory, its random access memory is capable of loading a set of data and instructions that can be authenticated by a public key cryptographic module, the execution by the computer, after the authentication of same, of certain instructions, increments one of the monotonic counters.

Abstract: Disclosed is a method for validating a digital request in which cooperating entities are able to use security processors loaded with an application for processing the request, each processor issuing, on request, a digital certificate of integrity; wherein said method includes: an application integrity verification process such that, based on the issued certificates, each entity ensures that each of the other entities implements an application identical to its own; a process by which entities create a common secret and thus form a group of Creative entities; and a process by which entities of the group of Creative entities designate the signatory entities, thus forming a group of cooperating signatory entities, so that, as such, the group has access to the common secret; in order for the request to be validated if and only if entities of the group of signatory entities implement the application by means of the common secret.

Abstract: The method for checking the integrity of an electronic device (DE), in particular a payment terminal, including at least one processor (MPU), a secure element (SE) able to store and manage data and into which a public key that is intended to verify an electronic signature has been loaded, and a data storage means (MEM), whose content has been authenticated beforehand and whose integrity is able to be verified by the public key, is such that a command to check integrity brings about the execution of the following successive steps: the processor (MPU) of the device calls upon the secure element (SE); in response, the secure element (SE) addresses, to the data storage means (MEM), a request for the purpose of receiving the integral content of its memory; the secure element then executes, on the content received from the memory of the data storage means (MEM), an authenticity verification in order to verify, using the public key (KP), that its content has not been able to be modified since its initial authenticat

Abstract: Disclosed is a method for validating a digital request in which cooperating entities are able to use security processors loaded with an application for processing the request, each processor issuing, on request, a digital certificate of integrity; wherein said method includes: an application integrity verification process such that, based on the issued certificates, each entity ensures that each of the other entities implements an application identical to its own; a process by which entities create a common secret and thus form a group of Creative entities; and a process by which entities of the group of Creative entities designate the signatory entities, thus forming a group of cooperating signatory entities, so that, as such, the group has access to the common secret; in order for the request to be validated if and only if entities of the group of signatory entities implement the application by means of the common secret.

Abstract: Method of mutual authentication of a controllable electronic device (DE) and of its user (USER) able to control it so that it procures him a service (DS), the device (DE) containing sensitive or confidential data (DA) and being arranged so as to—in an operational phase (OP) including a preliminary step of authentication of the user (UAP)—, execute an operation (SO) so as to procure the service (DS), including, furthermore, a prior phase of authentication of the device (SDAP), in which the authenticity of the device (DE) is verified, so that if on completion of the prior phase of authentication of the device (SDAP), the device (DE) is confirmed to be authentic, the user (USER) can execute the operational phase (OP), whilst if the device (DE) is not confirmed to be authentic, the user (USER) can prevent the execution of the operational phase (OP).

Abstract: Devices and methods for executing instructions in an automatic and secure manner include a security processor having at least a read-only memory, a random access memory, a computer capable of performing cryptographic functions, a monotonic counter management unit associated with one or more monotonic counters, is such that it does not include any other storage memory, meaning that the security processor does not store any program or external data, a public key allowing at least one initial enrolled administrator to be authenticated is stored before the first use of same in its read-only memory, its random access memory is capable of loading a set of data and instructions that can be authenticated by a public key cryptographic module, the execution by the computer, after the authentication of same, of certain instructions, increments one of the monotonic counters, so as to be able to automatically execute a sequence of operations in a secure manner, such a security processor being included in an assembly or in

Abstract: The method for checking the integrity of an electronic device (DE), in particular a payment terminal, including at least one processor (MPU), a secure element (SE) able to store and manage data and into which a public key that is intended to verify an electronic signature has been loaded, and a data storage means (MEM), whose content has been authenticated beforehand and whose integrity is able to be verified by the public key, is such that a command to check integrity brings about the execution of the following successive steps: the processor (MPU) of the device calls upon the secure element (SE); in response, the secure element (SE) addresses, to the data storage means (MEM), a request for the purpose of receiving the integral content of its memory; the secure element then executes, on the content received from the memory of the data storage means (MEM), an authenticity verification in order to verify, using the public key (KP), that its content has not been able to be modified since its initial authenticat