Abstract: Endpoints in a network execute a sensor module that intercepts commands. The sensor module compares a source of commands to a sanctioned list of applications received from a management server. If the source does not match a sanctioned application and the command is a write or delete command, the command is ignored and a simulated acknowledgment is sent. If the command is a read command, deception data is returned instead. In some embodiments, certain data is protected such that commands will be ignored or modified to refer to deception data where the source is not a sanctioned application. The source may be verified to be a sanctioned application by evaluating a certificate, hash, or path of the source. Responses from an active directory server may be intercepted and modified to reference a decoy server when not addressed to a sanctioned application.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosting operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. Credentials for services implemented by a BotSink may be planted in an active directory (AD) server. The BotSink periodically uses the credentials thereby creating log entries indicating use thereof. When an attacker accesses the services using the credentials, the BotSink engages and monitors an attacker system and may generate an alert. Decoy services may be assigned to a domain and associated with names according to a naming convention of the domain.

Abstract: An endpoint executes a deflection service that detects failed connection attempts (TCP RST packets) and evaluates whether they are likely the result of a reconnaissance attack. If an inbound connection fails, a connection request packet (TCP SYN) is sent to a decoy server that includes data from the TCP RST packet. The decoy server then completes a connection handshake with a destination of the TCP RST packet and engages a process at the destination. If an outbound connection fails, the deflection service facilitates a connection between a process executing on the endpoint and the decoy server and associated with a destination port referenced by the TCP RST packet.

Abstract: Endpoints of various domains implement forwarding modules as well as perform various production tasks. The endpoints of a domain participate in an election process by which one or more endpoints are selected to operate as honeypots. The forwarding modules of non-selected endpoints become inactive, but wake up periodically to determine whether an election process is occurring. Selected endpoints obtain configuration data from a management server. The endpoints then acquire IP addresses and implement one or more services according to the configuration data. The management server may configure the services based on a location of the selected endpoint. Traffic received by the selected endpoints is forwarded to the management server, which engages an attacker system using one or more VMs. When an endpoint moves to a different domain, it releases acquired IP addresses and attempts to participate in the election process in the different domain.

Abstract: Endpoints in a network execute a sensor module that intercepts commands. The sensor module compares a source of commands to a sanctioned list of applications received from a management server. If the source does not match a sanctioned application and the command is a write or delete command, the command is ignored and a simulated acknowledgment is sent. If the command is a read command, deception data is returned instead. In some embodiments, certain data is protected such that commands will be ignored or modified to refer to deception data where the source is not a sanctioned application. The source may be verified to be a sanctioned application by evaluating a certificate, hash, or path of the source.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosing operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. In the case of shellcode attacks, unsuccessful attacks may be emulated by selecting a corresponding emulator that will receive and execute instructions, as would a successful shellcode attack. Events occurring on the BotMagnet and Sinkhole are correlated and used to characterize the malicious code. The characterization may be transmitted to other computer systems in order to detect instances of the malicious code.

Abstract: A system reports credentials on nodes of a network. Nodes are assigned to security silos. If a credential reported from a node is found to match a credential found on a node outside of its security silo or be for authentication with a node outside the its security an alert is generated, unless proper precautions are generated. Credentials may be reported as one-way hashes of credentials. Security silos may be automatically generated to segregate at-risk nodes from critical servers based on the presence or use of email clients and browsers. Precautions that may be used to suppress alerts, such as using KERBEROS TGT.

Abstract: Endpoints in a network environment include remote file systems mounted thereto that reference a file system generator that responds to file system commands with deception data. Requests to list the contents of a directory are intercepted, such as while a response is passed up through an IO stack. The response is modified to include references to deception files and directories that do not actually exist on the system hosting the file system generator. The number of the deception files and directories may be randomly selected. Requests to read deception files are answered by generating a file having a file type corresponding to the deception file. Deception files may be written back to the system by an attacker and then deleted.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosing operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. Dark space in a network (unused IP addresses, unused ports and absent applications, and invalid usernames and passwords) is consumed by a BotSink such that attempts to access Darkspace resources will be directed to the BotSink, which will engage the source host of such attempts.

