DEVICE DEFAULT WIFI CREDENTIALS FOR SIMPLIFIED AND SECURE CONFIGURATION OF NETWORKED TRANSDUCERS
A wireless device with transducers can support remote monitoring and include an 802.11 compatible radio and a set of device default credentials. The device can be installed at a physical location with service from a fixed access point operating with a different set of owner credentials. A mobile phone can (i) scan a tag for the device and download a set of configuration parameters for the device, and (ii) authenticate with a configuration system. The mobile phone can receive the set of device default credentials from the configuration system. The mobile phone can activate a mobile access point using the set of device default credentials. The device can connect with the mobile phone's access point and receive a ciphertext with the owner credentials and a configuration package. The device can apply the configuration package and load the owner credentials in order to connect with the fixed access point.
This U.S. non-provisional application claims the benefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 62/653,785, filed Apr. 6, 2018, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
BACKGROUND Technical FieldThe present systems and methods relate to configuration and operation of networked transducers, and more particularly, to systems and methods for a transducer device to use preconfigured WiFi credentials, in order for the transducer device to communicate with a configuration system.
Description of Related ArtThe ability to connect transducers such as sensors and actuators with a network is a growing field with many economical applications. As the costs for both electronic hardware and bandwidth continue to decrease, the use of networked transducers is expected to continue increasing over the coming decades. Connecting transducers to a network can be referred to as “machine-to-machine (M2M) communications” or “the Internet of Things (IoT).” Among many potential benefits, IoT technologies allow automated monitoring and/or control of assets, equipment, personnel, or a physical location where manual monitoring may not be economical. Many applications for the “Internet of Things” significantly reduce costs by using automated monitoring instead of manual techniques. Prominent examples of IoT applications today include monitoring and control for building heating/air-conditioning, automobiles, alarm systems, and tracking devices. Fast growing markets for IoT applications today include health applications such as the remote monitoring of a person's fitness activity, heartbeat, or glucose levels, monitoring of industrial equipment deployed remotely in the field, and also security systems.
IoT communications can provide remote control over actuators that may be connected to a device, such as turning on or off a power switch, locking or unlocking a door, adjusting a speed of a motor, or similar remote control. A decision to change or adjust an actuator associated with a connected device can utilize one or a series of sensor measurements. As one example, an IoT device for a truck can periodically report engine status to a remote server, and if the engine is operating outside specifications such as being too hot, including potentially an “alarm” condition, then temperature and an alarm code can be reported to a central server for the IoT device. The server can subsequently instruct the driver and/or a specified mechanic to investigate the engine for potential mechanical malfunctions or other causes. The previous example is just one of many possible applications for IoT technology.
Many IoT applications can leverage wireless networking technologies, in addition to wired technologies such as Ethernet. Wireless technologies such as wireless local area networks and wireless wide area networks have proliferated around the world over the past 20 years, and usage of these wireless networks is also expected to continue to grow. Wireless local area network (LAN) technologies include WiFi and wireless wide area network (WAN) technologies include 3rd Generation Partnership Project's (3GPP) 3rd Generation (3G) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and 4th Generation (4G) Long-term Evolution (LTE), LTE Advanced, and Narrow-band Internet of Things (NB-IoT). The many options to connect a transducer device to a network creates opportunities for new products and services, but also creates several classes of problems that need to be solved. Many of these problems or needs in the art pertain to enabling users to securely and efficiently configure the transducer devices. A need exists in the art to allow a user to securely upload to the device a set of network access credentials for the wireless network.
A need exists in the art to support the configuration of transducer devices for installation and operation, including deployment in the field by a user or a technician or with monitored units. A manufactured transducer device can record data for (i) a “root of trust” or secret key for the device as well as certificates and cryptographic parameters, and (ii) installed firmware and software. Manually configuring devices to use different keys, new network access credentials to connect with the owner's selected wireless network, and/or firmware can be time consuming and difficult for users. Entering network access credentials is also prone to errors and especially difficult for devices with limited user interfaces. A need exists in the art to allow users or device owners to efficiently change or update for a device both (i) network access credentials, certificates, and cryptographic parameters, and (ii) installed firmware and software. A need exists in the art for a configuration system and/or a reporting system to securely and efficiently record values and identities pertaining to operation of the device, such as a list of transducers attached, the identity of a monitored unit for the device, as well as the physical location of the device.
With conventional technology for configuration and installation of networked devices, a frequent challenge can be that default or manufactured configuration of a device may not match the requirements of (i) a device owner, or (ii) an associated configuration system or a reporting system. In other words, the manufactured state of a device may use credentials, certificates, and cryptographic parameters that are not compatible with an operating environment in which the device will be deployed (e.g. use of PM-based keys instead of a shared secret key for network access, lack of installation of user ID and password for enterprise-based authentication, etc.) A need exists in the art such that device credentials, cryptographic algorithms, and cryptographic parameters for a user's application can be securely updated after device manufacturing. A need exists in the art to support the update through a highly automated configuration step.
In addition, devices designed for machine-to-machine communications, or the “Internet of Things”, can frequently be shipped to an end user in a state that is not fully configured for the user. The lack of a full configuration could include incomplete information for any of the following: (i) current, running firmware or configuration files for the device, (ii) network access credentials, (iii) credentials for access to remote servers or a reporting system, and (iv) proper configuration to support transducers that are actually connected with a device. As one example, hospitals, health clinics, or doctor's offices can receive health monitoring equipment designed to be networked, but without both (i) the networking configured for the equipment, and (ii) updated or patched firmware for the equipment. A need exists in the art to allow general users (e.g. not requiring expert IT skills) to securely configure equipment designed to be networked, including securely updating the device's firmware and credentials for both accessing a network and remote servers.
Many other examples exist as well for needs in the art to support efficient yet secure device configuration by users, and the above are examples are just a few and intended to be illustrative instead of limiting.
SUMMARYMethods and systems are provided for configuration of networked transducers in order to support secure operation of the networked transducers. The methods and systems can support secure operation of devices for “The Internet of Things (IoT)” which is also known as “Machine to Machine (M2M)” communications. An objective of the invention is to address the challenges noted above for securing the deployment and operation of devices that have radios and transducers, where the devices connect to servers using networks based on Internet protocols.
A device can have a transducer for monitoring a monitored unit, and the device can support wirelessly connecting with an access network in order to communicate data for the transducer with a server. The device can be delivered to a user in a state where credentials for a local access point have not been loaded into the device, and thus connectivity through the available access point is not enabled for the device “out of the box”. The device can be configured with a set of device default credentials for connecting with a WiFi access point, where a plurality of device default credentials for a plurality of devices can be recorded in a device database. The device can also be configured with a set of configuration parameters. The connection with the access network can be via wireless and a radio, or could be through a wired connection such as Ethernet. The device, transducer, and monitored unit can have identifiers such as bar codes, QR codes, MAC addresses, serial numbers, or other identifiers. The device can be produced by a device manufacturer and include capabilities for conducting cryptographic operations, such as (i) creating and verifying signatures, and (ii) operating encryption algorithms using public, private, and/or symmetric keys. The device can also record a series of certificate authority certificates, such as a certificate authority certificate for the certificate of the device and a root certificate for the certificate authority, plus any intermediate certificates between the certificate authority certificate and the root certificate.
A device owner or device user may prefer the device transition from a manufactured state or delivered state to an operational state, where the transition for the device can comprise a configuration step. Or, after initial operation of the device, a device owner or device user may prefer the device transition from a first configured state to a second configured state, and the transition could also comprise a configuration step. In general, the security of a configuration step can be important because the overall security of a system can depend on the security of a configuration step. The configuration step can preferably be completed in a relatively automated manner using secure steps and hardware that is both (i) available for low cost and also (ii) readily easy to obtain or source. A mobile phone such as a smartphone could be used to connect a device in the manufactured state to an IP network, such that the device in the manufactured state could securely communicate with a reporting system after conduction a configuration step with a configuration system.
The configuration step with the configuration system can comprise a first collection of steps for the mobile phone to work in conjunction with the configuration system to prepare for authentication of the device and then configuration with the device. The first collection of steps may be depicted in
The mobile phone can conduct a first authentication with the authentication server, where the first authentication comprises the configuration user authenticating with the authentication server. The mobile phone can send device identity information to the authentication server and the authentication server can receive a certificate for the device. After authentication of the configuration user and/or mobile phone, the mobile phone can receive from the authentication server the set of device default credentials, which were previously recorded in the device before delivery to the device owner, device user, or configuration user. The authentication server can query a device owner or the device manufacturer for the set of default device credentials. The authentication server can also send the mobile phone data for the device to conduct a device configuration step. The mobile phone can conduct a mobile phone configuration step, where (i) the previous set of configuration user WiFi access point credentials for the mobile phone are backed up, and (ii) the received device default credentials are activated for the mobile phone.
The device can be powered and activate a WiFi radio within the device as a WiFi client using the device default credentials. The mobile phone operated by the configuration user can be in relatively close physical proximity of the device, such as within an exemplary several meters. The device and mobile phone can conduct a WiFi connection setup, since they both operate using the device default credentials. The mobile phone can notify the authentication server that the device successfully used the device default credentials. The authentication server can also notify the configuration server that device with a device ID is authenticated since the device successfully used the device default credentials. In other words, the use of a device default credentials by both the device and mobile phone can provide an initial level of mutual authentication, since both sides are demonstrating knowledge and recording of secured shared values.
After successful setup of the WiFi connection using the device default credentials, the device can use the set of recorded configuration parameters in order to receive data from the mobile phone for conducting a configuration step. The received data could comprise a URL for a configuration server, authentication parameters, a certificate for the authentication server, and a signature over the URL from the authentication server. The device can verify the signature using the certificate and also verify the certificate using a recorded root certificate. The device can then use the authentication parameters and URL to conduct a secure session setup with the configuration server. The secure session can pass through the access point operated by the mobile phone, where the mobile phone now provides connectivity to an IP network and the configuration server to the device. After successful setup of the secure session, the device can send the mobile phone a message of success for communication with the configuration server. A status or progress indicator for a configuration user viewing the mobile phone screen could be updated.
The mobile phone can collect a list of identities, which can include an RF sweep analysis to measure all available wireless networks as the location of the device in the form of a networks available list. The list of identities can include identities for a monitored unit, any attached transducers, a device owner, and the device as well. The mobile phone can conduct a second setup of a secure session with the configuration server (e.g. between the mobile phone and configuration server), where the first secure session above was between the device and the configuration server and routed through the mobile phone. The mobile phone can use the second secure session to send the list of identities to the configuration system pertaining to the device, transducers, networks available, and a monitored unit.
The configuration system can record the list of identities received from the mobile phone in a configuration database. The configuration server can use the identities list to collect a configuration package for the device. The configuration package can include an encrypted set of device owner WiFi access point credentials, so that the device can connect with a device owner WiFi access point. The presence or identity of the device owner WiFi access point can be included in the list of identities gathered by the mobile phone. The configuration server can send the configuration files and encrypted credentials to the device via the first secure session between the device and the configuration server.
The device can read the configuration package and apply the files and reboot. The device can decrypt the encrypted set of device owner WiFi access point credentials and apply the credentials to a WiFi radio, such that the device can start communicating through the device owner WiFi access point.
The device can setup a secure session with the reporting system using credentials and parameters received in the configuration package The device can subsequently transfer encrypted transducer data and a report regarding configuration to the reporting system, thereby completing the configuration step for the device. The mobile phone can check with the reporting system that transducer data has been successfully transmitted between the reporting system and the device, and display to the end user that the configuration step is successful and completed.
These as well as other aspects and advantages will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art by reading the following detailed description, with reference where appropriate to the accompanying drawings.
Various exemplary embodiments are described herein with reference to the following drawings, wherein like numerals denote like entities.
