Abstract: Methods, system, and apparatuses may support end-to-end (E2E) quality of service (QoS) through the use of service layer (SL) sessions. For example, an application can communicate with a targeted device based on application specified schedule, latency, jitter, error rate, throughput, level of security, and cost requirements.

Abstract: One or more devices may include a credentials server. The credentials server may be configured to: receive primary Standalone Non-Public Network (SNPN) credentials for a User Equipment device (UE) and SNPN information. The primary SNPN credentials and the SNPN information are associated with the UE and an SNPN. The devices may be configured to generate temporary SNPN credentials based on the primary SNPN credentials and the SNPNN information. The devices may forward the temporary SNPN credentials to the SNPN.

Abstract: Systems and methods leverage trust anchors to generate tokens which can then be used by network functions (NFs). A virtualization infrastructure manager (VIM) for a virtualized platform receives a NF software package and a certificate request token (CRT) from a management function. The NF is a virtual NF, a containerized NF, or another virtual entity (xNF) to be deployed. The CRT is digitally signed by the management function and includes a network address of a trust anchor platform and a NF profile. The VIM deploys the NF and provides the CRT to the NF. The NF obtains from the CRT the network address of the trust anchor platform, generates a certificate signing request (CSR) for a digital certificate, and submits the CSR and the CRT to the trust anchor platform. The NF receives a digital certificate from the trust anchor platform based on validation of both the CSR and CRT.

Abstract: Existing approaches to security within network, for instance oneM2M networks, are limited. For example, content might only be protected while the content is in transit between entities that trust each other. Here, the integrity and the confidentiality of content in an M2M network are protected. Such content may be “at rest,” such that the content is stored at a hosting node. Only authorized entities may store and retrieve the data that is stored at the hosting node, and the data may be protected from a confidentiality perspective and an integrity perspective.

Abstract: Methods, system, and apparatuses may support end-to-end (E2E) quality of service (QoS) through the use of service layer (SL) sessions. For example, an application can communicate with a targeted device based on application specified schedule, latency, jitter, error rate, throughput, level of security, and cost requirements.

Abstract: Described herein are complete lifecycle management processes for IoT/M2M devices. In an example, devices are commissioned and de-commissioned in a given system without requiring a user/human administrator. A delegated life-cycle management process is described, wherein devices rely upon a delegatee, which may have more computing and battery resources than the devices, to perform complete or partial lifecycle management operations on behalf of the devices. The delegatee may be a trusted entity that may belong to the same domain as the devices. Further, a Trust Enabling Infrastructure (TEI) is described herein, which may belong to a different trusted domain than the given device and its delegatee.

Abstract: A method may include receiving, at a network device, a registration request that comprises a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) associated with a particular user equipment (UE) device. The network device determines whether the SUCI indicates a request for null-scheme network access; and retrieves a scheme authorization parameter for the UE device when it is determined that the SUCI indicates a request for null-scheme network access. The scheme authorization parameter indicates whether the UE device is authorized for null-scheme access to a service provider network. The network device determines whether the UE device is authorized for null-scheme network access based on the retrieved scheme authorization parameter and performs processing associated with null-scheme network access when it is determined that the particular UE device is authorized for null-scheme network access.

Abstract: Systems and methods enable secure service-based communications in networks that use a Services Communications Proxy (SCP). A Network Function (NF) producer receives a service request including an authorization token and a signed service request object, wherein the service request originates from an NF consumer of the wireless core network and is forwarded to the NF producer via the SCP. The NF producer verifies the signed service request object and generates, after the verifying, a service response. The service response includes a signed service response object. The NF producer sends, to the NF consumer and via the SCP, the service response with the signed service response object.

Abstract: A caching entity may store a cached copy of a service layer resource. An original hosting entity may maintain a registry of the corresponding cached resources. Optionally, the original hosting entity may set cache parameters to govern the lifetime of the cache on a caching entity. The caching entity may keep storing the cached copy of the resource and the original hosting entity may obtain statistics about the cached resource. By knowing the statistics, e.g. how many times a resource is retrieved on each caching entity, the original hosting entity may better manage the resource.

Abstract: Described herein are complete lifecycle management processes for IoT/M2M devices, which are commissioned and de-commissioned in a given system without requiring a user/human administrator. A delegated life-cycle management process is described, wherein devices rely upon a delegatee, which may have more computing and battery resources than the devices. Further, a Trust Enabling Infrastructure (TEI) is described herein, which may belong to a different trusted domain than the given device and its delegatee. A device in response to powering on for the first time, registers with a trust enabling infrastructure (TEI) and generates one or more credentials based on the registration with the TEI so as to define a trust relationship with the TEI. After the registration, the device receives one or more security components and policies from the TEI and installs the one or more security components so as to define a secure environment.

