Abstract: Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to determine that a secure domain has been created on a device, where keys are required to access the secure domain, obtain the keys that are required to access the secure domain from a network element, and encrypt the keys and store the encrypted keys on the device. In an example, only the secure domain can decrypt the encrypted keys and the device is a virtual machine.

Abstract: An embodiment: (a) receives a request for a measurement of a hypervisor from at least one computing node that is external to the at least one machine; (b) executes a previously measured measuring agent to measure the hypervisor, after the hypervisor is measured and booted, to generate a measurement while: (b)(i) the at least one machine is in virtual machine extension (VMX) root operation, and (b)(ii) the measuring agent is in a protected mode; (c) attest to the measurement, based on at least one encryption credential, to generate an attested measurement output; and (d) communicate the attested measurement output to the at least one computing node. The hypervisor does not include the at least one encryption credential while the measuring agent is measuring the booted hypervisor. Other embodiments are described herein.

Abstract: A computing platform implements one or more secure enclaves including a first provisioning enclave to interface with a first provisioning service to obtain a first attestation key from the first provisioning service, a second provisioning enclave to interface with a different, second provisioning service to obtain a second attestation key from the second provisioning service, and a provisioning certification enclave to sign first data from the first provisioning enclave and second data from the second provisioning enclave using a hardware-based provisioning attestation key. The signed first data is used by the first provisioning enclave to authenticate to the first provisioning service to obtain the first attestation key and the signed second data is used by the second provisioning enclave to authenticate to the second provisioning service to obtain the second attestation key.

Abstract: Embodiments of an invention for memory management in secure enclaves are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive a first instruction and a second instruction. The execution unit is to execute the first instruction, wherein execution of the first instruction includes allocating a page in an enclave page cache to a secure enclave. The execution unit is also to execute the second instruction, wherein execution of the second instruction includes confirming the allocation of the page.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: An apparatus and method for securely suspending and resuming the state of a processor. For example, one embodiment of a method comprises: generating a data structure including at least the monotonic counter value; generating a message authentication code (MAC) over the data structure using a first key; securely providing the data structure and the MAC to a module executed on the processor; the module verifying the MAC, comparing the monotonic counter value with a counter value stored during a previous suspend operation and, if the counter values match, then loading processor state required for the resume operation to complete. Another embodiment of a method comprises: generating a first key by a processor; securely sharing the first key with an off-processor component; and using the first key to generate a pairing ID usable to identify a pairing between the processor and the off-processor component.

Abstract: A secure migration enclave is provided to identify a launch of a particular virtual machine on a host computing system, where the particular virtual machine is launched to include a secure quoting enclave to perform an attestation of one or more aspects of the virtual machine. A root key for the particular virtual machine is generated using the secure migration enclave hosted on the host computing system for use in association with provisioning the secure quoting enclave with an attestation key to be used in the attestation. The migration enclave registers the root key with a virtual machine registration service.

Abstract: A secure key manager enclave is provided on a host computing system to send an attestation quote to a secure key store system identifying attributes of the key manager enclave and signed by a hardware-based key of the host computing system to attest to trustworthiness of the secure key manager enclave. The secure key manager enclave receives a request to provide a root key for a particular virtual machine to be run on the host computing system, generates a secure data structure in secure memory of the host computing system to be associated with the particular virtual machine, and provisions the root key in the secure data structure using the key manager enclave, where the key manager enclave is to have privileged access to the secure data structure.

Abstract: Embodiments of an invention for memory management in secure enclaves are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive a first instruction and a second instruction. The execution unit is to execute the first instruction, wherein execution of the first instruction includes allocating a page in an enclave page cache to a secure enclave. The execution unit is also to execute the second instruction, wherein execution of the second instruction includes confirming the allocation of the page.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for implemented trusted packet processing for multi-domain separatization and security. Secure enclaves are created in system memory of a compute platform configured to support a virtualized execution environment including a plurality of virtual machines (VMs) or containers, each secure enclave occupying a respective protected portion of the system memory, wherein software code external from a secure enclave cannot access code or data within a secure enclave, and software code in a secure enclave can access code and data both within the secure enclave and external to the secure enclave. Software code for implementing packet processing operations is installed in the secure enclaves. The software in the secure enclaves is then executed to perform the packet processing operations.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for extending packet processing to trusted programmable and fixed-function accelerators. Secure enclaves are created in system memory of a compute platform, wherein software code external from a secure enclave cannot access code or data within a secure enclave, and software code in a secure enclave can access code and data both within the secure enclave and external to the secure enclave. Software code for implementing packet processing operations is installed in the secure enclaves. The compute platform further includes one or more hardware-based accelerators that are used by the software to offload packet processing operations. The accelerators are configured to read packet data from input queues, process the data, and output processed data to output queues, wherein the input and output queues are located in encrypted portions of memory that may be in a secure enclave or external to the secure enclaves.

Abstract: A processor to support platform migration of secure enclaves is disclosed. In one embodiment, the processor includes a memory controller unit to access secure enclaves and a processor core coupled to the memory controller unit. The processor core to identify a control structure associated with a secure enclave. The control structure comprises a plurality of data slots and keys associated with a first platform comprising the memory controller unit and the processor core. A version of data from the secure enclave is associated with the plurality of data slots. Migratable keys are generated as a replacement for the keys associated with the control structure. The migratable keys control access to the secure enclave. Thereafter, the control structure is migrated to a second platform to enable access to the secure enclave on the second platform.

Abstract: Particular embodiments described herein provide for receiving a request from a first cloud component in a cloud network, wherein the request is to access a key and the key allows the first cloud component to access located trusted execution environment of a second cloud component in the cloud network and allow the request on the condition that the first cloud component is authenticated. A more specific example includes determining a type for the first cloud component, and comparing the determined type of the first cloud component with a component type associated with the key. The example may also include blocking the request if the determined type of the first cloud component does not match the component type associated with the key.

Abstract: A technique to enable secure application and data integrity within a computer system. In one embodiment, one or more secure enclaves are established in which an application and data may be stored and executed.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to store data in a secure domain in a cloud network, create encryption keys, where each encryption key is to provide a different type of access to the data, and store the encryption keys in a secure domain key store in the cloud network. In an example, each encryption key provides access to a different version of the data. In another example, a counter engine stores the location of each version of the data in the cloud network.

Abstract: Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to determine that a secure domain has been created on a device, where keys are required to access the secure domain, obtain the keys that are required to access the secure domain from a network element, and encrypt the keys and store the encrypted keys on the device. In an example, only the secure domain can decrypt the encrypted keys and the device is a virtual machine.

Abstract: Embodiments include systems, methods, computer readable media, and devices configured to, for a first processor of a platform, generate a platform root key; create a data structure to encapsulate the platform root key, the data structure comprising a platform provisioning key and an identification of a registration service; and transmit, on a secure connection, the data structure to the registration service to register the platform root key for the first processor of the platform. Embodiments include systems, methods, computer readable media, and devices configured to store a device certificate received from a key generation facility; receive a manifest from a platform, the manifest comprising an identification of a processor associated with the platform; and validate the processor using a stored device certificate.

Abstract: An apparatus and method are described for implementing a trusted dynamic launch and trusted platform module (TPM) using a secure enclave. For example, a computer-implemented method according to one embodiment of the invention comprises: initializing a secure enclave in response to a first command, the secure enclave comprising a trusted software execution environment which prevents software executing outside the enclave from having access to software and data inside the enclave; and executing a trusted platform module (TPM) from within the secure enclave, the trusted platform module securely reading data from a set of platform control registers (PCR) in a processor or chipset component into a memory region allocated to the secure enclave.