Device 101 could utilize an owner WiFi access point 122b in order to communicate with the reporting system 120 using the IP network 128. After a configuration step 102 described in the present invention and in multiple figures below, device 101 can communicate transducer data 125 with reporting system 120 through the owner WiFi access point 122b. Note that the security of transducer data 125 for device owner 122, device user 101a, and reporting system 120 during operation of device 101 may generally depend on the security of a configuration step 102. Further, a manufactured device 101 may not have the credentials or configuration in order to send transducer data 125 to reporting system 120 without successfully completing a configuration step 102. In addition, although device 101 is depicted in
Access network 126 could be either a Local Area Network (LAN) or a Wide Area Network (WAN), or potentially a combination of both. For embodiments where device 101 communicates with reporting system 120 through a LAN after a configuration step 102, then one form of access network 126 could comprise a device owner WiFi access point 122b as depicted and described in connection with
Device 101 can include manufactured secure processing environment (not shown). The manufactured secure processing environment can also be referred to as a secure enclave or secure element. Device 101 can comprise functionality of a processor such as an ARM® or Intel® based processor to secure cryptographic key materials including private keys in public key infrastructure (PM) key pairs, secret shared keys, cryptographic parameters, cryptographic algorithms, a certificate 107a for the device 101 certificate authority, a root certificate 109a, etc. In other words, although root certificate 109a is depicted as external to device 101 in
Device 101 can also include a transducer 101k, and may also be referred to herein as a “transducer device 101”. Transducer 101k can be a sensor or an actuator and may be either passive or active. Transducer 101k could be internal within the physical housing of device 101, such as, but not limited to, a digital image sensor inside a camera. Transducer 101k could be external to the physical housing of device 101, such as, but not limited to, a thermocouple or probe extending from device 101 to a monitored unit 106. Although device 101 is depicted in
Examples of a monitored unit 106 can include an ATM or vending machine, a truck or automobile, a refrigerated or standard (“dry”) shipping container, or industrial equipment such as, but not limited to, an oil field pump, a transformer connected to an electrical grid or an elevator in a building. Additional examples of a monitored unit 106 include can also include a pallet for shipping or receiving goods, an refrigerator with food, a health monitoring device attached to a person such as, but not limited to, a heart monitor, and a gate or door for opening and closing. Device 101 can utilize a sensor to measure and collect data regarding a parameter of monitored unit 106 such as, but not limited to, temperature, humidity, physical location potentially including geographical coordinates from a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, surrounding light levels, surrounding RF signals, vibration and/or shock, voltage, current, and/or similar measurements. Monitored unit 106 could also be equipment in the house or home of device user 101a.
Monitored unit 106 could also be controlled by device 101 via a transducer 101k that is an actuator, where device 101 can change the actuator in order to change a state for monitored unit 106. For example, if monitored unit 106 is a door, then a transducer 101k could include a relay to activate a lock for the door. If monitored unit 106 is a lighting system in a building, then transducer 101k could comprise a switch to turn the lighting level up or down. Other examples exist for monitored unit 106 as well, and the above are intended to be illustrative instead of limiting. In the case where transducer 101k is either an actuator or a sensor, (X) device 101 could connect transducer 101k to the reporting system 120, and (Y) reporting system 120 can both (i) receive transducer data 125 input from sensors with monitored unit 106 and (ii) transmit transducer data 125 output to actuators in order to control monitored unit 106. Thus, in operation and after the configuration step 102, reporting system 120 can remotely monitor and control monitored unit 106 using device 101 and transducer 101k.
As depicted in
Each of the different entities depicted for system 100 of device owner, device user, and device manufacturer may control or operate device 101 at different times for the life cycle of device 101. In addition, a device owner or device user may change during the life of device 101 after manufacture and may use some initial configuration steps that could be different than a configuration step 102. This change in control and operation over time, plus potential prior operation in an insecure manner, can create challenges for ensuring secure operation of device 101. A prior party in control of device 101 may not have supported the security procedures or requirements for device owner 122. For example, device owner 122 may require that device 101 is configured after delivery from device manufacturer 101x or possibly after delivery from a previous device owner 122. A configuration step 102 with configuration system 114 can ensure that device 101 is configured to the standards or requirements of device owner 122, without depending on previous security procedures or steps of device manufacturer 101x or device user 101a.
In order to conduct a configuration step 102, system 100 can utilize a configuration system 114. As depicted in
A configuration system 114 can use a mobile phone 108 operated by a configuration user 108a. Details and components for a mobile phone 108 are depicted and described below in connection with
The servers shown for configuration system 114 can be co-located within the same data center or geographically dispersed. A configuration system 114 can also include a plurality of the elements depicted in
A reporting system 120 in system 100 can include a reporting server 116, an application server 117, and a reporting database 118. Although not depicted in
Reporting system 120 could also take input from device owner 122 or device user 101a to send control transducer data 125 to device 101 in order to operate a transducer 101k in order to control monitored unit 106. Reporting system 120 could also send control transducer data 125 to device 101 without requiring user input, such as for automated control. Reporting system 120, or elements in reporting system 120, can have a certificate 121a signed by a certificate authority 121 associated with reporting system 120. Certificate 121a may be associated or verified using root certificate 109a, although in some exemplary embodiments the root certificate for certificate 121 may be different than root certificate 109a for a device 101. The various servers depicted in
Device owner WiFi access point 122b can have internal hardware similar to mobile phone 108 as depicted and described in connection with
Owner WiFi credentials 199 can comprise a set of values for SSID.owner-AP 199a, PSK.owner-AP 199b, and Config.owner-AP 199c. The value for SSID.owner-AP 199a can comprise the service set identifier or network name for access point 122b to broadcast. In exemplary embodiments, AP 122b could use SSID.owner-AP 199a in a “hidden” mode and not broadcast the SSID, but listening for messages from a client using the hidden SSID. Other devices besides device 101 can connect with AP 122b operating as an access point by using the SSID 199a that is either broadcast or hidden. The selection of access point 122b either (i) broadcasting SSID.owner-AP 199a or (ii) not broadcasting can be included in Config.owner-AP 199c. The value PSK.owner-AP 199b used by AP 122b can comprise a pre-shared secret key, passphrase, pairwise master key (PMK) required by any node or client to connect with the access point, which can also be recorded in devices connecting to AP 122b.
Note that in exemplary embodiments where AP 122b uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), then (i) PSK.owner-AP 199b could comprise both a username and a password for different devices or WiFi clients that attach to AP 122b, and (ii) PSK.owner-AP 199b could be recorded and operated with a remote server (e.g. a RADIUS server) and may not be stored within AP 122b. PSK.owner-AP 199b could also contain certificates for allowed WiFi clients and a secret key for AP 122b for exemplary embodiments where AP 122b uses PKI for authentication and encryption with WiFi clients. In addition, for embodiments with EAP authentication, then (i) key 199b for AP 122b as stored and used by device 101 can comprise a secret key for AP 122b, and (ii) key 199b for AP 122b as stored and used by AP 122b can be a corresponding certificate or public key for device 101.
The access point configuration values for Config.owner-AP 199c could specify a version of the 802.11 standards to utilize, such as, but not limited to, 802.11n, 802.11ac, 802.11ah, 802.11ax, or related and subsequent versions of these standards. As contemplated herein, a set of configuration values for either an access point such as config.owner-AP 199c or similar values such as Config-default.device 103c may contain values that are closely associated with a set of credentials such as credentials 199. In other words, although the depicted configuration values themselves may not be regular credentials such as an SSID or PSK, the configuration values may be required in order to use the credentials and thus in the present invention configuration values for a set of credentials are depicted as included with the credentials. The configuration values for Config.owner-AP 199c could also specify a frequency band to utilize such as 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, and other possibilities exist as well such as channel numbers on which to operate. Further, the values for Config.owner-AP 199c could specify a preferred list of channels to operate on, such a subset of channels 1 through 11 at 2.4 GHz, or a subset of channels 40 through 62 at 5 GHz, and other possibilities exist as well.
In addition, the values for Config.owner-AP 199c could specify an authentication and encryption scheme for AP 122b to utilize with an SSID, such as none, WPA2-PSK, WPA3-SAE, WPA2-Enterprise EAP-PSK, etc. Config.owner-AP 199c can also specify routing, authentication, and firewall rules, such as a whitelist of allowed devices based on MAC address, allowed IP addresses, allowed TCP and/or UDP port numbers, etc. In exemplary embodiments, AP 122b can operate or transmit with multiple different SSID 199a values each associated with different Config.owner-AP 199c values. For embodiments where AP 122b comprises a “g node b” for a 5G wireless network, then the values for Config-owner-AP 199c could be associated with a 5G network and include equivalent data to that described above, such as RF frequencies or channels to use, release version of the wireless networking standard such as release 16, release 17, etc., and an authentication mechanism such as EAP-TLS or EAP-AKA′, etc.
In exemplary embodiments, manufactured device 101 can operate as a WiFi client 101i or user equipment client to connect with an access point. The default configuration of a manufactured device could include a set of default credentials 103, where the default credentials 103 may not match Owner WiFi Credentials 199 since a system 100 or system 100a may not have conducted a configuration step 102. Since a system 100a depicted in
A set of default credentials for device 101 may also be recorded in a device database 122x. As depicted in
The set of default credentials 103 could be written into nonvolatile memory of device 101 before device 101 is shipped for installed with monitored unit 106. The set of default credentials 103 could be recorded in device 101 by either a device manufacturer 101x or device owner 122. In exemplary embodiments, different devices 101 have different values for default credentials 103, as depicted in device database 122x. In addition, although default credentials 103 are depicted with a PSK-default.device 103b, a value for PSK-default.device 103b could comprise a public key for device 101 and device 101 could record and operate with the corresponding secret key. Further, a set of default credentials 103 can include a device certificate for device 101, such as an X.509 v3 certificate used with TLS or EAP-TLS authentication.
For a set of default credentials 103 in a device database 122x, ID.device 101b can correspond to a unique identifier for device 101, and the use of a ID.device 101b is depicted and described in connection with
Config-default.device 103c for a set of default credentials 103 in a device database 122x can record values similar to Config.owner-AP 199c described above, such as parameters for device 101 to use with WiFi client 101i. Exemplary possible values and fields for Config-default.device 103c are depicted in
As depicted for a device database 122x in
In exemplary embodiments as depicted in
The configuration step 127 can load default credentials 103 into mobile phone 108 and also temporarily backup user credentials 105, such that they can be automatically restored at a later time. A configuration step 127 could also comprise mobile phone 108 recording a ciphertext 222a where the plaintext inside ciphertext 222a can be the owner credentials 199 (also depicted and described in connection with
Device identity 108b could comprise a preferably unique alpha-numeric or hexadecimal identifier for mobile phone 108, such as a physical Ethernet or WiFi MAC address for WiFi radio 108i, an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), an owner interface identifier in an IPv6 network, a serial number, or other sequence of digits to uniquely identify each of the many different possible units for mobile phone 108b in a system 100. Note that a system 100 could include a plurality of different mobile phones 108 each using a different device identity 108b. Device identity 108b may also be depicted and referenced herein as ID.MP 108b. Device identity 108b can preferably be recorded in a non-volatile memory or written directly to hardware in mobile phone 108b by a manufacturer upon mobile phone manufacturing. In exemplary embodiments, a mobile phone 108 could use multiple different values for device identity 108b, such as a first device identity 108b for use with an access network 126 (e.g. IMEI or subscriber permanent identity or network access identifier) and a second device identity 108b for use with a configuration system 114 (e.g. a user name for configuration user 108a). Other possibilities exist as well for either a single device identity 108b or multiple device identities 108b without departing from the scope of the present invention.
The components of CPU 108b, RAM 108d, OS 108e, storage 108f, and system bus 108j can be similar to the components of CPU 101b, RAM 101d, OS 101e, storage 101f, and system bus 101j, respectively, depicted and described for a device 101 in
A mobile phone 108 before a configuration step 127 could record a set of access point user credentials 105, where access point user credentials 105 were depicted and described in connection with
Note that a nonvolatile memory 108f in a mobile phone 108 both before and after a configuration step 127 can record a certificate for the mobile phone comprising cert0.mobile-phone 108m. The certificate cert0.mobile-phone 108m can be used by a mobile phone 108 when authenticating with a configuration system 114, such as used when setting up a secure channel via transport layer security (TLS) and also similar standards that utilize public keys in certificates for authentication, key exchange, and encryption. WiFi radio 108i can also record a set of credentials for mobile phone 108 to utilize when mobile phone 108 operates as a WiFi client for configuration user 108a. The exemplary values depicted in
A configuration step 127 can include the download and activation of a configuration application 108g for mobile phone 108, where configuration application 108g can record a set of configuration parameters 151. Configuration application 108g can comprise a software program running in mobile phone 108 in order to support a configuration step 102 with device 101. Although depicted as a separate component for mobile phone 108 in
As depicted in
In exemplary embodiments, a value for Config-default.device 103c′ in a set of device default credentials 103 can specify a maximum power for WiFi radio 108i that is intentionally lower than normal operating power for WiFi radio 108i (and thus the use of 103c′ instead of 103c for the depiction in
After a configuration step 102 is completed for a device 101, a configuration application 108g or a configuration user 108a can conduct a mobile phone restore step 129. Mobile phone restore step 129 can restore WiFi radio 108i with user credentials 105, such that a configuration user 108a can utilize mobile phone 108 in the same manner as before a configuration step 127. In other words, without a mobile phone restore step 129, then the other devices for configuration user 108a may no longer connect with WiFi radio 108i as an access point. Although
Since mobile phone 108′ and device 101 operate with compatible device default credentials 103, device 101 can initiate a WiFi connection setup 303 with mobile phone 108′. Exemplary details for WiFi connection setup 303 are depicted and described in connection with
As depicted in
The set of configuration packages 132 can also be transferred via WiFi connection 303, and will be depicted and described in
A sub-package 132z can include information for device 101 not otherwise separately depicted, such as additional programs or files for device 101. In summary, a set of configuration packages 132 can comprise multiple files in a bound and signed package for device 101 to download and install. The configuration packages support device 101 changing from a manufactured device 101 state to a configured device 101′ state. A set of configuration packages 132 may also be sent to device 101 via AP 122b instead of via the connection shown in
Device identity 101b could comprise a preferably unique alpha-numeric or hexadecimal identifier for device 101, such as an Ethernet MAC address, an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), an owner interface identifier in an IPv6 network, a serial number, or other sequence of digits to uniquely identify each of the many different possible units for device 101. Device identity 101b can preferably be recorded in a non-volatile memory or written directly to hardware in device 101 by device manufacturer 101x upon device manufacturing. The CPU 101c can comprise a general purpose processor appropriate for typically low power consumption requirements for a device 101, and may also function as a microcontroller. CPU 101c can comprise a processor for device 101 such as an ARM® based process or an Intel® based processor such as belonging to the Atom or MIPS family of processors, and other possibilities exist as well. CPU 101c can utilize bus 101j to fetch instructions from RANI 101d and operate on the instruction. CPU 101c can include components such as registers, accumulators, and logic elements to add, subtract, multiply, and divide numerical values and record the results in RANI 101d or storage memory 101f, and also write the values to an external interface such as WiFi radio 101i or transducer 101k.
