Abstract: Systems and methods for safety-enabled control. Input values provided to a control system can be validated. Command gating can be performed for control values provided by the control system. Validation of input values and command gating for control values can be performed in accordance with respective validation windows. Validation windows can be dynamically adjusted based on data received via a sensor or interface.

Abstract: A safety module having a plurality of microcontrollers receives an analog input and determines a value of the analog input. The microcontrollers each determine a respective ternary state of the device by identifying, from three candidate ranges of values, a range of values in which the value falls, wherein at least two of the plurality of microcontrollers uses different candidate ranges of values, determining, based on the identified range, a ternary state corresponding to the range, and assigning the determined ternary state as the respective ternary state. The safety module determines whether the ternary states from the two microcontrollers map to a fault state, and, where they do, cause a command a command to be output to the device to enter a safe state.

Abstract: Systems and methods for safety-enabled control by: establishing a wireless communication channel with a plurality of remote control units via the wireless interface device; in response to establishing the wireless communication channels, operating a system-under-control in a supervised mode based on input received from at least one of the plurality of remote control units; in response to a mode switch command received from a first remote control unit of the plurality of remote control units, providing the other remote control units with a request for a mode switch confirmation; and, in response to confirming receipt of a safety-rated input from an autonomous control system and receipt of a mode switch confirmation from each of the other remote control units, operating the system-under-control in an autonomous mode based on input received from the autonomous control system.

Abstract: A system generates, by a first source microcontroller, a first data packet comprising a payload and a first error code, the payload indicating a safety state of a robot. The first source microcontroller transmits the data packet from the first source microcontroller to a second source microcontroller. The second source microcontroller generates a second data packet that includes the payload, the first error code and a second error code. The second source microcontroller transmits the second data packet to a sink microcontroller, wherein the sink microcontroller recovers the payload based on at least one of the first error code and the second error code.

Abstract: A method includes, storing a set of valid codewords including: a first valid functional codeword representing a functional timeout state of a second controller; a first valid fault codeword representing a fault timeout state of the second controller and characterized by a minimum hamming distance from the first valid functional codeword; a second valid functional codeword representing a functional state of a system; and a second valid fault codeword representing a fault state of the system; in response to detecting receipt of a safety message from the second controller within a predefined time quantum, storing the first valid functional codeword in a first memory; in response to detecting a match between contents of the first memory and the first valid functional codeword, outputting the second valid functional codeword; in response to detecting a mismatch between contents of the first memory and every codeword in the first set of valid codewords, outputting the second valid fault codeword.

Abstract: A method comprising: accessing a response mapping defining a set of safety-critical functions associated with a safety-critical latency threshold and a set of safety responses, each safety response corresponding to a safety-critical function; executing a time-synchronization protocol with a transmitting system to calculate a clock reference; accessing a safety message schedule indicating an expected arrival time for each safety message in a series of safety messages based on the clock reference; for each safety message in the series of safety messages, calculating a latency of the safety message based on an arrival time of the safety message and the expected arrival time; and in response to a latency of a current safety message in the series of safety messages exceeding the safety-critical latency threshold, initiating the safety response corresponding to the safety-critical function for each safety-critical function in the set of safety-critical functions.

Abstract: A method includes, storing a set of valid codewords including: a first valid functional codeword representing a functional state of a controller subsystem; a first valid fault codeword representing a fault state of the controller subsystem and characterized by a minimum hamming distance from the first valid functional codeword; a second valid functional codeword representing a functional state of a controller; and a second valid fault codeword representing a fault state of the controller; in response to detecting functional operation of the controller subsystem, storing the first valid functional codeword in a first memory; in response to detecting a match between contents of the first memory and the first valid functional codeword, outputting the second valid functional codeword; in response to detecting a mismatch between contents of the first memory and every codeword in the first set of valid codewords, outputting the second valid fault codeword.

Abstract: A safety module having a plurality of microcontrollers receives an analog input and determines a value of the analog input. The microcontrollers each determine a respective ternary state of the device by identifying, from three candidate ranges of values, a range of values in which the value falls, wherein at least two of the plurality of microcontrollers uses different candidate ranges of values, determining, based on the identified range, a ternary state corresponding to the range, and assigning the determined ternary state as the respective ternary state. The safety module determines whether the ternary states from the two microcontrollers map to a fault state, and, where they do, cause a command a command to be output to the device to enter a safe state.

Abstract: Systems and methods for safety-enabled control.