Abstract: An apparatus, method, system and computer-readable medium are provided for preserving an encryption of data when confronted by an attack, such as a side channel analysis (SCA) attack based on a statistical analysis. In some embodiments, hardware, software, and/or firmware associated with an encryption calculation may be exercised or accessed during a background operation when an actual or real operation is not taking place. During the background operation, dummy values for data and one or more keys may be input to the hardware. A switching between the real operation and the background operation may take place seamlessly such that measurement of a physical characteristic associated with the hardware is indistinguishable in terms of when the real and background operations are active. In this manner, the secrecy of a key used in connection with the real operation may be preserved.

Abstract: Methods, systems, computer-readable media, and apparatuses for providing control word and associated entitlement control message (ECM) functionalities are presented. In some embodiments, a computing device may cache concurrently a first set of control words and a first set of entitlement control messages (ECMs) associated with the first set of control words. The computing device may encrypt a transport stream with a particular control word of the first set of control words. The computing device may insert a particular ECM, of the first set of ECMs, corresponding to the particular control word into the transport stream sent to a device downstream from the computing device. In some embodiments, a computing device may reuse control words and associated ECMs.

Abstract: Methods, systems, computer-readable media, and apparatuses for providing control word and associated entitlement control message (ECM) functionalities are presented. In some embodiments, a computing device may cache concurrently a first set of control words and a first set of entitlement control messages (ECMs) associated with the first set of control words. The computing device may encrypt a transport stream with a particular control word of the first set of control words. The computing device may insert a particular ECM, of the first set of ECMs, corresponding to the particular control word into the transport stream sent to a device downstream from the computing device. In some embodiments, a computing device may reuse control words and associated ECMs.

Abstract: An apparatus, method, system and computer-readable medium are provided for preserving an encryption of data when confronted by an attack, such as a side channel analysis (SCA) attack based on a statistical analysis. In some embodiments, hardware, software, and/or firmware associated with an encryption calculation may be exercised or accessed during a background operation when an actual or real operation is not taking place. During the background operation, dummy values for data and one or more keys may be input to the hardware. A switching between the real operation and the background operation may take place seamlessly such that measurement of a physical characteristic associated with the hardware is indistinguishable in terms of when the real and background operations are active. In this manner, the secrecy of a key used in connection with the real operation may be preserved.

Abstract: An apparatus, method, system and computer-readable medium are provided for preserving an encryption of data when confronted by an attack, such as a side channel analysis (SCA) attack based on a statistical analysis. In some embodiments, hardware, software, and/or firmware associated with an encryption calculation may be exercised or accessed during a background operation when an actual or real operation is not taking place. During the background operation, dummy values for data and one or more keys may be input to the hardware. A switching between the real operation and the background operation may take place seamlessly such that measurement of a physical characteristic associated with the hardware is indistinguishable in terms of when the real and background operations are active. In this manner, the secrecy of a key used in connection with the real operation may be preserved.

Abstract: An encryption key may be generated based on personalized unit data associated with a software download recipient, for example, a secure processor. In some aspects, the secure processor may generate a decryption key based on its personalized unit data, and a software download may be performed between the software provider and the secure processor using the generated encryption keys. The secure processor may then decrypt and load the software for execution. The encryption and decryption key generation may also be based on a sequence number or other data indicating one or more previous software downloads at the secure processor. Using the sequence number or other data, sequences of multiple encryption and/or decryption keys may be generated to support multiple software downloads to a secure processor.