RAM 101d may comprise a random access memory for device 101. RAM 101d can be a volatile memory providing rapid read/write memory access to CPU 101c. RANI 101d could be located on a separate integrated circuit in device 101 or located within CPU 101c. The RAM 101d can include data recorded in device 101 for the operation when collecting and communicating transducer data 125 regarding monitored unit 106. The system bus 101j may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures including a data bus. System bus 101j connects components within device 101 as illustrated in
The operating system (OS) 101e can include Internet protocol stacks such as a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) stack, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stack, a domain name system (DNS) stack, a TLS stack, a datagram transport layer security (DTLS) stack, etc. The operating system 101e may include timers and schedulers for managing the access of software to hardware resources within device 101, including CPU 101c and transducers 101k. The operating system shown of 101e can be appropriate for a low-power device with more limited memory and CPU resources (compared to a server such as reporting server 116 and configuration server 112). Example operating systems 101e for a device 101 includes Linux, Android® from Google®, IOS from Apple®, Windows® 10 IoT Core, or Open AT® from Sierra Wireless®. Additional example operating systems 101e for a transducer device 101 include eCos, uC/OS, LiteOs, Contiki, OpenWRT, Raspbian, and other possibilities exist as well without departing from the scope of the present invention. Although depicted as a separate element within device 101 in
Storage memory 101f (or “memory 101f”) within device 101 can comprise a nonvolatile memory for storage of data when device 101 is powered off. Memory 101f may be a NAND flash memory or a NOR flash memory, and other possibilities exist as well without departing from the scope of the present invention. Memory 101f can record firmware for device 101. Memory 101f can record long-term and non-volatile storage of data or files for device 101. In an exemplary embodiment, OS 101e is recorded in memory 101f when device 101 is powered off, and portions of memory 101f are moved by CPU 101c into RAM 101d when device 101 powers on. Memory 101f (i) can be integrated with CPU 101b into a single integrated circuit (potentially as a “system on a chip”), or (ii) operate as a separate integrated circuit or a removable card or device, such as a removable SD card. Memory 101f may also be referred to as “device storage” and can include exemplary file systems of FAT16, FAT 32, NTFS, ext3, ext4, UDF, or similar file systems.
As depicted in
A secret key SK0.device 101s in a nonvolatile memory 101f could comprise the private key for a PKI key pair, where the corresponding public key could be recorded in a certificate cert0.device 101t. The corresponding public key from a cert0.device 101t could comprise a PK0.device 101ta as depicted and described in connection with a step 223 in
For use of RSA algorithms, parameters within certificate 101t can specify a modulus and other associated values for using an RSA PKI key pair. For either asymmetric algorithms RSA or ECC for a PKI key pair herein, parameters in a certificate can specify key lengths, a duration for key validity, uses of the PKI key pair such as for key derivation or signatures, encoding rules, message digest algorithms, etc. Parameters in certificate 101t (and other certificates herein) may also include identifying information associated with the PKI key pair such as a sequence number, a serial number, a certificate revocation list or URL, a domain name of the server associated with the PKI key pair. In addition, a secret key such as SK0.device 101s could comprise two secret keys, where the first key is used with a key exchange or key encapsulation mechanism, and the second key is used with digital signatures. Likewise, a certificate such as cert0.device 101t could comprise two certificates, where (i) the first certificate is used with a key exchange or key encapsulation mechanism and corresponds with the first secret key SK0.device 101s, and (ii) the second certificate is used with digital signatures and corresponds with the second secret key SK0.device 101s.
Device 101 and 101′ can include a WiFi radio 101i to communicate wirelessly with networks such as AP 122b and access network 126 depicted and described in
WiFi radio 101i can include standard radio components such as RF filters, RF amplifiers, a clock, and phased loop logic (PLL), and may be connected with an antenna. WiFi radio 101i can support protocols and specifications according to the IEEE 802.11 family of standards. For example, if WiFi radio 101i operates according to 802.11n standards, WiFi radio 101i could operate at a radio frequency of 2.4 or 5 GHz. In other embodiments where WiFi radio 101i supports 802.11ac standards, then WiFi radio 101i could also support radio frequencies of 0.054 through 0.79 GHz in order to operate in “white space” spectrum. Other possibilities exist as well for WiFi radio to support wireless LAN standards or 802.11 standards and radio frequencies, without departing from the scope of the present invention. WiFi radio 101i can access a nonvolatile memory 101f in order to record the depicted configuration values of default configuration credentials 103 and/or owner WiFi credentials 199, where the nonvolatile memory could be within WiFi radio 101i, or WiFi radio 101i could access memory 101f via bus 101j in order to read the values.
As depicted in
Device 101 may also optionally include user interface 101y (not shown but similar to user interface 108k in
In exemplary embodiments, device 101 can also include a wide area network radio 101h, which could be similar to WAN radio 108h described above for mobile phone 108 in
As one exemplary embodiment, a device 101 could (i) include a battery backup and (ii) be a security alarm system for a building and (iii) connect via access point 122b. The access point 122b for device 101 and/or associated DSL or cable model could be powered from wall power. If the electrical power to the building goes down, then device 101 operating as a security alarm (even when operating on battery) could be disconnected from IP network 128 without the backup access network 126 depicted in
Although not depicted in
The present disclosure also contemplates that a fixed station configuration unit 108 could be utilized instead of a mobile phone 108 in order to conduct the configuration step 102 with device 101. In exemplary embodiments, a fixed station configuration unit 108 could comprise a server operated by a device owner 122 or device manufacturer 101x in order to configure a plurality of devices 101 at the same physical location before being deployed to monitored units 106. For these embodiments with a fixed station configuration unit 108, the fixed station configuration unit 108 could include components equivalent to a mobile phone depicted and described in connection with
Mobile phone 108 can include a battery, radio, and touch screen, as well as a camera 108r. Mobile phone 108 can connect with access network 126 in order to communicate with discovery server 110 and authentication server 111, as depicted in
Device 101 in system 200 can comprise a device 101 depicted in
Although
Either a configuration unit or mobile phone 108 operating in system 200 and related systems below can implement similar components to those depicted in
In another embodiment for
At step 201 in
At step 204, mobile phone 108 can receive data from tag 101r, such as a response, where the response can consist of a uniform resource locator (URL) for discovery server 110, URL-DS 205, an ID-token.device 206, and a tag value 101w. The response at step 204 could be recorded in the tag 101r. URL-DS 205 could include a domain name for discovery server 110 and parameters such as the use of HTTP or HTTPS and a destination TCP or UDP port number for sending packets to discovery server 110. ID-token.device 206 could be a token for ID.device 101b, or a value or unique pseudo-random number associated with device 101 and/or ID.device 101b. ID-token.device 206 could be a value that obfuscates ID.device 101b but can preferably uniquely map to ID.device 101b in a system 100 or 200 with a plurality of devices 101. Through the use of ID-token.device 206 that is readable by mobile phone 108, then the actual value for ID.device 101b can remain confidential at step 204. Tag value 101w in response can include data associated with tag 101r and device 101, such as versions of software supported, product validity or expiration dates, a public key PK0.device 101ta, cryptographic parameters supported (e.g. RSA, ECC, or post-quantum cryptographic algorithms), a curve name utilized for an ECC cryptographic algorithm, a name or URL for Certificate Authority 107 used by manufactured device 101, a certificate for device cert0.device 101t, or a subset of config-provisioning.ID.device 212. In an exemplary embodiment, tag value 101w could comprise some values of config-provisioning.ID.device 212 upon manufacturing of device 101, which could be subsequently updated at a later date in discovery server DB 110a before installation or operation of device 101. For exemplary embodiments where tag 101r comprises a bar code or QR code or similar markings, then tag value 101w can be limited to fewer bytes such as identifying a certificate authority 107 and a serial number/identifier for cert0.device 101t (where the serial number/identifier could be used by mobile phone 108 to fetch the full cert0.device 101t from the certificate authority 107). For exemplary embodiments where tag 101r comprises an NFC tag capable of storing an exemplary few thousand bytes, then tag value 101w could include more values and data listed in the first sentence of this paragraph.
At step 207, mobile phone 108 could process the data received in response 204. For embodiments where tag 101r is an image such as a bar code or QR code, at step 207 mobile phone 108 could process the image and extract the data or values for ID-token.device 206, URL-DS 205, and tag value 101w. Continuing at step 207, mobile phone 108 could connect with an access network 126 in order to call the URL in URL-DS 205, which could be an HTTPS/TLS session in exemplary embodiments. In exemplary embodiments, URL-DS 205 is combined with ID-token.device 206, such that the HTTPS session is a unique request to discovery server 110 for each device 101. In exemplary embodiments, the value ID-token.device 206 can have enough information entropy or pseudo randomness that it cannot be easily guessed, such as (i) appearing to be a 16 or 32 byte random number, and (ii) not related to a value ID-token.device 206 for another device in any externally observable manner such as in sequence, or sharing similar common factors, etc.
By combining a URL-DS 205 with a unique and a sufficiently randomized ID-token. device 206, only a mobile phone 108 physically in the presence of device 101 could feasibly query discovery server 110 with a fully and properly formed query to fetch the subsequent data from discovery server 110. At step 207, mobile phone 108 could perform additional checks and steps in preparation for communication with device 101, such as verifying data in tag value 101w is compatible with software or settings in mobile phone 108, including configuration application 108g (if configuration application 108g is already installed).
In message flow 208, mobile phone 108 can establish a secure HTTPS session with discovery server 110 using the URL-DS 205, and the secure session could comprise a transport layer security (TLS) session such as TLS version 1.2, TLS version 1.3, or similar and subsequent standards. As part of the setup of message flow 208, mobile phone 108 can receive a certificate cert.DS 110c from discovery server 110. Cert.DS 110c could comprise an X.509 certificate and include a signed public key for discovery server 110. In exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 verifies the certificate cert.DS 110c using the public key in certificate cert.CA1 115a (which may require mobile phone 108 fetching certificate cert.CA1 115a from certificate authority 115). The verification of signatures using public keys in certificates is similar to the steps for verifying signatures outlined below in step 221 for
In exemplary embodiments mobile phone 108 can also authenticate with discovery server 110, such as a configuration user 108a associated with mobile phone 108 entering user credentials in a web site for discovery server 110. Or mobile phone 108 could send discovery server 110 a certificate for mobile phone 108 Cert0.Mobile-Phone 108m, which the discovery server 110 could verify using a signature verification step 221 in
In message 209 and after the secure HTTPS/TLS session setup in message flow 208, mobile phone 108 can send discovery server 110 ID-token.device 206 and data from tag value 101w. Or, the value for ID-token.device 206 could be included in the URL called by mobile phone 108 when accessing discovery server 110, and in this manner a value ID-token. device 206 does not need to be sent again in a separate message 209. Mobile handset could alternatively send discovery server 110 a subset of the data for ID-token. device 206 and/or tag value 101w.
At step 210, discovery server 110 can use data in ID-token.device 206 to query discovery server database 110a for the values or data sets ID.device 101b and config-provisioning.ID.device 212. Discovery server database 110a may comprise a database with tables to track configuration information for a plurality of devices 101. A device manufacturer 101x could send initial data for a device 101 to discovery server 110 and discovery server database 110a. In exemplary embodiments, config-provisioning.ID. device 212 contains data used by mobile phone 108 for the configuration of device 101. Exemplary data depicted for config-provisioning.ID.device 212 in
The value config-provisioning.ID.device 212 can comprise a set of values or a table of data for mobile phone 108 and/or a configuration application 108g to use in order to conduct a configuration step 102 with device 101, where a specific device 101 can be identified by either ID-token.device 206 or ID.device 101b. In exemplary embodiments, the values for config-provisioning.ID.device 212 also includes the default root certificates 109a recorded by device 101 before a configuration step 102. Mobile phone 108 and configuration system 114 can use the default root certificates 109a to confirm that any subsequent certificates sent by configuration system 114 and mobile phone 108 for device 101 could be verified by device 101 using the default root certificates 109a. In other words, subsequent certificates received by device 101 such as cert.CS 112c in a message 307 in
Configuration application 108g in a config-provisioning.ID.device 212 can specify the name or URL of a software application for mobile phone 108 to utilize (e.g. a field with less than a few hundred bytes), instead of comprising the full software package for configuration application 108g in exemplary embodiments (which could comprise several megabytes or more). For these exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 could utilize the name or URL to fetch the software for configuration application 108g. Configuration application 108g could be a public or private application for the operating system 108e of mobile phone 108. For embodiments where mobile phone 108 utilizes an Android-based operating system, configuration application 108g could be downloaded from the Google Play store or a private web site associated with configuration system 114. For embodiments where mobile phone 108 utilizes an Apple®/IOS-based operating system, configuration application 108g could be distributed through a developer enterprise program or downloaded through iTunes®. Other possibilities exist as well without departing from the scope of the present invention for a mobile phone 108 to download a configuration application 108g, where the name of configuration application 108b is received from a discovery server 110, after mobile phone 108 sends a message 209 to a discovery server 110.
