Abstract: Embodiments are directed to protection of privacy and data on smart edge devices. An embodiment of an apparatus includes a sensor to produce a stream of sensor data; an analytics mechanism; and a trusted execution environment (TEE) including multiple keys for data security, the apparatus to exchange keys with a host server to establish one or more secure communication channels between the apparatus and a TEE on a host server, process the stream of sensor data utilizing the analytics mechanism to generate metadata, perform encryption and integrity protection of the metadata utilizing a key from the TEE for the sensor, sign the metadata utilizing a private key for the analytics mechanism, and transfer the encrypted and integrity protected metadata and the signature to the host server via the one or more secure communication channels in a manner that prevents privileged users on the host from accessing the data.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O data transfer includes a compute device, which includes a processor to execute a trusted application, an input/output (I/O) device, and an I/O subsystem. The I/O subsystem is configured to establish a secured channel between the I/O subsystem and a trusted application running on the compute device, and receive, in response to an establishment of the secured channel, I/O data from the I/O device via an unsecured channel. The I/O subsystem is further configured to encrypt, in response to a receipt of the I/O data, the I/O data using a security key associated with the trusted application that is to process the I/O data and transmit the encrypted I/O data to the trusted application via the secured channel, wherein the secured channel has a data transfer rate that is higher than a data transfer rate of the unsecured channel between the I/O device and the I/O subsystem.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to providing integrity-protected command buffer execution. An embodiment of an apparatus includes a computer-readable memory comprising one or more command buffers and a processing device communicatively coupled to the computer-readable memory to read, from a command buffer of the computer-readable memory, a first command received from a host device, the first command executable by one or more processing elements on the processing device, the first command comprising an instruction and associated parameter data, compute a first authentication tag using a cryptographic key associated with the host device, the instruction and at least a portion of the parameter data, and authenticate the first command by comparing the first authentication tag with a second authentication tag computed by the host device and associated with the command.

Abstract: A computer platform is disclosed. The computer platform comprises a non-volatile memory to store fuse override data; and a system on chip (SOC), coupled to the non-volatile memory, including a fuse memory to store fuse data and security micro-controller to receive the fuse override data and perform a fuse override to overwrite the fuse data stored in the fuse memory with the fuse override data.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to protection of communications between a trusted execution environment and a hardware accelerator utilizing enhanced end-to-end encryption and inter-context security. An embodiment of an apparatus includes one or more processors having one or more trusted execution environments (TEEs) including a first TEE to include a first trusted application; an interface with a hardware accelerator, the hardware accelerator including trusted embedded software or firmware; and a computer memory to store an untrusted kernel mode driver for the hardware accelerator, the one or more processors to establish an encrypted tunnel between the first trusted application in the first TEE and the trusted software or firmware, generate a call for a first command from the first trusted application, generate an integrity tag for the first command, and transfer command parameters for the first command and the integrity tag to the kernel mode driver to generate the first command.

Abstract: A system and method of enhancing the trustworthiness of an artificial intelligence system include detecting whether a data element includes an existing data domain tag, processing the data element into a transformed data element, generating a data domain tag, where the data domain tag includes at least a data domain identifier and a timestamp, appending the data domain tag to the transformed data element, creating a signature for the transformed data element and the appended data domain tag using a private key, and creating another signature for the data domain tag using the private key.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to a session management framework for secure communications between host systems and trusted devices. An embodiment of computer-readable storage mediums includes instructions for establishing a security agreement between a host system and a trusted device, the host device including a trusted execution environment (TEE); initiating a key exchange between the host system and the trusted device, including sending a key agreement message from the host system to the trusted device; sending an initialization message to the trusted device; validating capabilities of the trusted device for a secure communication session between the host system and the trusted device; provisioning secrets to the trusted device and initializing cryptographic parameters with the trusted device; and sending an activate session message to the trusted device to activate the secure communication session over a secure communication channel.

Abstract: Technologies for trusted I/O include a computing device having a hardware cryptographic agent, a cryptographic engine, and an I/O controller. The hardware cryptographic agent intercepts a message from the I/O controller and identifies boundaries of the message. The message may include multiple DMA transactions, and the start of message is the start of the first DMA transaction. The cryptographic engine encrypts the message and stores the encrypted data in a memory buffer. The cryptographic engine may skip and not encrypt header data starting at the start of message or may read a value from the header to determine the skip length. In some embodiments, the cryptographic agent and the cryptographic engine may be an inline cryptographic engine. In some embodiments, the cryptographic agent may be a channel identifier filter, and the cryptographic engine may be processor-based. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to protection of privacy and data on smart edge devices. An embodiment of an apparatus includes a sensor to produce a stream of sensor data; an analytics mechanism; and a trusted execution environment (TEE) including multiple keys for data security, the apparatus to exchange keys with a host server to establish one or more secure communication channels between the apparatus and a TEE on a host server, process the stream of sensor data utilizing the analytics mechanism to generate metadata, perform encryption and integrity protection of the metadata utilizing a key from the TEE for the sensor, sign the metadata utilizing a private key for the analytics mechanism, and transfer the encrypted and integrity protected metadata and the signature to the host server via the one or more secure communication channels in a manner that prevents privileged users on the host from accessing the data.

