Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a method to validate supply chains for electronic devices using side-channel information in a signature analysis. The method includes sending, to a target device, a first signal associated with a set of codes to be executed by the target device, and then receiving first side-channel information associated with the target device in response to the target device executing the set of codes. The method also includes determining second side-channel information associated with a simulated device in response to the set of codes. The method further includes comparing a discriminatory feature of the first side-channel information with a discriminatory feature of the second side-channel information to determine a characteristic of the target device based on a pre-determined characteristic of the simulated device. Finally, the method includes sending, to a user interface, a second signal associated with the characteristic of the target device.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a method to validate supply chains for electronic devices using side-channel information in a signature analysis. The method includes sending, to a target device, a first signal associated with a set of codes to be executed by the target device, and then receiving first side-channel information associated with the target device in response to the target device executing the set of codes. The method also includes determining second side-channel information associated with a simulated device in response to the set of codes. The method further includes comparing a discriminatory feature of the first side-channel information with a discriminatory feature of the second side-channel information to determine a characteristic of the target device based on a pre-determined characteristic of the simulated device. Finally, the method includes sending, to a user interface, a second signal associated with the characteristic of the target device.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include an apparatus having a processor communicatively coupled to a memory. The processor is configured to monitor, at a characteristic controller, a first characteristic of an electronic device. The processor is then configured to receive side-channel signature analysis of the electronic device from a signature analyzer. The processor is configured to determine if the first characteristic of the electronic device has changed or will change in a predefined period of time based on the side-channel signature analysis. The processor is then configured to adjust a second characteristic of the electronic device and/or filtering characteristics such that the side-channel signature analysis reflects predefined side-channel behavior.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a method to validate supply chains for electronic devices using side-channel information in a signature analysis. The method includes sending, to a target device, a first signal associated with a set of codes to be executed by the target device, and then receiving first side-channel information associated with the target device in response to the target device executing the set of codes. The method also includes determining second side-channel information associated with a simulated device in response to the set of codes. The method further includes comparing a discriminatory feature of the first side-channel information with a discriminatory feature of the second side-channel information to determine a characteristic of the target device based on a pre-determined characteristic of the simulated device. Finally, the method includes sending, to a user interface, a second signal associated with the characteristic of the target device.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: A power fingerprinting system is adopted for assessing integrity of a target computer-based system. In one implementation, the power fingerprinting system may receive, at a first module, side-channel information of a first target component of a system, the first module being collocated with the first target component; obtain a power fingerprint for the first target component based on the side-channel information for the first target component, the power fingerprint for the first target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the first target component; receive, at a second module, side-channel information of a second target component of the system, the second module being collocated with the second target component, the power fingerprint for the second target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the second target component; and obtain a power fingerprint for the second target component based on the side-channel information for the second target component.

Abstract: A power fingerprinting system is adopted for assessing integrity of a target computer-based system. In one implementation, the power fingerprinting system may receive, at a first module, side-channel information of a first target component of a system, the first module being collocated with the first target component; obtain a power fingerprint for the first target component based on the side-channel information for the first target component, the power fingerprint for the first target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the first target component; receive, at a second module, side-channel information of a second target component of the system, the second module being collocated with the second target component, the power fingerprint for the second target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the second target component; and obtain a power fingerprint for the second target component based on the side-channel information for the second target component.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include an apparatus having a processor communicatively coupled to a memory. The processor is configured to monitor, at a characteristic controller, a first characteristic of an electronic device. The processor is then configured to receive side-channel signature analysis of the electronic device from a signature analyzer. The processor is configured to determine if the first characteristic of the electronic device has changed or will change in a predefined period of time based on the side-channel signature analysis. The processor is then configured to adjust a second characteristic of the electronic device and/or filtering characteristics such that the side-channel signature analysis reflects predefined side-channel behavior.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include an apparatus having a processor communicatively coupled to a memory. The processor is configured to send, at a first compute device, input vectors to a second compute device. The processor is configured to receive side-channel information, from the second compute device, in response to the input vectors. The processor is then configured to compare the received side-channel information with predefined side-channel information associated with the second compute device. If the received side-channel information does not match the predefined side-channel information, the processor is configured to generate a message that the second compute device has an anomaly.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include an apparatus having a memory and a processor operatively coupled to the memory. The processor is configured to receive, in response to an excitation signal and from the power signature detector, a power signature signal associated with a target electronic device disposed within a sealed package. The processor is configured to extract a characteristic of the power signature signal and compare the characteristic of the power signature signal with a characteristic of a reference power signature signal associated with at least one reference device to determine a counterfeit status of the target electronic device. The at least one reference device is a pre-determined trusted device or a pre-determined counterfeit device. The processor is configured to send, to a communication interface, a notification signal associated with the counterfeit status of the target electronic device.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a method to validate supply chains for electronic devices using side-channel information in a signature analysis. The method includes sending, to a target device, a first signal associated with a set of codes to be executed by the target device, and then receiving first side-channel information associated with the target device in response to the target device executing the set of codes. The method also includes determining second side-channel information associated with a simulated device in response to the set of codes. The method further includes comparing a discriminatory feature of the first side-channel information with a discriminatory feature of the second side-channel information to determine a characteristic of the target device based on a pre-determined characteristic of the simulated device. Finally, the method includes sending, to a user interface, a second signal associated with the characteristic of the target device.

Abstract: A power fingerprinting system is adopted for assessing integrity of a target computer-based system. In one implementation, the power fingerprinting system may receive, at a first module, side-channel information of a first target component of a system, the first module being collocated with the first target component; obtain a power fingerprint for the first target component based on the side-channel information for the first target component, the power fingerprint for the first target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the first target component; receive, at a second module, side-channel information of a second target component of the system, the second module being collocated with the second target component, the power fingerprint for the second target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the second target component; and obtain a power fingerprint for the second target component based on the side-channel information for the second target component.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: A power fingerprinting system is adopted for assessing integrity of a target computer-based system. In one implementation, the power fingerprinting system may receive, at a first module, side-channel information of a first target component of a system, the first module being collocated with the first target component; obtain a power fingerprint for the first target component based on the side-channel information for the first target component, the power fingerprint for the first target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the first target component; receive, at a second module, side-channel information of a second target component of the system, the second module being collocated with the second target component, the power fingerprint for the second target component representing a plurality of execution statuses of the second target component; and obtain a power fingerprint for the second target component based on the side-channel information for the second target component.

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).

Abstract: Some embodiments described herein include a system that collects and learns reference side-channel normal activity, process it to reveal key features, compares subsequent collected data and processed data for anomalous behavior, and reports such behavior to a management center where this information is displayed and predefine actions can be executed when anomalous behavior is observed. In some instances, a physical side channel (e.g. and indirect measure of program execution such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and other physical signals) can be used to assess the execution status in a processor or digital circuit using an external monitor and detect, with extreme accuracy, when an unauthorized execution has managed to disrupt the normal operation of a target system (e.g., a computer system, etc.).