As depicted in
As depicted in
In another exemplary embodiment, mobile phone 108 can (a) call URL-authentication server 111b without an identity for device 101, and subsequently (b) send either ID.Device 101b or ID-token.Device 206. Cert.AS 111c could comprise a certificate for authentication server 111 where cert.AS 111c could include (i) a public key for authentication server 111 and (ii) a signature of a certificate authority. In exemplary embodiments, a certificate cert.CA1 115a for a certificate authority 115 associated with cert.AS 111c is sent with cert.AS 111c in a message 211. Authentication parameters 111d can include parameters for configuration application 108g to utilize with authentication server 111, such as, but not limited to, hash or message digest algorithms, digital signature algorithms, padding schemes, key lengths, nonce or challenge lengths, timers, and retry counts, encoding rules, TLS or DTLS versions supported, cipher modes supported (e.g. AES-CBC, AES-CTR), etc. In exemplary embodiments, authentication parameters 111d can include the parameters supported by root certificates 109a recorded by device 101 before a device configuration step 102.
Message 211 from discovery server 110 to mobile phone 108 can communicate the above fields and values described for config-provisioning.ID.device 212 and ID.device 101b, as depicted in
Step 213 may comprise mobile phone 108 launching the configuration application 108g and applying a subset of configuration parameters 151 or tag-value 101w. If any of the steps depicted in
Secure session setup 214 could comprise a secure HTTPS session with authentication server 111 using the URL-authentication server 111b, and the secure session could comprise a transport layer security (TLS) session such as TLS version 1.2, TLS version 1.3, or similar and subsequent standards. Other networking standards besides HTTPS and TLS could be utilized as well for secure session setup 214, such as an IPSec tunnel. As part of the setup of secure session setup 214, mobile phone 108 can receive a certificate cert.AS 111c from authentication server 111, if mobile phone 108 had not already received cert.AS 111c from discovery server 110. Mobile phone 108 could verify cert.AS 111c after receiving the certificate, such as verifying a signature from a certificate authority and parent certificates of cert.AS 111c as well. In other words, a secure session setup 214 can mutually authenticate both authentication server 111 and mobile phone 108, such as using certificates from both sides with TLS. An additional layer of authentication can be performed by a configuration user 108a, although authentication for all of authentication server 111, mobile phone 108, and configuration user 108a is not required for some embodiments.
In message 215, mobile phone 108 transmits authentication information to authentication server 111, and authentication server 111 verifies the authentication information in a step 217. The authentication information transmitted in a message 215 could comprise information to authenticate (i) configuration user 108a, (ii) mobile phone 108, or (iii) both configuration user 108a and mobile phone 108. The authentication information in message 215 may comprise a configuration user 108a entering identification and credential information in a touch screen of mobile phone 108, and the information is passed by mobile handset to authentication server 111 (possibly in an encrypted or hashed form). In exemplary embodiments, configuration user 108a provides biometric data such as a fingerprint, an image of the user's face, or similar data, where mobile phone 108 transmits confirmation or signatures for the data through secure session setup 214 to authentication server 111, and the authentication server 111 verifies the biometric data or signatures of the biometric data is associated to configuration user 108a.
Message 215 may also request the verification of mobile phone 108 with authentication server 111. In exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 records a certificate Cert0.Mobile-Phone 108m for mobile phone 108. The certificate for mobile phone 108 includes a public key and a signature by a certificate authority. In an authentication step 217, authentication server can use the information in message 215 to verify the identity of a configuration user 108a and/or mobile phone 108. In embodiments where mobile phone 108 uses a device certificate for mobile phone 108 (which could be a Cert0.Mobile-Phone 108m), authentication server 111 could verify that mobile phone 108 also records the private key, by sending a challenge/random nonce and verifying a signature from mobile phone 108 using the private key (and authentication server 111 verifies the signature using the public key for mobile phone 108 from CertO.Mobile-Phone 108m). Message 215 and authentication 217 could be conducted using authentication parameters 111d, which could be previously included in Config-provisioning.ID. device 212.
Message 215 can also include a list of root certificates or certificate authorities 109a recorded by device 101, where the list of root certificates or certificate authorities 109a were included in provisioning configuration parameters Config-provisioning.ID.device 212. Note that root certificates or certificate authorities 109a and also include cryptographic parameters such as parameters 111d in order to use the root certificates or certificate authorities 109a. For some exemplary embodiments, root certificates or certificate authorities 109a could be optionally omitted from Config-provisioning.ID.device 212 and a configuration system 114 and authentication server 111 could obtain the root certificates or certificate authorities 109a for device 101 from a device owner 122 below from a step 219a and step 219b.
In step 216a of
In some embodiments, the value of ID.owner 122a could be recorded in a tag 101r. Note that a tag 101r could also comprise a collection of different tags, such that a first tag could specify a URL-DS 205 (which could be a label or sticker applied by a manufacturer 101x), and a second tag could specify ID.owner 122a (which could be a label or sticker or mark applied by an owner 122). A step 216b can function to associate device 101 with device owner 122 for a configuration system 114 and/or reporting system 120. In exemplary embodiments, millions of devices 101 could be distributed out to thousands or more device owners 122, and configuration system 114 and reporting system 120, as well as device owner 122, may need to know which devices 101 have been configured and/or installed with monitored units 106. In an exemplary embodiment, the value ID.owner 122a could be included in a set of Config-provisioning.ID.device 212 for cases where device owner 122 can register the ID.device 101b with discovery server 110 before mobile phone 108 sends message 208 to discovery server 110.
In message 218, mobile phone 108 can send a first set of identities to authentication server 111 through the secure session setup in 214, and also send authentication parameters 111d. Note that in some embodiments the set of authentication parameters 111d can be sent from authentication server 111 to a mobile phone 108 in a response to message 218. The list of identities in a message 218 can include an ID.device 101b, ID.M11 108b, and ID.owner 122a, as depicted in
For a step 219a, authentication server 111 may communicate with device owner 122 in order to confirm that mobile phone 108 with configuration user 108a is authorized to conduct configuration step 102 on device 101 identified by ID.device 101b. Note that ID.device 101b could also comprise a network access identifier (NAT), where ID.device 101b includes both a device identity and a domain name, where the domain name is associated or used by a device owner 122. In other words, a value for ID.device 101b could support standards such as IETF RFC 4282 and RFC 7542, as well as subsequent or related versions of the standards. Authentication server 111 can utilize the ID.owner 122a received in message 218 (possibly as part of ID.device 101b) in order to identify and communicate with the correct device owner 122. Although not depicted in
After the authorization step 219a for mobile phone 108, authentication server 111 can query device owner 122 for (i) device default credentials 103 for device 101 using ID.device 101b, (ii) a configuration server URL 112b for device 101 to utilize in order to conduct a configuration step 102, and (iii) a list of root certificates or certificate authorities 109a recorded by device 101. The query could be made by authentication server 111 using ID.device 101b, which was previously received in message 218. As depicted and described in connection with
For a step 219b, if device owner 122 does not record or have a device database 122x with the device default credentials 103 and/or URL-CS 112b, then for step 219b device owner 122 could point authentication server 111 to another server or location for the device default credentials 103 and/or URL-CS 112b for device 101 with ID.device 101b, such as possibly device manufacturer 101x which could also record a device default database 122x as depicted in
Authentication server 111 could receive device default credentials 103 and/or URL-CS 112b and/or root certificates or certificate authorities 109a in a step 219c. In another exemplary embodiment, authentication server 111 could record a device default database 122x for a plurality of devices 101 in a system 100 and system 200 and in this embodiment then step 219c could represent querying a locally stored device default database 122x for authentication server 111 to obtain the device default credentials 103 and/or URL-CS 112b (and the separate query to device owner 122 could be omitted). A step 219c for authentication server 111 can also comprise authentication server 111 reading both (i) a value for a URL for configuration server 112, which can be a URL-CS 112b, and (ii) the certificate 112c for a configuration server 112. Authentication server 111 could use root certificates or certificate authorities 109a for device 101 in order to select certificate 112c, such that device 101 could verify certificate 112c. In other words, authentication server 111 could confirm that device 101 can fully verify certificate 112c using a root certificate 109a recorded by device 101. Root certificates or certificate authorities 109a for device 101 could be received by authentication server 111 from device owner 122 or mobile phone 108, and other possibilities exist as well for authentication server to receive root certificates or certificate authorities 109a for device 101 without departing from the scope of the present invention.
The value URL-CS 112b can be subsequently utilized by device 101 in order to obtain configuration packages 132, but device 101 will need to receive URL-CS 112b in a secure and authenticated manner in exemplary embodiments. The use of URL-CS 112b is depicted and described in connection with
As depicted in
Mobile phone 108 could receive message 221 and read and record the data received. ID.device 101b can be useful in a message 221 for mobile phone 108, because mobile phone 108 could communicate with a plurality of devices 101 over time and thus keep track of which message 221 is for which device 101. Mobile phone 108 could then conduct configuration step 127, which was depicted and described in connection with
In an alternative exemplary embodiment to that depicted in
For another alternative exemplary embodiment to that depicted in
These steps usually require physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical, magnetic, or optical signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, compared, or otherwise manipulated. It is convention for those skilled in the art to refer to representations of these signals as bits, bytes, words, information, elements, symbols, characters, numbers, points, data, entries, objects, images, files, or the like. It should be kept in mind, however, that these and similar terms are associated with appropriate physical quantities for computer operations, and that these terms are merely conventional labels applied to physical quantities that exist within and during operation of device 101, mobile handset 108, and servers herein.
It should also be understood that manipulations within the computer are often referred to in terms such as listing, creating, adding, calculating, comparing, moving, receiving, determining, configuring, identifying, populating, loading, performing, executing, storing etc. that are often associated with manual operations performed by a human operator. The operations described herein can be machine operations performed in conjunction with various input provided by a human operator or user that interacts with the device, wherein one function of the device can be a computer.
In addition, it should be understood that the programs, processes, methods, etc. described herein are not related or limited to any particular computer or apparatus. Rather, various types of general purpose machines may be used with the following process in accordance with the teachings described herein.
The present invention may comprise a computer program or hardware or a combination thereof which embodies the functions described herein and illustrated in the appended flow charts. However, it should be apparent that there could be many different ways of implementing the invention in computer programming or hardware design, and the invention should not be construed as limited to any one set of computer program instructions.
Further, a skilled programmer would be able to write such a computer program or identify the appropriate hardware circuits to implement the disclosed invention without difficulty based on the flow charts and associated description in the application text, for example. Therefore, disclosure of a particular set of program code instructions or detailed hardware devices is not considered necessary for an adequate understanding of how to make and use the invention. The inventive functionality of the claimed computer implemented processes will be explained in more detail in the following description in conjunction with the remaining Figures illustrating other process flows.
Further, certain steps in the processes or process flow described in all of the logic flow diagrams below must naturally precede others for the present invention to function as described. However, the present invention is not limited to the order of the steps described if such order or sequence does not alter the functionality of the present invention. That is, it is recognized that some steps may be performed before, after, or in parallel other steps without departing from the scope and spirit of the present invention.
The processes, operations, and steps performed by the hardware and software described in this document usually include the manipulation of signals by a CPU or remote server and the maintenance of these signals within data structures resident in one or more of the local or remote memory storage devices. Such data structures impose a physical organization upon the collection of data stored within a memory storage device and represent specific electrical or magnetic elements. These symbolic representations are the means used by those skilled in the art of computer programming and computer construction to most effectively convey teachings and discoveries to others skilled in the art.