Abstract: A method comprises initializing, by an accelerator device of the computing device, an authentication tag in response to an initialization command from a trusted execution environment of the computing device, initiating a transfer, by the accelerator device, of data between a host memory and an accelerator device memory in response to a descriptor from the trusted execution environment, wherein the descriptor comprises a target memory address and is indicative of a transfer direction, comparing, in a memory range selection engine comprising at least one comparator to compare the target memory address with a plurality of address ranges and select a cryptographic key from the plurality of plurality of address range registers based on the target memory address, performing, by the accelerator device, a cryptographic operation with the data in response to transferring the data, updating, by the accelerator device, the authentication tag in response to transferring the data, and finalizing, by the accelerator device

Abstract: Technologies for secure device configuration and management include a computing device having an I/O device. A trusted agent of the computing device is trusted by a virtual machine monitor of the computing device. The trusted agent securely commands the I/O device to enter a trusted I/O mode, securely commands the I/O device to set a global lock on configuration registers, receives configuration data from the I/O device, and provides the configuration data to a trusted execution environment. In the trusted I/O mode, the I/O device rejects a configuration command if a configuration register associated with the configuration command is locked and the configuration command is not received from the trusted agent. The trusted agent may provide attestation information to the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment may verify the configuration data and the attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Technologies for secure authentication and programming of an accelerator device are described. In one example, a computing is disclosed comprising an accelerator device to: provide a unique device identifier to an accelerator services enclave (ASE) of a processor of the computing device; authenticate with the ASE by: performing a secure key exchange with the ASE to establish a shared secret tunnel key; verifying an enclave certificate of the ASE; and providing an attestation response to the ASE indicative of an accelerator device configuration; establish a secure channel with the ASE protected by the shared secret tunnel key; receive bitstream image key and bitstream data key from the ASE via the secure channel; program the accelerator device via the secure channel using the bitstream image key; and exchange data with a tenant enclave of the processor, the data protected by the bitstream data key.

Abstract: Technologies for secure authentication and programming of an accelerator device include a computing device having a processor and an accelerator. The processor establishes a trusted execution environment, which receives a unique device identifier from the accelerator, validates a device certificate for the device identifier, authenticates the accelerator in response to validating the accelerator, validates attestation information of the accelerator, and establishes a secure channel with the accelerator. The trusted execution environment may securely program a data key and a bitstream key to the accelerator, and may encrypt a bitstream image and securely program the bitstream image to the accelerator. The accelerator and a tenant may securely exchange data protected by the data key. The trusted execution environment may be a secure enclave, and the accelerator may be a field programmable gate array (FPGA). Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Attestation of operations by tool chains is described. An example of a storage medium includes instructions for receiving source code for processing of a secure workload of a tenant; selecting at least a first compute node to provide computation for the workload; processing the source code by an attestable tool chain to generate machine code for the first compute node, including performing one or more conversions of the source code by one or more convertors to generate converted code and generating an attestation associated with each code conversion, and receiving machine code for the first compute node and generating an attestation associated with the first compute node; and providing each of the attestations from the first stage and the second stage for verification.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O include a compute device having a processor, a memory, an input/output (I/O) device, and a filter logic. The filter logic is configured to receive a first key identifier from the processor, wherein the first key identifier is indicative of a shared memory range includes a shared key identifier range to be used for untrusted I/O devices and receive a transaction from the I/O device, wherein the transaction includes a second key identifier and a trust device ID indicator associated with the I/O device. The filter logic is further configured to determine whether the transaction is asserted with the trust device ID indicator indicative of whether the I/O device is assigned to a trust domain and determine, in response to a determination that the transaction is not asserted with the trust device ID indicator, whether the second key identifier matches the first key identifier.

Abstract: Technologies for cryptographic separation of MMIO operations with an accelerator device include a computing device having a processor and an accelerator. The processor establishes a trusted execution environment. The accelerator determines, based on a target memory address, a first memory address range associated with the memory-mapped I/O transaction, generates a second authentication tag using a first cryptographic key from a set of cryptographic keys, wherein the first key is uniquely associated with the first memory address range. An accelerator validator determines whether the first authentication tag matches the second authentication tag, and a memory mapper commits the memory-mapped I/O transaction in response to a determination that the first authentication tag matches the second authentication tag. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: A method comprises initializing, by an accelerator device of the computing device, an authentication tag in response to an initialization command from a trusted execution environment of the computing device, initiating a transfer, by the accelerator device, of data between a host memory and an accelerator device memory in response to a descriptor from the trusted execution environment, wherein the descriptor comprises a target memory address and is indicative of a transfer direction, comparing, in a memory range selection engine comprising at least one comparator to compare the target memory address with a plurality of address ranges and select a cryptographic key from the plurality of plurality of address range registers based on the target memory address, performing, by the accelerator device, a cryptographic operation with the data in response to transferring the data, updating, by the accelerator device, the authentication tag in response to transferring the data, and finalizing, by the accelerator device

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to a session management framework for secure communications between host systems and trusted devices. An embodiment of computer-readable storage mediums includes instructions for establishing a security agreement between a host system and a trusted device, the host device including a trusted execution environment (TEE); initiating a key exchange between the host system and the trusted device, including sending a key agreement message from the host system to the trusted device; sending an initialization message to the trusted device; validating capabilities of the trusted device for a secure communication session between the host system and the trusted device; provisioning secrets to the trusted device and initializing cryptographic parameters with the trusted device; and sending an activate session message to the trusted device to activate the secure communication session over a secure communication channel.

Abstract: Methods, apparatuses and system provide for technology that interleaves a plurality of verification commands with a plurality of copy commands in a command buffer, wherein each copy command includes a message authentication code (MAC) derived from a master session key, wherein one or more of the plurality of verification commands corresponds to a copy command in the plurality of copy commands, and wherein a verification command at an end of the command buffer corresponds to contents of the command buffer. The technology may also add a MAC generation command to the command buffer, wherein the MAC generation command references an address of a compute result.

Abstract: Systems and methods include establishing a cryptographically secure communication between an application module and an audio module. The application module is configured to execute on an information-handling machine, and the audio module is coupled to the information-handling machine. The establishment of the cryptographically secure communication may be at least partially facilitated by a mutually trusted module.