Abstract: The re-encryption of data can be performed with independent cryptographic agents that can automatically encrypt and decrypt data in accordance with cryptographic regions, such that data within a single cryptographic region is encrypted and decrypted with the same cryptographic key. An “in-place” re-encryption can be performed by reading data from a chunk in an existing cryptographic region, shrinking the existing cryptographic region past the chunk, expanding a replacement cryptographic region over the chunk, and then writing the data back to the same location, which is now part of the replacement cryptographic region. An “out-of-place” re-encryption can be performed by reading data from a chunk in an existing cryptographic region and then writing the data back to a location immediately adjacent that is part of a replacement cryptographic region. After the re-encrypted data is “shifted”, the cryptographic regions can be expanded and contracted appropriately, and another chunk can be selected.

Abstract: A set of security claims for a communication channel are obtained, the set of security claims including one or more security claims each identifying a security characteristic of the communication channel. The security claims are stored, as is a digital signature generated over the set of security claims by an entity. The security claims and digital signature are subsequently accessed when a computing device is to transfer data to and/or from the communication channel. The set of security claims is compared to a security policy of the computing device, and the entity that digitally signed the set of security claims is identified. One or more security precautions that the computing device is to use in transferring data to and/or from the communication channel are determined based at least in part on the comparing and the entity that has digitally signed the set of security claims.

Abstract: An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Abstract: An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Abstract: A communication channel has an associated channel authenticator that includes a channel identifier, a use policy identifying how an owner of the communication channel indicates the communication channel is used, and a digital signature over the channel identifier and use policy. The identifier of the communication channel and the use policy can be verified by a computing device, and a check made as to whether a current security policy of the computing device is satisfied by the use policy. An access that the computing device is allowed to have to the communication channel is determined based at least in part on both whether the current security policy is satisfied by the use policy and whether the identifier of the communication channel and the use policy are verified.

Abstract: Single-use authentication methods for accessing encrypted data stored on a protected volume of a computer are described, wherein access to the encrypted data involves decrypting a key protector stored on the computer that holds a volume-specific cryptographic key needed to decrypt the protected volume. Such single-use authentication methods rely on the provision of a key protector that can only be used once and/or that requires a new access credential for each use. In certain embodiments, a challenge-response process is also used as part of the authentication method to tie the issuance of a key protector and/or access credential to particular pieces of information that can uniquely identify a user.

Abstract: Cryptographic key management techniques are described. In one or more implementations, an access control rule is read that includes a Boolean expression having a plurality of atoms. The cryptographic keys that corresponds each of the plurality of atoms in the access control rule are requested. One or more cryptographic operations are then performed on data using one or more of the cryptographic keys.

Abstract: In accordance with one or more aspects, a storage volume is transformed into an encrypted storage volume or an unencrypted storage volume using a multi-phase process. One or more parts of the storage volume that have not yet been transformed are identified, and one or more parts of the storage volume that are allocated for use are identified. In a first phase of the multi-phase process, one or more parts of the storage volume that have not yet been transformed and that are allocated for use are transformed. In a second phase of the multi-phase process, after the first phase is finished, one or more parts of the storage volume that have not yet been transformed and are not allocated for use are transformed.

Abstract: Cryptographic keys and, subsequently, the data they are intended to protect, are safeguarded from unwarranted attacks utilizing various systems and methodologies designed to minimize the time period in which meaningful versions of cryptographic keys exist in accessible memory, and therefore, are vulnerable. Cryptographic keys, and consequently the data they are intended to protect, can alternatively, or also, be protected from attackers utilizing systems and a methodology that employs a removable storage device for providing authentication factors used in the encryption and decryption processing. Cryptographic keys and protected data can alternatively, or also, be protected with a system and methodology that supports data separation on the storage device(s) of a computing device. Cryptographic keys and the data they are intended to protect can alternatively, or also, be protected employing a system and methodology of virtual compartmentalization that effectively segregates key management from protected data.

Abstract: Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Abstract: A key protector for a storage volume is created by generating an intermediate key and protecting, based at least in part on a public/private key pair, the intermediate key. A volume master key for encrypting and decrypting one or more volume encryption keys that are used to encrypt the storage volume can be encrypted in different manners, including being encrypted based at least in part on the intermediate key. A key protector for the storage volume is stored that includes both the encrypted volume master key and information indicating how to obtain the intermediate key. Subsequently, the key protector can be accessed and, based at least in part on a private key of the entity associated with the key protector, the intermediate key can be decrypted. The intermediate key can then be used to decrypt the volume master key.