In
Signature algorithm 227 and a corresponding signature verification algorithm for a signature verification step 221 below could comprise an RSA-based digital signature algorithm (DSA) or an ECC based elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), and other possibilities exist as well for signature algorithm 227 and the corresponding signature verification algorithm without departing from the scope of the present invention. For some exemplary embodiments, digital signature algorithms could support post-quantum cryptography, where the digital signature algorithms could be based on lattice-based algorithms, hash-based algorithms, multivariate-based algorithms, or zero-knowledge proofs. When using a DSA or ECDSA algorithm in non-deterministic mode for a signature creation 220, a value of “k” or “r”, which could comprise a random number can be associated with the digital signature 223. When using a DSA or ECDSA in deterministic mode for preferred exemplary embodiments, such as specified in IETF RFC 6979 and titled “Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)”, which are hereby incorporated by reference, then the requirement for a separately transmitted random number with digital signature 223 (such as value “k” or “r”) can be optionally omitted, such that “r” can be deterministically calculated based on the message to sign.
In exemplary embodiments, device 101 and servers such as authentication sever 111 can utilize deterministic ECDSA without also sending a random number along with a digital signature, although the value “r” from the deterministic mode could be sent with the digital signature 223. In other words, a value can be sent with the digital signature 223 that is deterministically derived and associated with the message to sign. In other exemplary embodiments, a random number can be generated a derived value for the random number such as “r” sent with digital signature 223.
For a signature creation 220a step, the exemplary message to sign comprises ID.device 101b and URL-CS 112b (e.g. the URL for the configuration server 112). The message to sign values can be transmitted to the verifying party, such as shown for message 221 in
For the additional signature creation 220 instances depicted in
Signature verification 221 can comprise a step using the sub-steps of (i) obtaining a message to verify, (ii) calculating a message digest 230 for the message to sign, (iii) using a public key corresponding to the private key 226, (iv) using a signature verification algorithm corresponding to signature creation algorithm 227, (v) inputting parameters 111d′ and received signature 223 into the signature verification algorithm, and (vi) determining a pass/fail. If the signature 223 received matches a calculated signature with the public key and message to sign, then the received signature 223 passes or is validated or verified. If the signature 223 does not match the calculated signature in a step 221, then the signature 223 is considered to fail or not be verified. The above sub-steps (i) through (vi) described for device 101 verifying signature 223 for a verification 221a in
Other possibilities exist as well for the use of an asymmetric encryption algorithm 231a and asymmetric decryption algorithm 23 lb without departing from the scope of the present invention. In exemplary embodiments, algorithms 231a and 23 lb can support a post-quantum cryptography key exchange mechanism (KEM). Device public key PK0.device 101ta and device private key or secret key SK0.device 101s could support lattice-based algorithms, code-based algorithms, or Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny algorithms.
For an encryption step 222, the public key PK0.device 101ta recorded in a certificate 101t can be input into an asymmetric encryption algorithm 231a. As depicted, the plaintext values can be input as well, along with a set of parameters 151′. Parameters 151′ can be a subset of parameters 151 depicted and described in connection with
For a decryption step 233, the private key SK0.device 101s recorded in nonvolatile memory for device 101 can be input into an asymmetric decryption algorithm 231b. Private key SK0.device 101s can be the secret key corresponding to the public key PK0.device 101ta used with the asymmetric encryption algorithms 231a. Asymmetric decryption algorithm 231b can correspond to asymmetric encryption algorithm 231a, such that if an ECC curve with a given set of parameters 151′ or parameters 151d is used with asymmetric encryption algorithm 231a, then the same ECC curve with the same or equivalent set of parameters 151′ can be used with asymmetric decryption algorithm 23 lb. The output of an asymmetric decryption algorithm 231b can be the plaintext, as depicted in
Mobile phone 108 in system 300 can operate a running configuration application 108g and WiFi radio 101i operating as an access point with device default credentials 103. Configuration application 108g may previously be downloaded in a step 213 as depicted in
Configuration server 112 and authentication server 111 can establish a secure session 301, where secure session 301 could comprise a session using TLS, IPSec, a VPN, and other possibilities exist as well. At step 302 in
At step 303a in
Since device default credentials 103 received by mobile phone 108 in message 221 can match or be compatible with device default credentials 103 recorded in device 101, communication between mobile phone 108 and device 101 can be established. The values for config-default.device 103c could specify a version of the 802.11 standards to utilize, such as, but not limited to, 802.11n, 802.11ac, 802.11ah, 802.11ax, or related and subsequent versions of these standards. The values for config-default.device 103c could also specify a frequency band to utilize such as 2.4 GHz, 5GHz, and other possibilities exist as well. Further, the values for config-default.device 103c could specify a preferred list of channels to operate on, such a subset of channels 1 through 11 at 2.4 GHz, or a subset of channels 40 through 62 at 5 GHz, and other possibilities exist as well.
Continuing with a step 303a in
A step 303b in
Other possibilities exist as well without departing from the scope of the present invention for radio 108i to use a step 303a and radio 101i to use a step 303b in order to setup a secure WiFi connection 303 without departing from the scope of the present invention. In another exemplary embodiment, the requirement for a PSK could be optionally omitted and the WiFi access point 108i could operate in an “open” configuration such that any client could connect, so long as the client selects the SSID-default.device 103a, which could include device 101 since it would search for SSID-default.device 103a. In this embodiment, the time where WiFi access point 108i could remain limited, such as only the time required to complete a configuration step 102. In exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 could operate an access list to “whitelist” only certain devices, such as devices 101 with a specific MAC address, which could comprise ID.device 101b as depicted in device database 122x in
In some exemplary embodiments, radio 108i could use a step 303a and radio 101i could use a step 303b with configuration parameters in Config-default.device 103c in order to setup WiFi connection 303 through any of a WiFi Direct connection, a WiFi connection established using the device provisioning protocol, or a WiFi peer-to-peer connection. In addition, connection 303 could use other local wireless technologies besides WiFi as well, such as Bluetooth and Near-Field Communications (NFC). For embodiments where connection 303 supports Bluetooth, then radios 101i and radio 108i can comprise Bluetooth radios. For embodiments where connection 303 supports Near-Field Communications, then radios 101i and radio 108i can comprise NFC radios. In general, the values for Config-default.device 103c within device default credentials 103 can specify settings for radios 101i and 108i to use with the local wireless connection between mobile phone 108 and device 101. In general, the values for PSK-default.device 103b can specify optional keys for securely encrypting and/or authenticating the local wireless connection for a connection 303 between mobile phone 108 and device 101.
At step 304 in
Note that in an exemplary embodiment, secure session setup 214 may be temporarily disabled or unavailable (such as mobile phone 108 moves outside of range of a mobile network or access network 126 providing connectivity to authentication server 111). In this case, the values from message 221 from
In order to send message 305, device 101 can use configuration parameters 151 in order to know what remote process or server to contact in order to receive initial configuration data. Note that device 101 as received from device manufacturer 101x by device user 101 may not be configured with a destination configuration server 112 for several reasons. First, device manufacturer 101x may not know the configuration system 114 preferred for use by device owner 122, such as the configuration system 114 that could have a business or contractual relationship with device owner 122, and thus a URL for configuration server 112 may not be programmed or written to memory 101f before a configuration step 102. Second, device manufacturer 101x may ship device 101 in a state with an incomplete configuration, since many different configurations might be possible, such as the need to support different requirements from different owners 122 or device users 101a. Configuration parameters 151 and device default credentials 103 could be included in a minimal “pre-configured” state of device 101 from device manufacturer 101x, such that device 101 could be subsequently configured by a configuration user 108a using a mobile phone 108. For exemplary embodiments where a configuration server 112 is known by device 101 in a set of configuration parameters 151 before a mobile phone 108 configuration step 127 (e.g. configuration parameters 151 records URL-CS 112b), then (i) message 305 could be transmitted directly to configuration server 112 and (ii) the subsequent message 307 could be omitted or transmitted by configuration server 112.
Further regarding device 101 sending message 305, device 101 could use configuration parameters 151 to specify an address, port number, and protocol for initially downloading files. In an exemplary embodiment depicted in
Device 101 can then send message 305 to mobile phone 108, where the initial message could comprise a TCP SYN to the gateway IP address 151a in the LAN for WiFi connection 303, which would be the mobile phone 108, and port number 151b, which could be assigned to and listened by the configuration application 108g. Device 101 and configuration application 108g could then use the protocol 151c in order to transfer files or data. For exemplary embodiments where configuration parameters 151 record an address or URL of configuration server 112 (e.g. for address 151a in a manufactured device 101 in
After a step 304 and also possibly after receiving a message 305, mobile phone 108 can then send authentication server 111 a message 314. Message 314 can include ID.device 101b and also a signal or data that device 101 is authenticated. The authentication could be confirmed by mobile phone 108 and authentication server 111 since device 101 has successfully used device default credentials 103 in order to setup a WiFi session 303. In other words, WiFi session 303 could not normally be established unless device 101 using ID.device 101b had previously recorded device default credentials 103. In exemplary embodiments as depicted in
After receipt of message 304a by authentication server 111, authentication server 111 can transmit a message 306 to configuration server 112, where message 306 could include ID.device 101b, ID.mobile-phone 108b, and certificate for mobile phone cert0.mobile-phone 108m. Authentication server 111 could obtain the certificate for mobile phone cert0.mobile-phone 108m during establishment of secure session 214, and certificate for mobile phone cert0.mobile-phone 108m is depicted and described in connection with
Configuration server 112 could receive message 306 and conduct a step 306a to validate the certificates received in message 306 and record data from the certificates in a configuration database 112a, including the identities received and the public keys as well. For processing message 306 in a step 306a, data in message 306 could also serve as (x) a signal or contain data that device 101 using ID.device 101b is authenticated, as well as (y) a configuration user 108a for mobile phone 108 has successfully conducted an authentication step 215, such that subsequent data can be securely received from (b) mobile phone 108 using mobile phone identity ID.mobile-phone 108b by (b) configuration server 112.
For embodiments where message 305 is received by mobile phone 108 and not configuration server 112, configuration application 108g in mobile phone 108 can then send a message 307, where message 307 can include Cert.AS 111c, Authentication Parameters 111d, a URL for configuration server URL-CS 112b, a certificate for configuration server Cert.CS 112c, and the signature from authentication server signature.AS 223. The signature.AS 223 can be over (ID.Device 101b, URL-CS 112b), as depicted and described in connection with
Although not depicted in
In step 308, device 101 can receive the message 308 via the WiFi session 303 and record the data in RAM 101d or storage 101f. In step 308, device 101 can also verify cert.AS 111c using either (i) cert.CA1 115a directly and/or (ii) a commonly shared certificate cert.CA.root 109a shared between device 101 and authentication server 111. In other words, in exemplary embodiments and before a configuration step 102, device 101 records in nonvolatile memory either (i) cert.CA1 115a or (ii) cert.CA.root 109a, where a parent certificate for cert.AS 111c can be checked with cert.CA.root 109a. In the exemplary embodiment depicted in
After a step 308, device 101 can conduct a step 221a depicted in
Note that in exemplary embodiments, device 101 may not trust mobile phone 108, which could comprise an insecure device or possibly operated by an adversarial configuration user 108a. Thus device 101 would prefer signed configuration data such as the signed URL-CS 112b in a signature.AS 223 in order to avoid attacks that would point device 101 to an incorrect or improper configuration server 112. In exemplary embodiments, signature.AS 223 can also be over authentication parameters 111d, where authentication parameters 111d are received by device 101 in a message 307 above. In another exemplary embodiment, authentication parameters 111d may be optionally omitted from signature 225, such as both (i) not being included in the “message to sign” in signature creation 220 in
In exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 can provide connectivity to IP network 128 to device 101 through WiFi session 303. Device 101 and configuration server 112 can subsequently conduct a secure session setup 309 using certificates from the two sides comprising certificates cert0.device 101t and cert.CS 112c. Secure session setup 309 could comprise establishing a secure communications link using protocols such as TLS, datagram transport layer security (DTLS), IPSec, a virtual private network (VPN), a secure shell (SSH), or similar networking, transport, or application layer technologies in order to establish secure communications between configuration server 112 and device 101. Other techniques for secure session could be utilized as well for secure session 309 without departing from the scope of the present invention. In exemplary embodiments, configuration server 112 and device 101 utilize DTLS as specified in IETF RFC 6347 and subsequent or related standards. The two nodes could transmit their certificate and then use the certificates in order to mutually authenticate and conduct a key exchange in order to encrypt and verify/validate data transferred within the session. In an exemplary embodiment, device 101 may not contain a certificate cert0.device 101t, but configuration system 114 and configuration server 112 can know that device 101 is authenticated based on the successful use of device default credentials 103 in order to establish IP connectivity for device 101 using WiFi session 303 (e.g. via message 306 above). For this embodiment (where a message 306 has been received confirming device 101 is authenticate via the use of credentials 103), secure session 309 could be set up using only the certificate cert.CS 112c, similar to a web browser securing a session with a web server using only the certificate of the web server.