Abstract: Systems and methods described herein enforce access controls for network slices via proxy in a secure enclave of a user equipment (UE) device. A UE device executes, in a rich execution environment (REE), a function or application designated for using one or more secure network slices of a telecommunications network. The UE device executes, in a trusted execution environment (TEE), a slice admission control proxy (SACP) to perform admission control for the one or more secure network slices, and forces network traffic for the function or application through the SACP.

Abstract: Multi-RAT UEs currently have 2 independent paths to authenticate with HSS (e.g., via the MME or the 3GPP AAA Server causing repeated authentication messages to HSS). The use of one unified authentication path between the UE and HSS for Small Cell and Wi-Fi authentication is described. First, a new 3GPP EPC-TWAN interworking architecture has the MME manage all the authentication requests from multi-RAT UEs. Second, new unified authentication procedures are added, which allow the ISWN-based multi-RAT UE to be authenticated directly with the HSS, irrespective of its current access network (TWAN or HeNB). Third, new fast re-authentication procedures for Inter-RAT handover scenarios are done. Finally, the needed extensions to the various standard protocol messages to execute the authentication procedures are described.

Abstract: Existing approaches to security within network, for instance oneM2M networks, are limited. For example, content might only be protected while the content is in transit between entities that trust each other. Here, the integrity and the confidentiality of content in an M2M network are protected. Such content may be “at rest,” such that the content is stored at a hosting node. Only authorized entities may store and retrieve the data that is stored at the hosting node, and the data may be protected from a confidentiality perspective and an integrity perspective.

Abstract: IoT service layer capabilities may be employed to automate and simplify the service enrollment process for IoT service subscribers/enrollees. These capabilities enable virtualization of a service subscriber and the physical IoT devices, applications, data and authorized users of the subscriber into a software profile that is representative of the subscriber. Once virtualized, a service subscriber may then delegate the complexities and burden of service enrollment to an automated IoT service enrollment software function.

Abstract: Systems and methods enable the provisioning of security as a service for network slices. A network device stores definitions of multiple security assurance levels for network slices based on security parameters of assets used in the network slices. The network device stores multiple network slice templates, wherein the multiple network slice templates have different security assurance levels, of the multiple security assurance levels, for a Network Service Descriptor (NSD). The network device receives a request for a network slice with a requested security assurance level, of the multiple security assurance levels, for the NSD, and deploys the network slice using one of the network slice templates that has a security assurance level that corresponds to the requested security assurance level. The network device monitors the security parameters of the assets of the network slice for changes to the security assurance level of the deployed network slice.

Abstract: Methods, system, and apparatuses may support end-to-end (E2E) quality of service (QoS) through the use of service layer (SL) sessions. For example, an application can communicate with a targeted device based on application specified schedule, latency, jitter, error rate, throughput, level of security, and cost requirements.

Abstract: Systems and methods enable the provisioning of security as a service for network slices. A network device stores definitions of multiple security assurance levels for network slices based on security parameters of assets used in the network slices. The network device stores multiple network slice templates, wherein the multiple network slice templates have different security assurance levels, of the multiple security assurance levels, for a Network Service Descriptor (NSD). The network device receives a request for a network slice with a requested security assurance level, of the multiple security assurance levels, for the NSD, and deploys the network slice using one of the network slice templates that has a security assurance level that corresponds to the requested security assurance level. The network device monitors the security parameters of the assets of the network slice for changes to the security assurance level of the deployed network slice.

Abstract: IoT service layer capabilities may be employed to automate and simplify the service enrollment process for IoT service subscribers/enrollees. These capabilities enable virtualization of a service subscriber and the physical IoT devices, applications, data and authorized users of the subscriber into a software profile that is representative of the subscriber. Once virtualized, a service subscriber may then delegate the complexities and burden of service enrollment to an automated IoT service enrollment software function.

Abstract: A computer device may include a memory storing instructions and processor configured to execute the instructions to host a network function container that implements a microservice for a network function in a wireless communications network, wherein the network function container is deployed by a container orchestration platform; host a service proxy container associated with the network function container, wherein the service proxy container is deployed by the container orchestration platform; and configure the hosted service proxy container to apply a wireless network policy to the microservice for the network function. The processor may be further configured to intercept messages associated with the microservice for the network function using the configured service proxy container; and apply the wireless network policy to the intercepted messages using the configured service proxy container.

Abstract: Enhancements to the device management functionality within service layer architecture of a Gateway node are described. The SL application registration procedure can be enhanced for devices in support of device management. Functionality can be added to the service layer to initiate automated request notification for DM purposes. Lightweight SL Transport Protocol bindings can support sending multiple DM commands called DM Action Scripts with a specific focus on the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Protocol.