Abstract: A storage may store machine-readable instructions for execution by a processor. Execution of the machine-readable instructions may cause the processor to receive an update capsule via a firmware update interface. The update capsule may include a device identifier and a payload. The payload may include data that is different from a firmware update. Execution of the machine-readable instructions may cause the processor to execute a virtual device handler, based on the device identifier, to process the payload.

Abstract: A computer device includes a network interface to connect to a computer network, memory, and a processor connected to the network interface and the memory. The processor is to execute instructions stored in the memory. The instructions are to establish a connection with an auxiliary computer device and start a proxy to forward network communications between the auxiliary computer device and the computer network. The instructions are further to start the proxy in response to the computer device receiving a captive portal from the computer network.

Abstract: In example implementations, an apparatus is provided. The apparatus includes a controller, a memory protection policy, an electrically isolated memory, and a non-volatile memory. The memory protection policy includes an allowable write function. The electrically isolated memory is to store code executable by the controller to execute a requested write function based on the set of memory protections. The non-volatile memory is in communication with the controller. The requested write function is to be executed in the non-volatile memory when the requested write function matches the allowable write function.

Abstract: A computer device includes a network interface to connect to a computer network, memory, and a processor connected to the network interface and the memory. The processor is to execute instructions stored in the memory. The instructions are to establish a connection with an auxiliary computer device and start a proxy to forward network communications between the auxiliary computer device and the computer network. The instructions are further to start the proxy in response to the computer device receiving a captive portal from the computer network.

Abstract: In some examples, a system includes a memory resource, a communication channel to allow a bus mastering capable device to access the memory resource, and a controller to block the system from responding to a request from the bus mastering capable device for accessing the memory resource until the controller has authorized the bus mastering capable device.

Abstract: Examples associated with basic input/output system (BIOS) up-dates are described. One example method includes system management mode locking a first pre-extensible firmware interface initialization (PEI) region and a driver execution environment (DXE) region of a shared serial peripheral (SPI) chip of a BIOS of a computer. A second PEI region of the shared SPI chip is chipset locked. A record in a system management random access memory associated with a video option read only memory (ROM) is created. The video option ROM is loaded. The first PEI region is updated, and periodic graphical updates regarding the progress of updating the first PEI region are provided using the video option ROM.

Abstract: In some examples, an embedded controller in a system monitors a basic input/output system (BIOS) policy stored in a non-volatile storage, and executes a management action with respect to the BIOS policy, where the monitoring and the executing are performed by the embedded controller independent of instructions executed by a processor in the system.

Abstract: A method of protecting basic input/output system (BIOS) code. The method includes, with a relocation information tool executed by a processor, refactoring a number of data sections within a number of handlers of the BIOS code to tag a number of variables within the handlers. The tags indicate which of the variables should be protected at runtime. The method further includes generating a relocation file comprising a number of relocation addresses identifying locations of a number of dynamic variables that change at runtime. The relocation addresses point to a location within the handlers different from an original location. The method further includes, with a loader, loading at runtime the relocation file as part of a BIOS firmware image and adjusting data access to the dynamic variables in handler code to identify the location of the dynamic variables based on the relocation file.

Abstract: Examples herein disclose erasing data from a target device based upon an authentication of an erase command. The examples receive an erase command during execution to boot strap information and authenticate the erase command. Upon the authentication of the erase command, the examples erase data from the target device prior to completion of execution of boot strap information.

Abstract: A method of protecting basic input/output system (BIOS) code. The method includes, with a relocation information tool executed by a processor, refactoring a number of data sections within a number of handlers of the BIOS code to tag a number of variables within the handlers. The tags indicate which of the variables should be protected at runtime. The method further includes generating a relocation file comprising a number of relocation addresses identifying locations of a number of dynamic variables that change at runtime. The relocation addresses point to a location within the handlers different from an original location. The method further includes, with a loader, loading at runtime the relocation file as part of a BIOS firmware image and adjusting data access to the dynamic variables in handler code to identify the location of the dynamic variables based on the relocation file.

Abstract: In some examples, an embedded controller in a system monitors a basic input/output system (BIOS) policy stored in a non-volatile storage, and executes a management action with respect to the BIOS policy, where the monitoring and the executing are performed by the embedded controller independent of instructions executed by a processor in the system.

Abstract: Examples herein disclose erasing data from a target device based upon an authentication of an erase command. The examples receive an erase command during execution to boot strap information and authenticate the erase command. Upon the authentication of the erase command, the examples erase data from the target device prior to completion of execution of boot strap information.

Abstract: An authentication system is disclosed herein. An example includes a computing device and a port associated with the computing device for connection of an accessory to the computing device. The example also includes an authentication device that generates an accessory response upon receipt of a challenge and a hardware controller. The hardware controller generates both the challenge and an expected response to the challenge. It compares the expected response to the accessory response to ascertain if the accessory response is one of a valid response and an invalid response, and it signals for the port to be enabled for the valid response to allow access to functionality of the accessory by the computing device. Other features and components of the authentication system are also disclosed herein, as is a method of authenticating an accessory for use by a computing device.

Abstract: A method of tamper-resistant control comprising reading a flag of an electronic device with firmware, the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state of the electronic device and provisioning a management processor of the electronic device to facilitate communications between the management processor and a server in response to reading the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state.

Abstract: A media access control (MAC) address management system, comprises logic configured to generate a MAC address for at least one network device of a computing device based on a MAC address of another network device of the computing device.

Abstract: A method of tamper-resistant control comprising reading a flag of an electronic device with firmware, the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state of the electronic device and provisioning a management processor of the electronic device to facilitate communications between the management processor and a server in response to reading the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state

Abstract: A media access control (MAC) address management system, comprises logic configured to generate a MAC address for at least one network device of a computing device based on a MAC address of another network device of the computing device.