Abstract: Cryptographic keys and, subsequently, the data they are intended to protect, are safeguarded from unwarranted attacks utilizing various systems and methodologies designed to minimize the time period in which meaningful versions of cryptographic keys exist in accessible memory, and therefore, are vulnerable. Cryptographic keys, and consequently the data they are intended to protect, can alternatively, or also, be protected from attackers utilizing systems and a methodology that employs a removable storage device for providing authentication factors used in the encryption and decryption processing. Cryptographic keys and protected data can alternatively, or also, be protected with a system and methodology that supports data separation on the storage device(s) of a computing device. Cryptographic keys and the data they are intended to protect can alternatively, or also, be protected employing a system and methodology of virtual compartmentalization that effectively segregates key management from protected data.

Abstract: An online key stored by a remote service is generated or otherwise obtained, and a storage media (as it applies to the storage of data on a physical or virtual storage media) master key for encrypting and decrypting a physical or virtual storage media or encrypting and decrypting one or more storage media encryption keys that are used to encrypt a physical or virtual storage media is encrypted based at least in part on the online key. A key protector for the storage media is stored, the key protector including the encrypted master key. The key protector can be subsequently accessed, and the online key obtained from the remote service. The master key is decrypted based on the online key, allowing the one or more storage media encryption keys that are used to decrypt the storage media to be decrypted.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a remote resource using two-factor authentication based on information regarding a host machine of a portable storage drive that stores an operating system that is booted by the host machine. The information regarding the host machine of a portable storage drive may be used as a second factor in a two-factor authentication. Such information regarding the host machine may include, in some embodiments, information retrieved from a secure storage of the host machine, such as from a cryptoprocessor of the host machine. The information may include an identifier for the host machine or may be a user credential pre-provisioned to the host machine to be used in two-factor authentication.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a portable storage drive, that stores an operating system securely, using information regarding a host machine. In accordance with some of the techniques described herein, when a portable storage drive that stores an operating system securely is to be accessed by a host machine, information regarding the host machine, such as information regarding the hardware of the host machine, may be retrieved and evaluated to determine whether to grant access to the host machine. When the host machine is granted access, the host machine may access secured data stored on the portable storage drive in any suitable manner. In some cases, accessing the secured data may include decrypting the secured data and transferring decrypted data to another storage of the host machine. The decrypted information may include an operating system that is booted by the host machine.

Abstract: A storage volume is encrypted using a particular encryption technique, the storage volume including an access application and one or more cover files. The access application can be executed by a computing device having an operating system lacking support for the particular encryption technique, and allows the computing device to access data on the storage volume encrypted using the particular encryption technique.

Abstract: Full volume encryption can be applied to volumes in a clustering environment. To simplify the maintenance of keys relevant to such encrypted volumes, a cluster key table construct can be utilized, where each entry of the cluster key table corresponds to an encrypted volume and comprises an identification of the encrypted volume and a key needed to access that volume. Keys can be protected by encrypting them with a key specific to each computing device storing the cluster key table. Updates can be propagated among the computing devices in the cluster by first decrypting the keys and then reencrypting them with a key specific to each computing device as they are stored on those computing devices. Access control requirements can also be added to the entries in the cluster key table. Alternative access control requirements can be accommodated by assigning multiple independent entries to a single encrypted volume.

Abstract: In accordance with one or more aspects, a current security policy for accessing a device or volume of a computing device is identified. A secondary access control state for the device or volume is also identified. An access state for the device is determined based on both the current security policy and the secondary access control state.

Abstract: A portable device may be roamed from one host to another. In one example, the portable device stores software that is to be executed by a host. The host may maintain a policy that governs which software may be executed on the host. When the portable device is connected to a host, the host checks the software version installed on the guest to determine whether that software version is compatible with the host's policy. If the guest's software does not comply with the host's policy, then the host installs a compatible version. If the guest's version complies with the policy and is newer than the host's version, then the host copies the guest's version to the host and propagates it to other guests. In this way, newer versions of software propagate between hosts and guests, while also respecting specific execution policies of the various hosts.

Abstract: A communication channel has an associated channel authenticator that includes a channel identifier, a use policy identifying how an owner of the communication channel indicates the communication channel is used, and a digital signature over the channel identifier and use policy. The identifier of the communication channel and the use policy can be verified by a computing device, and a check made as to whether a current security policy of the computing device is satisfied by the use policy. An access that the computing device is allowed to have to the communication channel is determined based at least in part on both whether the current security policy is satisfied by the use policy and whether the identifier of the communication channel and the use policy are verified.