Abstract: Endpoints in a computer network create connections to a deception server without sending any payload data. The connections create records of the connection on the endpoints, by which an attacker accesses the deception server. Received packets that include payload data are determined to be unauthorized. The deception server acquires IP addresses in various VLANS and provides these IP addresses to the endpoints over a secure channel. The connections from the endpoints to the deception server are not performed on the secure channel. IP addresses acquired by the deception server are not assigned to an interface. Instead, NAT is used to route packets including the IP addresses to various engagement servers. Each IP address is assigned a unique hostname in order to appear as multiple distinct servers. The deception server further generates broadcast traffic to generate other records that may be used to lure an attacker to the deception server.

Abstract: MITM attacks are detected by intercepting network configuration traffic (name resolution, DHCP, ARP, ICMP, etc.) in order to obtain a description of network components. A computer system generates artificial requests for network configuration information and monitors responses. Multiple responses indicate a MITM attack. Responses that are different from previously-recorded responses also indicate a MITM attack. MITM attacks may be confirmed by transmitting fake credentials to a source of a response to a request for network configuration information. If the fake credentials are accepted or are subsequently used in an access attempt, then a MITM attack may be confirmed.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosing operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. Credentials for services implemented by a BotSink may be planted in an active directory (AD) server. The BotSink periodically uses the credentials thereby creating log entries indicating use thereof. In response to an attacker accessing the services using the credentials, the BotSink engages and monitors an attacker system and may generate an alert.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosing operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. The Sinkhole module may implement a proxy mode in which traffic received by the Sinkhole module is transmitted to a destination specified in the traffic but modified to reference the Sinkhole as the source. Events occurring on the BotMagnet and Sinkhole are correlated and used to characterize the malicious code. The characterization may be transmitted to other computer systems in order to detect instances of the malicious code.

Abstract: A system of client devices and a server system implementing services makes use of credentials to facilitate authentication of the client devices with the server and generates log entries for different accesses to the server system. A monitoring system places credentials and log entries referencing the monitoring system with the credentials and log entries on the client devices without any authentication or actual access attempts by the client devices to the monitoring system. Unauthorized access to the client devices may result in the credentials and log entries to the monitoring system being accessed and used to access the monitoring system. Attempts to exploit the monitoring system using the credentials and log entries is contained within the monitoring system and data is collected to characterize malicious code attempting to exploit the monitoring system. The data is then used to prevent attacks and detect compromised client devices and server systems.

Abstract: A system is disclosed for protecting a network against malicious attacks or attempts for unauthorized access. A network is connected to an external network by a number of firewalls. Inspectors detect packets blocked by the firewalls and some or all of the packets are detected to a labyrinth configured to emulated an operational network and response to the packets in order to engage an attacker. Blocked packets may be detected by comparing packets entering and exiting a firewall. Packets for which a corresponding packets are not received within a transit delay may be identified as blocked. Entering and exiting packets may be compared by comparing only header information. A central module may receive information from the inspectors and generate statistical information and generate instructions for the inspectors, such as blacklists of addresses known to be used by attackers.

Abstract: A system includes one or more “BotMagnet” modules that are exposed to infection by malicious code. The BotMagnets may include one or more virtual machines hosing operating systems in which malicious code may be installed and executed without exposing sensitive data or other parts of a network. In particular, outbound traffic may be transmitted to a Sinkhole module that implements a service requested by the outbound traffic and transmits responses to the malicious code executing within the BotMagnet. Requests by a user system for a resource at a URL may be received by a firewall, a honey client module may access the URL and permit installation of malicious code or other malicious activities. In response to detecting malicious activities, the honey client module characterizes the malicious activity to generate a descriptor used to detect malicious code in other systems. The URL may also be blacklisted by the firewall.

Abstract: A system is disclosed for protecting a network against malicious attacks or attempts for unauthorized access. A network is connected to an external network by a number of firewalls. Inspectors detect packets blocked by the firewalls and some or all of the packets are detected to a labyrinth configured to emulated an operational network and response to the packets in order to engage an attacker. Blocked packets may be detected by comparing packets entering and exiting a firewall. Packets for which a corresponding packets are not received within a transit delay may be identified as blocked. Entering and exiting packets may be compared by comparing only header information. A central module may receive information from the inspectors and generate statistical information and generate instructions for the inspectors, such as blacklists of addresses known to be used by attackers.