Although secure session 309 passes through mobile handset 108, mobile handset 108 would not normally be able to read plaintext or alter data transferred in secure session 309. Upon successful establishment of secure session 309, device 101 can send message 310 to mobile handset 108 via WiFi session 303 in order to notify mobile handset 108 and configuration user 108a that secure session 309 has been successfully established. In other words, a first display progress indicator could be shown for configuration user 108a when WiFi session setup 303 was completed, and a second display progress indictor for configuration user 108a could be shown upon successful setup of secure session 309. Although not depicted in
As depicted in
The networks available list 322 can be useful for configuration system 114 to select the best or a preferred access network 126 from the networks available list 322 for device 101 operating with monitored unit 106. As depicted in
A step 319 may also comprise mobile phone 108 collecting a list of identities for monitored units 106 and transducers 101k that are externally connected to device 101, and include the identities in the identity list 320. In exemplary embodiments, a step 319 in
Mobile phone 108 could also or alternatively take a picture and record the picture for each monitored unit 106 and transducer 101k. The picture for monitored unit 106 and transducer 101k could be processed by mobile phone 108 or configuration system 114 in order to identify monitored unit 106 and transducer 101k. Pictures could be included in a identity list 320 an subsequently received and stored by configuration server 112 in a configuration database 112a for later use after a configuration step 102, such enabling query by device user 101a at a later time in order to support the operation of device 101 and/or monitored unit 106. The identity of owner 122, which could comprise a value ID.owner 122a for device 101 could be entered by the user in a screen or previously acquired by mobile phone 108, such as with a set of configuration parameters config-provisioning.ID.device 212 or recorded in a tag-value 101w.
A step 319 could also comprise mobile phone 108 preferably obtaining (i) geographical coordinates for a valued location.device 325 or (ii) estimated geographical coordinates or similar physical location for the physical location of device 101. In exemplary embodiments, mobile phone 108 can have a GPS or similar receiver for outdoor location, or use WiFi or Bluetooth for approximate indoor locations, and record the location in location. device 325. Although step 319 to collect an identity list 322 for device 101 is depicted as after receiving message 310 (confirming mutual authentication between device 101 and configuration server 112 in session 309), step 319 to collect an identity list 322 could be conducted at other times, such as before
As depicted in
After secure session setup 321, mobile phone 108 can send configuration server 112 a message 323, where message 323 can include the identity list 320 collected by mobile handset in a step 319 above, and exemplary data for an exemplary identity list 320 is depicted in
The identity list 320 recorded in a step 324 can be utilized in subsequent steps in order to configure device 101 to use transducers 101k with monitored unit 106, such as for the collection of a configuration package 132 in a step 326 depicted in
Before initiating steps and message flows depicted in
Although a single cert.CS 112c is depicted in
Configuration system 114 can then send message 404 to device owner server 122d through the secure session 403, where message 404 can include ID.Device 101b, Location.Device 325, ID.mobile phone 108b, ID.monitored unit 106a, and WiFi SSID—Owner AP 199a. Message 404 could also include a certificate for device of cert0.device 101t. Device owner server 122d can receive the data and perform a step 404a in order to lookup values from a device database 122x for use with device 101 and ID.device 101b. For example, device owner 122 could use WiFi SSID—Owner AP 199a in order to select the full set of owner WiFi credentials 199, where WiFi SSID—Owner AP 199a was previously recorded by mobile phone 108 or device 101 in the identities list 320. Device owner 122 with server 122d could use the identity ID.monitored-unit 106a in order to select URL 421a for monitored unit manufacturer 421.
Device owner 122 could use geographical location location.device 325 in order to select a reporting system 120, and in exemplary embodiments a different reporting system 120 could be used for different geographies, such as a first reporting system 120 used with devices 101 in China (possibly due to regulatory requirements), and a second reporting system 120 used with device 101 in Germany (possibly due to different laws regarding protection of personal data), and other possibilities exist as well for a device owner 122 to use the data received in a message 404 in order to select a reporting system 120 for device 101 with ID.device 101b. Device owner 122 and/or server 122d could repeat the queries in a step 404a in order to record the information transmitted in a message 405 sent to configuration system 114 and described below.
Device owner server 122d can then perform an encryption step 222 as depicted and described in connection with
In a different exemplary embodiment, encryption step 222 for server 122d could comprise (i) server 122d deriving a symmetric key and then (ii) using the symmetric key as the plaintext to generate ciphertext 222a with an asymmetric ciphering algorithm. In other words, encryption step 222 for server 122d could comprise (i) encrypting WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.) with the symmetric key instead of (ii) asymmetrically encrypting the full set of owner WiFi credentials 199. In this different exemplary embodiment, the derived symmetric key could then be used with a symmetric ciphering algorithm such as AES in order to encrypt owner WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.) into ciphertext 222a. The asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key could be transmitted along with symmetrically encrypted ciphertext 222a in a message 405 below.
The configuration system 114 could pass the asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key and the symmetrically encrypted ciphertext 222a to the device 101, which could use SK0.device 101s to decrypt the asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key (where the asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key could be a first portion of ciphertext 222a). Device 101 could then use the decrypted symmetric key to symmetrically decrypt the symmetrically encrypted portion ciphertext 222a in order for device 101 to read the plaintext owner WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.). The use of a step 222a in
Although
An owner or operator of wireless network 329 could use the network identity for wireless network 329 (which could be an SSID for a WiFi access point) to select a set of credentials for wireless network 329 and then (i) perform an encryption step 222 for the credentials for wireless network 329 and then also (ii) conduct a signature creation 220 step for the credentials using a private key corresponding to a public key recorded in a certificate, and (iii) send the resulting ciphertext 222a, signature, and certificate to configuration system 114 in a message 405. In other words, although
Device owner server 122d can then send message 405 to configuration system 114, where message 405 can contain Device Configuration 132b, URL-Manufacturer 421a, ID.RS 120a, Cert.RS 120c, URL-RS 120b Ciphertext 222a (Owner WiFi Credentials 199), Cert.Owner 122c, Cert.CA3 123a, and Signature Owner 407 (Ciphertext 222a). Device Configuration 132b can comprise an operating configuration for device 101, including the specification of operating mode (e.g. debug, release, safe mode, etc.), logging levels for device 101, device certificate renewal or revocation policies, security policies or parameters (e.g. firewall rules), and an identity or URL for device 101 to contact device owner server 122d in the future after a configuration step 102. Device configuration 132b could also include a secondary bundle or configuration for a primary platform or “smart secure platform” operated by device 101. URL-Manufacturer 421a can comprise a URL for configuration system 114 to contact the manufacturer 421 of monitored unit 106 for configuration data such as Monitoring Unit Configuration 132e. ID.RS 120a can comprise an identity for reporting system 120, Cert.RS 120c can comprise a certificate for reporting system 120, URL-RS 120b can comprise a URL for reporting system 120 that configuration system should use when contacting reporting system 120.
Ciphertext 222a (Owner WiFi Credentials 199) can comprise encrypted credentials from owner 122, and ciphertext 222a is depicted and described in connection with
Configuration system 114 can receive message 405 and record and process the data. Configuration system 114 can perform a step 405a, which could be to record ciphertext 222a in encrypted format in order to subsequently send to device 101. Note that in exemplary embodiments, configuration system 114 cannot feasibly decrypt ciphertext 222a and read the plaintext since configuration system 114 does not record secret key SK0.device 101s. Also note that ciphertext 222a has been “double encrypted” since ciphertext 222a is transmitted over a secure session 403. Further, signature 407 can be transmitted within secure session 403 as depicted in
Device manufacturer 101x can use ID.Device 101b and device version 101y in order to lookup operating system 108e updates, which could comprise security patches, firmware updates, device driver updates, etc. Device manufacturer 101x can respond with a message 409, where message 409 could include a set of files for a Device OS Updates 132a and also a value or number for OS version 101ea, which can be a version number for the operating system 101e including updates or patches from device OS updates 132a. Although not depicted in
Configuration system 114 can send transducer manufacturer 420 a message 410 which includes the value for OS version 101ea and ID.transducer 101ka. Transducer manufacturer 420 can use the values OS version 101e a and ID.transducer 101ka in order to look up and obtain current versions of transducer libraries/drivers 132c and also transducer configuration 132d. In other words, transducer libraries/drivers 132c could be updated to support or be compatible with OS 101e including updates via patches in device OS updates 132a. Transducer configuration 132d could comprise a transducer electronic data sheet (TEDS) as specified in IEEE standard 1451.5, or similar or subsets of contained within a TEDS.
Configuration system 114 can send the manufacturer 421 of monitored unit 106 a message 412 with the identity.MU 106a, which could be recorded by mobile handset 108 in a step 319 above. The manufacturer 421 of monitored unit 106 could respond with a monitoring unit configuration 132e, which could specify operating ranges or values for device 101 to operate with monitored unit 106. As one example, if monitored unit 106 comprises an autonomous vehicle then manufacturer 421 could comprise a car manufacturer and configuration 132e could specify a maximum speed allowed, a maximum engine temperature before device 101 sends an alarm condition to reporting system 120, and other possibilities exist as well. In other words, device 101 could use monitoring unit configuration 132e in order to determine alarm thresholds or conditions in order to notify reporting system 120 regarding a potential alarm state for monitored unit 106. Configuration 132e could also specify maximum values or minimum values or a range of values for device 101 to use with a transducer 101k, such as a range in voltage, a range in current, or similar values for transducer 101k to implement with monitored unit 106 when transducer 101k operates as a transducer.
Configuration system 114 can send reporting system a message 414, where message 414 can include ID.Device 101b, CertO.Device 101t, ID.TR 101ka, and ID.MU 106a. ID.TR 101ka can comprise the identity for transducer 101k and ID.MU 106a can comprise an identity for monitored unit 106. At step 415 reporting system 120 can record the data received in message 414 in a reporting database 118 to support the ongoing operation of device 101 upon completion of a configuration step 102. Although not depicted in
A step 415 for reporting system 120 can also comprise reporting system using the data from message 414 in order to determine or select a configuration of device 101 for reporting system 120, such as the use of a first or second reporting server 116 (such as different geographical locations), and other possibilities exist as well. Reporting system 120 could specify values for a reporting system configuration 132f, which could identify the first or second reporting server 116 as the primary and the other reporting server 116 as the backup. Reporting system configuration 132f could also specify values such as timers for device 101 to use when sending data to a reporting server 116, the name or URL of a reporting server 116, a protocol or port number for device 101 to use when communicating with reporting system 116, and other or similar parameters as well. In exemplary embodiments, a reporting system configuration 132f can specify ECC algorithms and parameters for device 101 to use, such as a curve name and key length, which could comprise curve P-256 and key length of 256 bits in an exemplary embodiment.
A step 415 could also comprise reporting system 120 selecting a reporting application software 132g file, which could be an application or program for device 101 to operate when communicating with reporting system 120. Although not depicted in
In a step 415, reporting system 120 can also select a set of reporting system (RS) credentials 132h for device 101 with ID.device 101b to use when communicating with reporting system 120. RS credentials 132h can include a name or identity for device 101 to use with reporting system 120, a password, preshared secret key (PSK), a certificate associated with reporting system 120, and also parameters for using RS credentials 132h. Parameters for using RS credentials 132h could be similar or equivalent to authentication parameters 111d depicted and described in connection with
Reporting system 120 can then send a message 416 to configuration system 114, where message 416 can include Reporting System Configuration 132f, Reporting Application Software 132g, Ciphertext 222b (RS credentials 132h), cert.RS 120c, and Signature RS 418 (Ciphertext 222b). Reporting System Configuration 132f, Reporting Application Software 132g were described two paragraphs above and Ciphertext 222b (RS credentials 132h), and Signature RS 418 (Ciphertext 222b) were described in the paragraph above. Configuration system 114 can receive message 416 and record the data. Note that in exemplary embodiments, configuration system cannot normally read ciphertext 222b since the data is encrypted. The transfer of a ciphertext 222b through a secure session 403 could comprise a “double encryption” of ciphertext 222b, where configuration system 114 could decrypt a first layer of encryption applied by secure session 403, but configuration system 114 (or any device or node other than device 101) would not normally be able to decrypt the second layer of encryption comprising ciphertext 222b since SK0.device 101s would normally be required to decrypt a ciphertext 222a (and also a ciphertext 222a above).
Configuration system 114 may then select or obtain access network credentials 126a, where network access credentials 126a could be used for a wide area network (WAN) and WAN radio 101h in device 101. In exemplary embodiments and as discussed above in connection with
Upon selection of a preferred access network 126, configuration system 114 can send access network 126 a message 419a that includes an identity of device 101 in the form of ID.device 101b. Message 419a could also include a request to provision credentials to configuration system 114 for ID.device 101b and also include cert0.device 101t. Access network 126 could then respond with a set of access network credentials 126a for device 101 in a message or response 419b. Access network credentials 126a could include data for device 101 to use with access network 126, such as an identity, a secret key, cryptographic parameters similar to parameters 111d or parameters 151, a shared key (equivalent to a PSK such as K in 4G and 5G standards), a certificate authority certificate, a root certificate for access network 126, and similar data necessary for device 101 to setup a wireless connection with access network 126.
