Abstract: Techniques for use in transferring an assignment of a secure chip of a wireless device from a current subscription manager (SM) of a current mobile network operator (MNO) to a new SM of a new MNO are described. In one illustrative example, the current SM receives a request for transferring the assignment and produces transfer permission data in response. The transfer permission data includes an identifier of the secure chip, an identifier of the current SM, and a digital signature of the current SM. The current SM then sends to the secure chip a transfer permission message which includes the transfer permission data. The transfer permission data indicates a permission for the secure chip to transfer the assignment from the current SM to the new SM. Additional techniques are performed by the secure chip, and the new SM, as described.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and computer programs for managing authentication data for an authentication device are disclosed. An authentication device may be included, for example, in a mobile device battery so that the battery can be authenticated by a mobile device. In some implementations, encrypted certificate data are stored on an authentication device. The encrypted certificate data are accessed, and unencrypted certificate data are generated by decrypting the encrypted certificate data. The unencrypted certificate data are stored on the authentication device. The unencrypted certificate data enable the authentication device to provide a valid reply message, for example, in response to receiving an interrogation message from an interrogation device. In some implementations, the reply message includes the unencrypted certificate data and a response value generated by the authentication device based on a secret value.

Abstract: Devices and methods are provided for managing identity-based decryption of digital content. A message sender (“Alice”) uses a random key (Krand) to encrypt message content for a message recipient (“Bob”). Then Alice uses the public key of a message decryption service provider (“Carmen”) to generate a wrapped key ciphertext comprising the Krand and authentication information associated with Bob. Alice then sends a message text containing the encrypted message content and the wrapped key ciphertext to Bob, who in turn sends the wrapped key ciphertext to Carmen along with his authentication information. Carmen then uses her private key to process the wrapped key ciphertext to decrypt the Krand and Bob's authentication information. If the authentication information provided by Bob matches the decrypted authentication information, then Carmen sends the decrypted Krand to Bob, who uses it to decrypt the encrypted message content.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and computer programs for interrogating an authentication device are disclosed. For example, a mobile device can include an interrogator module that interrogates an authentication module in a mobile device accessory, for example, upon installation of the mobile device accessory. In some implementations, challenge-response pairs and a challenge-response distribution are stored in a memory of an interrogator module. The challenge-response distribution defines selection probabilities for the challenge values. In some instances, the interrogator module receives an authentication request from an authentication module, and in response to the authentication request, the interrogator module selects an initial challenge value according to the challenge-response distribution. The interrogator module sends the authentication module an interrogation message that includes the initial challenge value.

Abstract: A computer implemented method of compressing a digitally represented cryptographic value. The method comprising the steps of: (a) selecting a secret value; (b) performing a cryptographic operation on the secret value to generate the cryptographic value; (c) determining whether the cryptographic value satisfies the pre-determined criteria; and (d) repeating the sequence of steps starting at step (a) until the cryptographic value satisfies the pre-determined criteria.

Abstract: A system and method for validating digital information transmitted by one correspondent to another in a data communication system. The method comprising the steps of generating a public key in accordance with a predetermined, generating a public key in accordance with a predetermined cryptographic scheme having predetermined arithmetic properties and system parameters. The verifying said public key conforms to said arithmetic properties of said scheme, transmitting said verified public key to a recipient.

Abstract: A method for communicating information between at least a pair of correspondents, the method comprising the steps of each of the correspondents selecting a plurality of cryptographic algorithms known to each of the correspondents. One of the correspondents applies the algorithms in a predetermined manner to a message for producing a set of processed information. The set of processed information is transmitted to the other correspondent. The other correspondent applies complimentary operations of the cryptographic schemes in accordance with the predetermined manner for deriving information related to the message from the processed information.

Abstract: An elliptic curve encryption system represents coordinates of a point on the curve as a vector of binary digits in a normal basis representation in F2m. A key is generated from multiple additions of one or more points in a finite field. Inverses of values are computed using a finite field multiplier and successive exponentiations. A key is represented as the coordinates of a point on the curve and key transfer may be accomplished with the transmission of only one coordinate and identifying information of the second. An encryption protocol using one of the coordinates and a further function of that coordinate is also described.

Abstract: A method and apparatus for authenticating a pair of correspondents C, S in an information exchange session to permit exchange of information therebetween. The first correspondent C having log on applets and the correspondent having means for processing applets.

Abstract: A digital signature verification protocol utilises a pair of signature components incorporating a pair of private keys, one of which is a long term key and the other of which is a short term key. The long term key is applied to one of the signature components to reveal the short term key. The short term key is then used to compute a value of a signature component contained in the signature. If the computed value and received values agree then authenticity is verified.

Abstract: The present invention relates to digital signature operations using public key schemes in a secure communications system and in particular for use with processors having limited computing power such as ‘smart cards’. This invention describes a method for creating and authenticating a digital signature comprising the steps of selecting a first session parameter k and generating a first short term public key derived from the session parameter k, computing a first signature component r derived from a first mathematical function using the short term public key, selecting a second session parameter t and computing a second signature component s derived from a second mathematical function using the second session parameter t and without using an inverse operation, computing a third signature component using the first and second session parameters and sending the signature components (s, r, c) as a masked digital signature to a receiver computer system.

Abstract: A key establishment protocol between a pair of correspondents includes the generation by each correspondent of respective signatures. The signatures are derived from information that is private to the correspondent and information that is public. After exchange of signatures, the integrity of exchange messages can be verified by extracting the public information contained in the signature and comparing it with information used to generate the signature. A common session key may then be generated from the public and private information of respective ones of the correspondents.

Abstract: A key establishment protocol between a pair of correspondents includes the generation by each correspondent of respective signatures. The signatures are derived from information that is private to the correspondent and information that is public. After exchange of signatures, the integrity of exchange messages can be verified by extracting the public information contained in the signature and comparing it with information used to generate the signature. A common session key may then be generated from the public and private information of respective ones of the correspondents.