Abstract: A system for using biometric data to authenticate a subject as an individual whose biometric data has been previously obtained. A second transducer has a digital electronic signal output characterizing a biometric of the subject; a second computing facility to receive the digital electronic signal; an array of servers; and a third computing facility. These components implement processes including generating shards from the digital electronic signal and distributing of the generated shards to the array of servers; receiving and storing by the array of servers the generated shards; performing a data exchange process using a subset of the generated shards to develop information relating to authentication of the subject; and transmitting to a third computing facility, the information developed, to cause the third computing facility to generate an output value indicating whether the subject is authenticated as the individual. A related enrollment system is also provided.

Abstract: A method for using biometric data to authenticate a subject as an individual whose biometric data has been previously obtained. In this embodiment, the method utilizes a series of computer processes with asymmetrically loaded servers that are configured with one-time values for use in multi-party computing to perform the authentication.

Abstract: A device generates a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret S, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either. The biometric data has a Sparse Representation and is encoded in a manner to include a component of noise, such that it is challenging to identify which locations are actually encoded features. Accordingly, the biometric data are encoded as a vector by choosing marker at locations where features are present and, where features are not present, choosing noisy data. The noisy data may be chaff bit values selected collectively from a group of (a) random values and (b) independent and identically distributed values. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data. In operation, a confident subset of a set of biometric values of the subject is extracted, including by performing a transform of the set of biometric values. The transform may variously be a Gabor transform, a wavelet transform, processing by a machine learning system, etc.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data, and may be used to provide authentication in addition to, or in lieu of, passwords or cryptographic tokens. Various use cases are disclosed, including: enrollment, authentication, establishing and using a secure communications channel, and cryptographically signing a message.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data. In operation, a confident subset of a set of biometric values of the subject is extracted, including by performing a transform of the set of biometric values. The transform may variously be a Gabor transform, a wavelet transform, processing by a machine learning system, etc.

Abstract: A device generates a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret S, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either. The biometric data has a Sparse Representation and is encoded in a manner to include a component of noise, such that it is challenging to identify which locations are actually encoded features. Accordingly, the biometric data are encoded as a vector by choosing marker at locations where features are present and, where features are not present, choosing noisy data. The noisy data may be chaff bit values selected collectively from a group of (a) random values and (b) independent and identically distributed values. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust.

Abstract: A device generates a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret S, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either. The biometric data has a Sparse Representation and is encoded in a manner to include a component of noise, such that it is challenging to identify which locations are actually encoded features. Accordingly, the biometric data are encoded as a vector by choosing marker at locations where features are present and, where features are not present, choosing noisy data. The noisy data may be chaff bit values selected collectively from a group of (a) random values and (b) independent and identically distributed values. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data, and may be used to provide authentication in addition to, or in lieu of, passwords or cryptographic tokens. Various use cases are disclosed, including: enrollment, authentication, establishing and using a secure communications channel, and cryptographically signing a message.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data. In operation, a confident subset of a set of biometric values of the subject is extracted, including by performing a transform of the set of biometric values. The transform may variously be a Gabor transform, a wavelet transform, processing by a machine learning system, etc.

Abstract: A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data, and may be used to provide authentication in addition to, or in lieu of, passwords or cryptographic tokens. Various use cases are disclosed, including: enrollment, authentication, establishing and using a secure communications channel, and cryptographically signing a message.