In exemplary embodiments, access network 126 could encrypt access network credentials 126a into a ciphertext 222c using PK0.device 101ta from cert0.device 101t such that only device 101 could feasible read ciphertext 222c. In this manner, configuration system 114 and any other intermediate servers or computers on the IP network 128 would not be feasibly able to read access network credentials 126a in ciphertext 222c. Further, exemplary embodiments contemplate that message 419a could contain a profile for an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) in a message 419a, where the profile for the eUICC could comprise the access network credentials 126a.
At step 422, configuration system 114 can assemble or combine all the data received above for a step 326, such that (i) configuration server 114 can create configuration package 132, and (ii) configuration package 132 can be transferred to device 101 via mobile phone 108, where (iii) connectivity to mobile phone 108 for device 101 has been established using the device default credentials 103. The data and/or filed depicted as received in by configuration server 114 in
For a step 220 by configuration system 114 in
In preferred exemplary embodiments for a step 422 in
In other words, in exemplary embodiments, configuration system 114 verifies signatures on files received in a step 326 before configuration server 112 conducts a signature creation step 220 for the configuration package 132. In this manner, elements for configuration package 132 may be sourced from multiple different parties in a system 400 and system 100 above, and configuration system 114 could (i) verify authenticity for each file source depicted and (ii) provide an overall signature 220d or “stamp of approval” of configuration package 132 for device 101. In this manner, device 101 may not need to check the signatures on individual elements within configuration package 132, which could be difficult if device 101 does not have all the intermediate and root certificates for each of the individual element signatures in a configuration package 132. A step 422 can comprise configuration system also collecting a set of root certificates 109a a for a configuration package 132, where the set of root certificates 109a a was depicted and described above in connection with
Note that not all data depicted is required for a step 326 in
As depicted in
At step 501, device 101 can prepare for download of configuration package 132 from configuration server 112, and also send data to configuration server 112 in preparation for download of configuration package 132. For step 501, device 101 could determine available storage memory 101f and send a report to configuration server 112 in order for configuration server 112 to determine if sufficient memory resources are available in device 101 in order to accept configuration package 132. Other data from device 101 to configuration server 112 could be included in a step 501 as well, such as (i) current mode of operation for device 101 (e.g. debug mode, release/operating mode, safe mode, etc.), (ii) a second identity list 320 determined by device 101 (which configuration server 112 could compare to the first identity list 320 received from mobile phone 108), and (iii) confirmation of a signature verification step 221 for configuration system certificate cert.CS 112c and all parent certificates through a root certificate 109a recorded in device 101. For example, if (iii) has failed, then configuration server 112 could be notified in a step 501 and subsequently send additional or missing “parent” certificates with a message 503 below, such that cert.CS 112c could be verified by a root certificate cert.CA.root 109a recorded in device 101. Other possibilities exist as well for a configuration package download preparation step 501 without departing from the scope of the present invention. Data from a step 501 could be sent in a message (not shown in
Configuration server 112 can then use connection 309 to send a message 503 to device 101, where message 503 includes ID.Transactionl 504, Ciphertext 222a (Owner WiFi Credentials 199), a certificate Cert.Owner 122c, Signature Owner 407 over (Ciphertext 222a), file list 505, Configuration Package 132, Signature 220c (Configuration Package 132), and Cert.Config-System 114c. ID.transactionl 504 can comprise a unique identifier for message 503, such that configuration server 112 and device 101 can reference ID.transactionl in subsequent messages, such as if retransmissions or acknowledgements are required with a transaction ID. Ciphertext 222a containing an encrypted set of owner WiFi credentials 199 was depicted and described in connection with
For other exemplary embodiments where configuration server 112 is either (a) operated by owner 122 or (b) under a sufficient level of control by owner 122, then use of a separate ciphertext 222a could be omitted and credentials 199 could be sent as plaintext inside secure session 309 (e.g. credentials 199 could be encrypted by session 309 but not “double encrypted” through the use of an additional layer of encryption in the form of ciphertext 222a). For exemplary embodiments where ciphertext 222a is included inside secure session 503, ciphertext 222a could either comprise (i) an asymmetric encryption of owner WiFi credentials 199 such as via Elgamal asymmetric encryption or RSA asymmetric encryption or a PQC KEM, or (ii) ciphertext 222a could comprise two separate portions of ciphertext where the first portion of ciphertext could comprise an asymmetric encryption of a symmetric key and the second portion of ciphertext could comprise a symmetric encryption of credentials 199 using the asymmetrically encrypted symmetric key.
The certificate cert.owner 122c in message 503 can be signed by a public key recorded in device 101, such as cert.CA1 115a or cert.CAO 107a or cert.CA.root 109a. For exemplary embodiments where ciphertext 222a comprises asymmetric encryption, then signature 407 over ciphertext 222a can comprise a signature using the owner 122 private key for the public key in certificate 122c, such that device 101 can verify that encrypted credentials 199 are authoritatively sent from owner 122. In other words, since (i) asymmetric encryption can be used for ciphertext 222a, and (ii) the asymmetric encryption can use public key PK0.device 101ta which may be publicly available, then without a signature 407 potentially any node with access to public key PK0.device 101a on IP network 128 could create a an unsigned ciphertext 222a. However, the use of a signature 407 over ciphertext 222a can confirm that ciphertext 222a was authoritatively originated by owner 122. Message 503 through secure session 309 can also include the file list 505 and configuration package 132 as depicted in
In some embodiments, configuration package 132 may optionally not be sent with a separate signature 220d (described above in connection with step 422 of
Device 101 can receive message 503 over secure connection 309, where secure connection 309 could use or be transferred via WiFi connection 303, as depicted in
In other words, in a step 507, device 101 could verify the public key for cert.owner 122c using cert.CA3 123a and a signature verification step 221, and then the public key for cert.CA3 123a could be verified by device 101 using a cert.CA.root 109a. For a step 507, if device 101 does not record the full certificate chain linking cert.owner 122c with a recorded cert.CA.root 109a, then device 101 could send a query to configuration server 112 requesting for an alternative certificate chain that would link cert.owner 122c with a recorded cert.CA.root 109a in device 101. For exemplary embodiments where (i) a different wireless network 329 is used than owner WiFi access point 122b and (ii) the credentials 199 received in message 503 are from the owner of wireless network 329, then both (a) message 503 can include a signature for the credentials 199 from the owner of the selected wireless network 329, and (b) a certificate for the owner of the selected wireless network 329, and (c) a chain of certificates linking the certificate for the owner of the selected wireless network 329 to a recorded root certificate cert.CA.root 109a.
In exemplary embodiments, device 101 can record a plurality of root certificates cert.CA.root 109a before a configuration step 102, such that a first cert.CA.root 109a comprises the “top-level” or root certificate for Certificate Authority (Configuration System) 115, a second cert.CA.root 109a comprises the “top-level” or root certificate for Certificate Authority (Reporting System) 120, a third cert.CA.root 109a comprises the “top-level” or root certificate for Certificate Authority (owner) 123, and a fourth cert.CA.root 109a comprises the “top-level” or root certificate for Certificate Authority (device) 107. Further, a device 101 or a device manufacturer may now “know” which configuration system 114 or device owner 122 may be used with a device 101 before a configuration step 102 (where different systems or owners may use different certificate authorities), and consequently device 101 could record multiple root certificates before a configuration step 102 (such as the exemplary 4 root certificates described in this paragraph). In exemplary embodiments, a device 101 from a manufacturer 101x can record root certificates 109a or root certificates 109a a from the list of included root certificates from the Mozilla Foundation with Mozilla projects, where the aggregate list of community approved root certificates and associated parameters is in the widely distributed file certdata.txt from the Mozilla web site.
Some of the certificate authorities in a
Device 101 can conduct a decryption step 233 for ciphertext 222a, where decryption 233 is depicted and described in connection with
Device 101 can then conduct a step 221b in order to verify signature 407, where (i) step 221b comprises using a signature verification step 221 with the public key for device owner server 122d received in cert.owner 122c in message 503, and (ii) signature 407 can be over ciphertext 222a. Or, in exemplary embodiments signature 407 could alternatively be over the plaintext data in ciphertext 222a, which could be owner WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.). A step 221b for device 101 can be used to verify that the owner WiFi credentials 199 received in a message 503 are authoritatively from device owner 122. As discussed above, the previous step 507 can confirm the public key for device owner 122 in cert.owner 122c is also authenticated using parent certificates that link to a recorded root certificate cert.CA.root 109a.
Device 101 can then conduct a step 221c in order to verify signature 220d, where (i) step 221c comprises using a signature verification step 221 with the public key for configuration system 114 received in cert.configuration-system 114c in message 503, and (ii) signature 220c can be over the configuration package 132. A step 221c for device 101 can be used to verify that the configuration package 132 received in a message 503 are authoritatively from configuration system 114. As discussed above, the previous step 507 can confirm the public key for configuration system 114 in cert.configuration-system 114c is also authenticated using parent certificates that link to a recorded root certificate cert.CA.root 109a.
Device 101 can then conduct a step 508, where step 508 can include both (i) device 101 decompressing configuration package 132 using an exemplary library such as gzip. Device 101 can (A) report an error or (B) refuse to process configuration package 132 or elements within configuration package 132 if (C) a signature verification step 221c fails. Step 508 can also comprise device 101 verifying that configuration package 132 contains all the data and files listed in a file list 505, processing metadata in file list 505 for configuration package 132. Device 101 in step 508 can also verify the individual files in file list 505 all properly load and can be read.
At step 508 in
Upon a reboot in a step 508, connections 303 and 309 may temporarily terminate with the reboot, but device 101 can re-establish connections after reboot. A step 508 can then also comprise device 101 creating a report 508a, where report 508a includes a status code with success or errors for each file in file list 505 for configuration package 132. In other words, report 508a can record the success or errors of applying each of the files in configuration package 132, which may be useful for configuration server 112 or other authorized elements in system 100 to know the state of device 101. Device 101 can then send configuration server 112 a message 509 over connection 309, where message 509 includes the transaction identity ID.transactionl and the report 508a.
Upon reading the plaintext report 508a, configuration server 112 can conduct a step 511 as depicted in
In exemplary embodiments, network access credentials 126a in a configuration package 132 could comprise a profile for an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). Network access credentials 126a could also comprise values for a “smart secure platform” (SSP) such as an integrated SSP (iSSP) operated by device 101, where device 101 uses the network access credentials 126a and the iSSP in order to authenticate and connect with an access network 126. In addition, network access credentials 126a could comprise a pointer, URL, or another identifier of an eUICC profile or secondary bundle for device 101 to load. The transfer of network access credentials 126a from a message 419a in
After processing step 511, configuration server 112 could perform a step 512, which can comprise a series of steps to close communications for mobile phone 108 and device 101. Configuration server 112 could generate and send a message 513a with command 512a for mobile phone 108, where command 512a instructs mobile phone 108 to close connection 321. Configuration server 112 could generate and send a message 513b with command 512b for device 101, where command 512b instructs device 101 to close connections 309 and 303 and also begin reporting through reporting system 120 using device owner WiFi access point 122b with device owner credentials 199 in
Mobile phone 108 can receive the message 513a with command 512a and report 512c, and mobile phone 108 then conduct a step 514a to close connection 321 with configuration server 112. Mobile phone 108 can then conduct a step 515, where the configuration user report 512c is displayed to configuration user 108a, and a step 515 can also comprise configuration user 108a entering information in a display for mobile phone 108 confirming any manual changes for device 101 or monitored unit 106. In some embodiments, a step 515 can take place before closing connection 321, such that mobile phone 108 can send information back to configuration server 112 and a configuration database 112a regarding any manual changes performed as requested in the configuration user report 512c.
At step 129, mobile handset 108 can then restore the previous user WiFi access point user credentials 105 for WiFi access point 108i recorded in a step 127 above in
Device 101 can receive the message 513b via session 309, where message 513b contains command 512b. Command 512b can instruct device 101 to close connection 303 and 309 and begin reporting through reporting system 120 using device owner WiFi access point 122b and credentials 199. Both mobile phone 108 and device 101 could then perform a step 516 and close connection 303. In exemplary embodiments, device 101 conducts a step 517 to load device owner WiFi credentials 199 for connecting with device owner WiFi access point 122b. Device 101 then conducts a connection setup 518 with device owner WiFi access point 122b (or wireless network 122b) using the device owner WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.). In exemplary embodiments, connection setup 518 could comprise using any of WPA2-PSK, WPA3-PSK, WPA2-Enterprise, WPA3-Enterprise, EAP-TLS, 5G authentication, and subsequent or related versions of these standards. The credentials necessary to connect with WiFi access point 122b (or wireless network 122b) could be from the received owner WiFi credentials 199 (or credentials 199 for wireless networks other than WiFi such 4G LTE or 5G, etc.).
