Abstract: A Tamper-Resistant Communication layer (TRC) adapted to mitigate ad hoc network attacks launched by malicious nodes is presented. One embodiment of the invention utilizes TRC, which is a lean communication layer placed between a network layer and the link layer of a network protocol stack. All aspects of the network protocol stack, with the exception of the routing protocol and data packet forwarding mechanism in the network layer, are unchanged. TRC takes charge of certain key functions of a routing protocol in order to minimize network attacks. Additionally, TRC implements highly accurate self-monitoring and reporting functionality that can be used by nodes in the network to detect compromised nodes. TRC of a node controls its ability to communicate with other nodes by providing non-repudiation of communications. The tamper-resistant nature of TRC provides high assurance that it cannot be bypassed or compromised.

Abstract: A Tamper-Resistant Communication layer (TRC) adapted to mitigate ad hoc network attacks launched by malicious nodes is presented. One embodiment of the invention utilizes TRC, which is a lean communication layer placed between a network layer and the link layer of a network protocol stack. All aspects of the network protocol stack, with the exception of the routing protocol and data packet forwarding mechanism in the network layer, are unchanged. TRC takes charge of certain key functions of a routing protocol in order to minimize network attacks. Additionally, TRC implements highly accurate self-monitoring and reporting functionality that can be used by nodes in the network to detect compromised nodes. TRC of a node controls its ability to communicate with other nodes by providing non-repudiation of communications. The tamper-resistant nature of TRC provides high assurance that it cannot be bypassed or compromised.

Abstract: A method and data processing apparatus for performing automated trust negotiations between first and second parties connected over a network can include providing each party with a set of credentials. The method also can include classifying one or more credentials in the set of credentials for the first party as sensitive, such that they can only be disclosed to another party subject to certain predetermined criteria. The method further can include establishing negotiations over the network between the first and second parties in order to complete a desired transaction, wherein the transaction is only authorized to proceed if at least one of the parties receives certain predetermined credentials from the other party.

Abstract: Distributed software subjects face the problem of determining one another's trustworthiness. The problem considered herein is managing the exchange of credentials between strangers for the purpose of property-based authentication and authorization when credentials, authenticating properties of the subject, are sensitive. An architecture for trust negotiation between client and server is presented. The notion of a trust negotiation strategy is introduced with respect to an abstract model of trust negotiation. Two strategies with very different properties are defined and analyzed. A language of credential expressions is described, with two example negotiations illustrating the two negotiation strategies ongoing work on policies governing credential disclosure and trust negotiation is disclosed.