Abstract: A process for solubilizing hydrophobic active ingredients in aqueous medium, which comprises using, as an assistant, at least one hyperbranched polymer (A) which is obtainable by reacting at least one hyperbranched polymeric compound having at least one primary or secondary amino group per molecule (a), selected from (a1) hyperbranched polyamides and (a2) hyperbranched polyureas, with (b) at least one mono-, di- or oligosaccharide.

Abstract: A process for solubilizing hydrophobic active ingredients in aqueous medium, which comprises using, as an assistant, at least one hyperbranched polymer (A) which is obtainable by reacting at least one hyperbranched polymeric compound having at least one primary or secondary amino group per molecule (a), selected from (a1) hyperbranched polyamides and (a2) hyperbranched polyureas, with (b) at least one mono-, di- or oligosaccharide.

Abstract: Software protection using data structures is described. In one implementation, an engine between the processor and the memory of a computing device encrypts and stores data and program variables in blocks of memory that correspond to nodes of a tree-like data structure. When accessed, the nodes of this search tree are rearranged according to various schemata to obscure memory access patterns from being detected by cache attacks or side-channel attacks. In one implementation, the data structure is a splay tree that self-rearranges upon access and increases efficiency while providing security.

Abstract: Techniques are described for generating and validating signatures. In an implementation, a method includes generating a signature by utilizing a plurality of isogenies included on a private key and incorporating the signature and a public key on a product, in which the public key is configured to validate the signature.

Abstract: In at least one implementation, described herein, P and Q1, . . . , Qn are public points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, but the ratios of Qi to P are private. Those ratios are the components (?1, . . . , ?n) of a private key, where Qi=?i P. This implementation generates short digital ciphers (i.e., signatures), at least in part, by mapping a message M to a point T on the elliptic curve and then scaling that point T based upon the private key ? to get S. At least one other implementation, described herein, verifies those ciphers by comparing pairing values of two pairs, where one pair is the public point P and the scaled point S and another pair is public Q and the point T. This implementation tests whether log(Q)/log(P)=log(S)/log(T), without computing any elliptic curve discrete logarithm directly.

Abstract: Software protection using data structures is described. In one implementation, an engine between the processor and the memory of a computing device encrypts and stores data and program variables in blocks of memory that correspond to nodes of a tree-like data structure. When accessed, the nodes of this search tree are rearranged according to various schemata to obscure memory access patterns from being detected by cache attacks or side-channel attacks. In one implementation, the data structure is a splay tree that self-rearranges upon access and increases efficiency while providing security.

Abstract: Techniques are described for generating and validating signatures. In an implementation, a method includes generating a signature by utilizing a plurality of isogenies included on a private key and incorporating the signature and a public key on a product, in which the public key is configured to validate the signature.

Abstract: Fast methods for generating randomly distributed pairs of keys for use in public-key cryptography use a precomputation step to reduce the online task of discrete exponentiation with long integers. After the precomputation is completed, the online steps required to produce a key pair are reduced to a small number .kappa. (about 16) of modular multiplications with long integers. The key pairs are of the form (k, g.sup.k) or (k, k.sup.e) where the exponentiations are computed modulo a long number p, g and e are fixed integers, and k is randomly distributed modulo ord(g), where ord(g) is the smallest positive integer that satisfies g.sup.ord(g) modulo p=1. The complexity of doing the precomputation step is itself about n exponentiation and may be accelerated to the same as two exponentiations, but the precomputation step needs to be done only very infrequently.