Although connection 518 using device owner WiFi credentials 199 and device owner WiFi access point 122b, in other exemplary alternative embodiments a device 101 could connect with an access network 126 that is different than device owner WiFi access point 122b. For this exemplary alternative embodiment, then device 101 could use a set of WAN credentials 126a from a configuration package 132 and also as depicted in
At step 519, device 101 can process data in order to connect with reporting server 116, where reporting server 116 can be a server or set of servers in a reporting system 120. Data processed in a step 519 can include collecting data from transducers 101k using Reporting Application Software 132g, and a step 519 can comprise recording a set of startup or initialization data for transducers 101k from transducer configuration 132d. In exemplary embodiments, a step 519 also includes a calibration of transducers 101k with assistance of configuration user 108a and mobile phone 108. Mobile phone 108 could display to configuration user 108a instructions or steps related to calibration, such as providing a known reference signal to a transducer 101k. An example of providing a known reference signal for transducer 101k could be putting a temperature probe for a transducer 101k such as a thermocouple or thermistor in an ice water bath, and other examples exist as well. In other exemplary embodiments, a calibration of transducers within a step 519 can be omitted.
Device 101 for a step 519 could also read and operate on values for connecting with reporting server 116, such as reading a DNS name for reporting server 116, a TCP or UDP port number to connect with at reporting server 116. Additional or other steps or data for device 101 to perform in a step 519 could be in the Reporting System Configuration 132f received in a configuration package 132. A certificate for reporting system 120 or reporting server 116 such as a cert.RS 116c could be included in a set of reporting system credentials 132h in configuration package 132. In exemplary embodiments, Reporting System Configuration 132f within configuration package 132 contains a list of cryptographic parameters to utilize when communicating with reporting system 120 and reporting server 116 (such as a subset or superset of parameters 111d). Further, device 101 can used credentials in reporting system credentials 132h from configuration package 132 in order to authenticate with reporting system 120 and/or reporting server 116.
Device 101 can then conduct a series of steps in order to establish a secure communications link with reporting server 116, and conduct a secure session setup 520.
In another exemplary embodiment, device 101 uses reporting system credentials 132h to establish secure session 520, and reporting system credentials 132h could include a new, different private key SK1.device 101s′ for device 101 to use with reporting server 116. Reporting system credentials 132h could also include an identity for device 101 to use with reporting system 120 or reporting server 116, as well as a new, different certificate certl.device 101t′. In other words, reporting system 120 can use different PKI keys for device 101 than those recorded for a manufactured device 101, and the credentials or keys could be received by device 101 in a set of reporting system credentials 132h. A set of reporting system credentials 132h could also include a shared secret key for device 101 to use with reporting system 120 or reporting server 116. Also, reporting server 116 could send device 101 a certificate for reporting server that may comprise a cert.RS 116c. Any certificates sent or received in a secure session 520 could be verified with a signature verification step 221 from
Step 521 could also comprise reporting server 116 and reporting system 120 verifying that device 101 is authorized to use reporting system 120, after device 101 with device identity 101b (or a different identity for device 101 to use with reporting system 120 from reporting system credentials 132h) has be authenticated in setup of secure session 520. In other words, setup of secure session 520 can authenticate an identity for device 101 and reporting server 116, but an authenticated identity for device 101 may not be authorized to use reporting system 120. Step 521 could also comprise reporting system 120 or reporting server 116 fetching or querying a reporting database 118 using ID.device 101b (or a different identity for device 101 to use with reporting system 120 from reporting system credentials 132h) for reporting configuration 132f data pertaining to device 101. In exemplary embodiments, ID.device 101b could comprise the use of different values, such as a first value with an access network 126 and a second value with a reporting system 120.
A reporting configuration 132f recorded by a reporting system 120 can include data such as an identity list 320, files list 505, authentication parameters 111d, and reporting system credentials 132h. Reporting system credentials 132h could include a pre-shared secret key (PSK) for use by device 101 with reporting system 120. The use of a PSK between device 101 and reporting system 120 or reporting server 116 can be used in embodiments where both reporting server 116 and device 101 don't both use certificates in secure session 520 (since use of certificates by both sides may normally provide authentication and a means for mutual key derivation). With data from a step 521, reporting server 116 can select subsequent steps or procedures in order to communicate with device 101 and transducer 101k fora device 101.
Device 101 can then conduct at step 525, which can comprise device 101 collecting or sending transducer data 125 with transducers 101k. A step 525 could also comprise device 101 running through a set of configuration test vectors 102a and generating a configuration report 525a. Configuration test vectors 102a could comprise device 101 testing dynamic range of transducers 101k, having configuration user 108a provide test data for transducers 101k, or also having transducers 101k collect initial, “production” data regarding monitored unit 106. In an exemplary embodiment, where device 101 includes a camera, for a configuration test vector 102a in a step 525, (a) mobile phone 108 could present a picture, QR code, bar code, or similar image on the screen 108k of mobile phone 108, and then (b) device 101 could read the picture, QR code, or bar code. Configuration report 525a can also comprise a set of data for a report 525a generated by device 101 using transducers 101k with monitored unit 106, as specified or instructed for device 101 in configuration test vector 102a. In other exemplary embodiments, a configuration test vector 102a could be omitted and transducers 101k and device 101 could simply begin operation with monitored unit and data could be recorded in a configuration report 525a. Device 101 can then send reporting server 116 a message 526 within secure session 520, where message 526 can include transducer data 125 and report 525a.
At step 527, device 101 can deprecate the used set of default credentials 103, and increase a sequence number 103d such that a second or different set of default credentials 103 could be utilized if a future configuration step 102 is conducted. In other words, if (a) device 101 becomes reset or device 101 loses connectivity to AP 122b and access network 126 (such as a physical move to a different geographical location, or memory 101f in device 101 getting corrupted) then (b) a mobile handset 108 could be used to conduct a second configuration step 102 at a later date. Other possibilities exist as well for reasons why device 101 could prefer to use a different set of default credentials 103 after a configuration step 102. For a step 527 both device 101 and configuration system 114 could increment a sequence number 103d in order to obtain a different, second set of default credentials 103 for device 101 at a subsequent time. The use of a second set of default credentials 103 with a sequence number 103d is depicted and described in connection with
At step 528, reporting server 116 can record plaintext data from message 526 in a reporting database 118 or also send data to device owner 122. If expected values for transducer data 125 are received and report 525a meets acceptance criteria, then at step 528 (i) reporting server 116 and reporting system 120 can record that configuration step 102 has been successfully completed, and (ii) reporting system 120 could inform device owner 122 and/or configuration system 114 in
Mobile phone 108 can conduct a step 529, where step 529 can comprise the configuration application 108g sending a query 530 to reporting server 116 in order to confirm successful completing of configuration step 102. As described in the paragraph above, reporting server 116 could determine that configuration step 102 is complete based on the successful receipt of transducer data 125 and a configuration report 525a. Receipt of a repot 525a can confirm any of: (i) network access credentials 126a for access network 126 function (such as a backup or if a device owner WiFi access point 122b is not available), (ii) device 101 has wireless or wired connectivity properly established, (iii) transducers 101k are connected to device 101 and functioning, (iv) that transducers 101k are collecting transducer data 125 for monitored unit 106, (v) device owner credentials 199 have been loaded and activated for a device WiFi client 101i, (vi) configuration package 132 has been downloaded and applied for device 101, (vii) a complete set for an identity list 320 has been received, including physical location of device 101 such as geographical coordinates 325, (viii) reporting system 116 can communicate with device 101 in a secure manner via a secure session 520, (ix) a configuration step 102 for device 101 properly functions, such that a configuration step 102 could be conducted a second time in the future if required potentially with a different set of device default credentials 103 using a different sequence number 103d, and/or (x) device 101 records root such as a cert.CA.root 109a and intermediate certificates in order to verify a certificate for reporting server 116, configuration server 112, and/or authentication server 111.
As depicted in
Various exemplary embodiments have been described above. Those skilled in the art will understand, however, that changes and modifications may be made to those examples without departing from the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A method for a mobile handset to configure a device, the method performed by the mobile handset, the method comprising:
- a) reading a tag for the device, wherein the tag includes (i) a domain name for a first server and (ii) a token for the device;
- b) establishing a secure session with the first server using at least the domain name and the token;
- c) receiving from the first server a set of configuration parameters, wherein the set of configuration parameters includes at least authentication parameters;
- d) authenticating with an authentication server using the authentication parameters and at least one of (i) identification information from a user and (ii) a certificate for the mobile handset;
- e) receiving device default credentials for the device, a uniform resource locator (URL) for a configuration system, and a digital signature of the URL;
- f) scanning for a list of available wireless networks and associated radio frequency (RF) channels, and sending the list to the configuration system;
- g) establishing a local wireless connection with the device using the device default credentials;
- h) sending the URL and the digital signature for the URL to the device;
- i) receiving an encrypted set of credentials from the configuration system, wherein the encrypted set of credentials are encrypted by the configuration system using at least a public key for the device, and wherein the encrypted set of credentials includes at least one wireless network identity and RF channel from the list; and
- j) sending the encrypted set of credentials to the device through the local wireless connection.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising establishing the secure session through a first radio, wherein the first radio comprises a wireless wide area network (WAN) radio.
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising establishing the local wireless connection through a second radio, wherein the second radio comprises one of a Wi-Fi radio, a Near-Field Communications (NFC) radio, and a Bluetooth radio.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first server comprises a discovery server, and the set of configuration parameters specifies a configuration application for at least establishing the local wireless connection.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the device default credentials include at least one of (i) a device public key for EAP authentication, and (ii) a pre-shared key for the local wireless connection.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted set of credentials includes (i) at least one of a symmetric key and a certificate for the wireless network and (ii) a wireless network configuration.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted set of credentials are encrypted with a symmetric ciphering key, wherein the configuration system asymmetrically encrypts the symmetric ciphering key with the public key for the device, wherein the device decrypts the symmetric key with a corresponding private key for the device, and wherein the device decrypts the encrypted set of credentials with the symmetric ciphering key.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the configuration system digitally signs the encrypted set of credentials with a configuration system private key, and wherein the device verifies the digitally signed encrypted set of credentials using at least a certificate authority public key, and wherein the device records the certificate authority public key before the mobile handset establishes the local wireless connection.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the mobile handset scans for the list before authenticating with the authentication server.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the device verifies the digital signature using at least a certificate authority public key, and wherein the device records the certificate authority public key before the mobile handset establishes the local wireless connection.
11. A mobile handset for configuring a device, the mobile handset comprising:
- a camera for reading a device tag, wherein the device tag includes a first server domain name and a token for the device;
- a nonvolatile memory for storing a configuration application and user credentials, wherein the configuration application scans for a list of available wireless networks and associated radio frequency (RF) channels;
- a first radio for establishing a secure session with a first server over a wireless wide area network, for receiving authentication parameters from the first server, for receiving (i) device default credentials for the device, (ii) a uniform resource locator (URL) for a configuration system, (iii) and a digital signature of the URL, and for receiving an encrypted set of credentials for a wireless network in the list, wherein the secure session uses the first server domain name and the token;
- a processor for authenticating with an authentication server using the authentication parameters and at least one of (i) identification information from a user and (ii) a certificate for the mobile handset;
- a second radio for operating with the user credentials before the mobile handset reads the device tag, for establishing a local wireless connection with the device using the device default credentials, for transmitting to the device (i) the URL, (ii), the digital signature of the URL, and (iii) the encrypted set of credentials, and for operating with the user credentials after transmitting the encrypted set of credentials to the device; and
- a system bus for transferring the encrypted set of credentials from the first radio to the second radio, wherein the encrypted set of credentials are encrypted using at least a public key for the device, and wherein the encrypted set of credentials includes at least one wireless network identity and RF channel from the list.
12. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the second radio comprises one of a Wi-Fi radio, a Near-Field Communications (NFC) radio, and a Bluetooth radio.
13. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the first server comprises a discovery server, and wherein the first radio receives configuration parameters from the discovery server, and wherein the configuration parameters at least select the configuration application.
14. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the device default credentials include at least one of (i) a device public key for EAP authentication, and (ii) a pre-shared key for the local wireless connection.
15. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the device records the default credentials before the second radio establishes the local wireless connection.
16. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the encrypted set of credentials includes at least one of (i) a symmetric key and a certificate for the wireless network and (ii) a wireless network configuration.
17. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the encrypted set of credentials are encrypted with a symmetric ciphering key, wherein the configuration system asymmetrically encrypts the symmetric ciphering key with the public key for the device, wherein the device decrypts the symmetric key with a corresponding private key for the device, and wherein the device decrypts the encrypted set of credentials with the symmetric ciphering key.
18. The mobile handset of claim 17, wherein the configuration system digitally signs the encrypted set of credentials with a configuration system private key, and wherein the device verifies the digitally signed encrypted set of credentials using at least a certificate authority public key, and wherein the device records the certificate authority public key before the mobile handset establishes the local wireless connection.
19. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the device verifies the digital signature using at least a certificate authority public key, and wherein the device records the certificate authority public key before the mobile handset establishes the local wireless connection.
20. The mobile handset of claim 11, wherein the mobile handset uses the device tag to download the configuration application before the processor authenticates with the authentication server.
Type: Application
Filed: Apr 5, 2019
Publication Date: Oct 10, 2019
Inventor: John A. Nix (Evanston, IL)
Application Number: 16/376,998
