Abstract: A system identifies degraded positional information by combining data from Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Alternative Positional Sources (APS) such as inertial measurement units. GNSS sources generate both location data and associated metadata, while APS provide additional location reports. An error modeling module computes an APS error covariance correction to indicate the accuracy of APS data. A primary classifier receives GNSS and APS reports along with the covariance correction and performs a generalized likelihood ratio test to assess GNSS data degradation. Simultaneously, a secondary classifier analyzes GNSS metadata to produce an independent degradation assessment. A degradation aggregation module then validates the primary assessment using the secondary one, ultimately generating a comprehensive GNSS positional degradation report that identifies and confirms instances of degraded location accuracy.

Abstract: A residual position correction for one or more non-geolocational satellites is formed by observing through signal reception, from a known location, orbital attributes. Using the residual position correction, the actual position of one or more non-geolocational satellites is determined. Upon denial of GNSS data, the angle of reception of a signal from one of the non-geolocational satellites and the actual position of the satellite, accounting for tropospheric refracting and antenna azimuth and elevations adjustments, is used to determine the geolocation of the antenna terminal.

Abstract: A system and method for cryptographically securing data communications between a group of networked devices establishes and maintains an overlay network at the Application Layer, on top of a unicast routing service provided at the Internetworking Layer. The overlay network provides first, the routes that are used to deliver multicast datagrams and second, the cryptographic keys used to secure multicast datagrams. A common cryptographic key is established between all members of each group, and end-to-end encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by authorized group members. In other embodiments, keys are established between pairs of adjacent devices in the overlay network, and hop-by-hop encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by overlay network members.

Abstract: A residual position correction for one or more non-geolocational satellites is formed by observing through signal reception, from a known location, orbital attributes. Using the residual position correction, the actual position of one or more non-geolocational satellites is determined. Upon denial of GNSS data, the angle of reception of a signal from one of the non-geolocational satellites and the actual position of the satellite, accounting for tropospheric refracting and antenna azimuth and elevations adjustments, is used to determine the geolocation of the antenna terminal.

Abstract: Cryptographically secure data communications between layered groups of devices in a wireless cooperative broadcast network encrypts datagrams twice prior to transmission by a source device, first using an inner layer key that is shared by a first group of devices, and second using an outer layer key that is shared by a second group of devices; the devices of the first group being members of the second group. Received datagrams are recovered by first decrypting with the outer layer key and second decrypting with the inner layer key.

Abstract: A system and method for cryptographically securing data communications between a group of networked devices establishes and maintains an overlay network at the Application Layer, on top of a unicast routing service provided at the Internetworking Layer. The overlay network provides first, the routes that are used to deliver multicast datagrams and second, the cryptographic keys used to secure multicast datagrams. A common cryptographic key is established between all members of each group, and end-to-end encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by authorized group members. In other embodiments, keys are established between pairs of adjacent devices in the overlay network, and hop-by-hop encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by overlay network members.

Abstract: Cryptographically secure data communications between layered groups of devices in a wireless cooperative broadcast network encrypts datagrams twice prior to transmission by a source device, first using an inner layer key that is shared by a first group of devices, and second using an outer layer key that is shared by a second group of devices; the devices of the first group being members of the second group. Received datagrams are recovered by first decrypting with the outer layer key and second decrypting with the inner layer key.

Abstract: A system and method for cryptographically securing data communications between a group of networked devices establishes and maintains an overlay network at the Application Layer, on top of a unicast routing service provided at the Internetworking Layer. The overlay network provides first, the routes that are used to deliver multicast datagrams and second, the cryptographic keys used to secure multicast datagrams. A common cryptographic key is established between all members of each group, and end-to-end encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by authorized group members. In other embodiments, keys are established between pairs of adjacent devices in the overlay network, and hop-by-hop encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by overlay network members.

Abstract: Cryptographically secure data communications between layered groups of devices in a wireless cooperative broadcast network encrypts datagrams twice prior to transmission by a source device, first using an inner layer key that is shared by a first group of devices, and second using an outer layer key that is shared by a second group of devices; the devices of the first group being members of the second group. Received datagrams are recovered by first decrypting with the outer layer key and second decrypting with the inner layer key.

Abstract: Cryptographically secure data communications between layered groups of devices in a wireless cooperative broadcast network encrypts datagrams twice prior to transmission by a source device, first using an inner layer key that is shared by a first group of devices, and second using an outer layer key that is shared by a second group of devices; the devices of the first group being members of the second group. Received datagrams are recovered by first decrypting with the outer layer key and second decrypting with the inner layer key.

Abstract: A system and method for cryptographically securing data communications between a group of networked devices establishes and maintains an overlay network at the Application Layer, on top of a unicast routing service provided at the Internetworking Layer. The overlay network provides first, the routes that are used to deliver multicast datagrams and second, the cryptographic keys used to secure multicast datagrams. A common cryptographic key is established between all members of each group, and end-to-end encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by authorized group members. In other embodiments, keys are established between pairs of adjacent devices in the overlay network, and hop-by-hop encryption ensures that multicast datagrams can be accessed only by overlay network members.