Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: According to one or more of the embodiments herein, systems and techniques for multi-system-based detection and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing are provided. In one embodiment, a method comprises: obtaining a first location of an object from a primary location determination hardware system; obtaining a second location of the object from a secondary location determination hardware system; determining a distance difference between the first location and the second location; determining whether the distance difference between the first location and the second location is acceptable based on a threshold distance; and initiating one or more mitigation actions in response to the distance difference between the first location and the second location being unacceptable.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: Satellite relaying for geolocation and mitigation of GNSS denial are provided, where a method comprises: receiving, by a processing device from a communication satellite along a communication path, a message initiated at a transmission time by a transmitting device, the communication path having a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; determining, by the device, a reception time upon receiving the message; determining, by the device, a time of travel of the message associated with only traversal of a portion of the communication that is path between the communication satellite and the target device based on a difference between the transmission time and the reception time; calculating, by the device, a distance between the communication satellite and the target device based on the time of travel; and performing, by the device, one or more actions based on the distance between the communication satellite and the target device.

Abstract: Satellite echoing for geolocation and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) denial are provided herein, where an example method comprises: transmitting, by a processing device, an echo message along a communication path having a communication satellite and a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; receiving, by the processing device, a return of the echo message from the communication satellite over the communication path; determining, by the processing device, a time of travel of the echo message associated with only a single traversal of a portion of the communication path that is between the communication satellite and the target device; calculating, by the processing device, a distance between the communication satellite and the target device based on the time of travel; and performing, by the processing device, one or more actions based on the distance between the communication satellite and the target device.

Abstract: Techniques are described for orchestration of measurements between a plurality of devices in a wireless network. In an example, a computing system configured to orchestrate round-trip time (RTT) measurements in a network of a plurality of wireless devices comprises one or more processors and a memory comprising instructions that when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: generate a network graph of the plurality of wireless devices in which each wireless device pair of a plurality of wireless device pairs of the network graph is connected by an edge assigned to an identifier, wherein each edge of at least two adjacent edges is assigned a different identifier; and orchestrate the RTT measurements such that RTT measurements between wireless device pairs connected by edges assigned to a same identifier are performed in parallel.

Abstract: In order to provide a survey that reflects details of a communication session between two parties, content of an established communication session between the parties is monitored. One or more topics in the content of the communication session are identified. For example, a voice communication between a customer and a call center agent can be monitored to identify a specific topic, such as a discussion about car insurance. Based on the identified topic, a survey is generated by incorporating the topic into the survey. For example, the survey can include a question regarding the customer's car insurance of his four wheel drive SUV, which was discussed during the call. The survey is then presented to or sent to a party of the communication session.

Abstract: According to one or more of the embodiments herein, systems and techniques for satellite relaying for geolocation and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) denial are provided.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: The disclosed embodiments estimate a location of a first wireless device based on signals received from the wireless device from two other wireless devices. To combine estimates of the two wireless devices, the two wireless devices share a definition of a plurality of geographic regions. A first set of expected phase differences for the plurality of regions are determined for a first of the two wireless devices, and a second set of expected phase differences for the plurality of regions are determined for a second of the two wireless devices. Based on these two sets of expected phase differences, each of the two devices estimate a position of the first wireless device.

Abstract: The techniques herein are directed generally to a “zero-knowledge” data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Abstract: Disclosed are embodiments that determine a location of a first wireless device based on estimates of two other wireless devices. Each of the other wireless devices is assigned or defines its own plurality of regions. Each wireless device estimates a location of the first wireless device with respect to its assigned or defined plurality of regions. One of the estimates is then translated to the other device’s plurality of regions. The two estimates are then combined to estimate the location of the first wireless device.

Abstract: Satellite echoing for geolocation and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) denial are provided herein, where an example method comprises: transmitting an initiated message to a communication satellite along a communication path that has a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; receiving a returned message from the communication satellite over the communication path in response to the initiated message; determining a local time difference between the transmission time and the reception time; calculating a distance between the communication satellite and the target device, the distance calculated based on a portion of the determined time difference associated with only a single traversal of a portion of the communication path that is between the communication satellite and the target device; and performing one or more actions based on the distance between the communication satellite and the target device.

Abstract: In one embodiment, the techniques herein are directed to receiving a reason for a call at a user device. For instance, an illustrative method herein may comprise: receiving, at an application on a recipient device of a user, information about a call to be made from an initiating device, the information having an outbound phone number of the call, a name of an organization of the initiating device, and a reason for the call; and configuring, by the application, a caller identification process on the recipient device to display, in response to receiving a subsequent call from the outbound phone number, the name of the organization and the reason for the call; wherein, in response to the initiating device calling the recipient device using the outbound phone number, the caller identification process on the recipient device displays the name of the organization and the reason for the call.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a method herein may comprise: receiving, at a first device, an encrypted private key of a second device encrypted using a public key of the first device, wherein the second device encrypted data into encrypted data using a public key of the second device and stored the encrypted data on a storage server; and decrypting, by the first device, a private key of the second device from the encrypted private key using a private key of the first device; and accessing, by the first device, the encrypted data on the storage server by utilizing the private key of the second device.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a method herein may comprise: identifying, by an initiating device of an organization, a user and a reason for a call to a recipient device of the user, the recipient device having an inbound phone number; informing an intermediate service about the call to the recipient device and the reason for the call, wherein the intermediate service coordinates with an application on the recipient device to inform the recipient device of the call, an outbound phone number of the call, a name of the organization, and the reason for the call; and calling, using the outbound phone number, the recipient device at the inbound phone number, wherein the application on the recipient device has configured a caller identification process on the recipient device to display, in response to receiving the call from the outbound phone number, the name of the organization and the reason for the call.