Abstract: A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) mitigation technique that can be implemented wholly on the client by installing a client-side filter that prevents reflected XSS vulnerabilities. XSS filtering performed entirely on the client-side enables web browsers to defend against XSS involving servers which may not have sufficient XSS mitigations in place. The technique accurately identifies XSS attacks using carefully selected heuristics and matching suspect portions of URLs and POST data with reflected page content. The technique used by the filter quickly identifies and passes through traffic which is deemed safe, keeping performance impact from the filter to a minimum. Non-HTML MIME types can be passed through quickly as well as requests which are same-site. For the remaining requests, regular expressions are not run across the full HTTP response unless XSS heuristics are matched in the HTTP request URL or POST data.

Abstract: A method for executing trusted commands, in which a trusted command is first received from a user at a user terminal and parsed by untrusted code; then passed to a trusted computing base for execution. The trusted computing base displays some indication of what is to be done back to the user for confirmation. Confirmation of the commands prevents unauthorized modification of the commands and increases system confidence. A randomly (or pseudo-randomly) generated process identifier is employed to verify the existence of a trusted path.

Abstract: A method for executing trusted commands, in which a trusted command is first received from a user at a user terminal and parsed by untrusted code; then passed to a trusted computing base for execution. The trusted computing base displays some indication of what is to be done back to the user for confirmation. Confirmation of the commands prevents unauthorized modification of the commands and increases system confidence. A randomly (or pseudo-randomly) generated process identifier is employed to verify the existence of a trusted path.

Abstract: A method for executing trusted commands, in which a trusted command is first received from a user at a user terminal and parsed by untrusted code; then passed to a trusted computing base for execution. The trusted computing base displays to the user for confirmation indication of what is to be done. Confirmation of the commands prevents unauthorized modification of the commands and increases system confidence. A randomly (or pseudo-randomly) generated process identifier is employed to verify the existence of a trusted path.

Abstract: A system and method for data escrow cryptography are described. An encrypting user encrypts a message using a secret storage key (KS) and attaches a data recovery field (DRF), including an access rule index (ARI) and KS, to the encrypted message. The DRF and the encrypted message are stored in a storage device. To recover KS, a decrypting user extracts and sends the DRF to a data recovery center (DRC) that issues a challenge based on access rules (ARs) originally defined by the encrypting user. If the decrypting user meets the challenge, the DRC sends KS in a message to the decrypting user. Generally, KS need not be an encryption key but could represent any piece of confidential information that can fit inside the DRF. In all cases, the DRC limits access to decrypting users who can meet the challenge defined in either the ARs defined by the encrypting user or the ARs defined for override access.

Abstract: A system and method for key escrow cryptography for use in a system comprising a sender and a receiver. Only public escrow keys are stored in the sender and the receiver. The sender encrypts a message using a secret session key (KS), and generates a leaf verification string (LVS) by combining an unique program identifier (UIP), a public portion of a program unique key (KUpub), and a signature. The sender encrypts the KS using the KUpub to generate a first encrypted session key (EKS), and generates a first law enforcement access field (LEAF) by encrypting a combination of the first EKS and the UIP with a copy of a public portion of a family key (KFpub) stored in the sender. The encrypted message, the LVS, and the first LEAF are transmitted from the sender to the receiver. The receiver stores therein a public portion of the KEPF key (KEPFpub). The receiver extracts the UIP, KUpub, and the signature from the LVS, and then encrypts the KS using the extracted KUpub to generate a second encrypted session key (EKS).

Abstract: A system and method for data escrow cryptography are described. An encrypting user encrypts a message using a secret storage key (KS) and attaches a data recovery field (DRF), including an access rule index (ARI) and KS, to the encrypted message. The DRF and the encrypted message are stored in a storage device. To recover KS, a decrypting user extracts and sends the DRF to a data recovery center (DRC) that issues a challenge based on access rules (ARs) originally defined by the encrypting user. If the decrypting user meets the challenge, the DRC sends KS in a message to the decrypting user. Generally, KS need not be an encryption key but could represent any piece of confidential information that can fit inside the DRF. In all cases, the DRC limits access to decrypting users who can meet the challenge defined in either the ARs defined by the encrypting user or the ARs defined for override access.

Abstract: A cryptographic communications system and method is provided for access field verification. A key exchange field which includes an encryption of at least part of a first encryption key using a public portion of a second encryption key, an access field which includes an encryption of at least part of the first encryption key using a public portion of a third encryption key, and a verification field which is created from at least one value used to create at least one of the key exchange field and the access field are provided to a receiver. Using the verification field, the receiver verifies that at least part of the first encryption key contained within the key exchange field and at least part of the first encryption key contained within the access field are equivalent. If the receiver's verification is successful, the access field is determined to be authentic.

Abstract: A system and method for key escrow cryptography for use in a system comprising a sender and a receiver. Only public escrow keys are stored in the sender and the receiver. The sender encrypts a message using a secret session key (KS), and generates a leaf verification string (LVS) by combining an unique program identifier (UIP), a public portion of a program unique key (KUpub), and a signature. The sender encrypts the KS using the KUpub to generate a first encrypted session key (EKS), and generates a first law enforcement access field (LEAF) by encrypting a combination of the first EKS and the UIP with a copy of a public portion of a family key (KFpub) stored in the sender. The encrypted message, the LVS, and the first LEAF are transmitted from the sender to the receiver. The receiver stores therein a public portion of the KEPF key (KEPFpub). The receiver extracts the UIP, KUpub, and the signature from the LVS, and then encrypts the KS using the extracted KUpub to generate a second encrypted session key (EKS).

Abstract: A system and method for dam escrow cryptography are described. An encrypting user encrypts a message using a secret storage key (KS) and attaches a data recovery field (DRF), including an access rule index (ARI) and KS, to the encrypted message. The DRF and the encrypted message are stored in a storage device. To recover KS, a decrypting user extracts and sends the DRF to a data recovery center (DRC) that issues a challenge based on access rules (ARs) originally defined by the encrypting user. If the decrypting user meets the challenge, the DRC sends KS in a message to the decrypting user. Generally, KS need not be an encryption key but could represent any piece of confidential information that can fit inside the DRF. In all cases, the DRC limits access to decrypting users who can meet the challenge defined in either the ARs defined by the encrypting user or the ARs defined for override access.

Abstract: A method and apparatus for authenticating a human user on a personal computer without requiring the user to expose his password or authentication secret to the personal computer of a server. Also a method for protecting a floppy disk with login software from unauthorized use.