Abstract: A system for testing a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver includes signal generators, antennas coupled to respective signal generators and having overlapping antenna radiation patterns, and processing circuitry. The signal generators generate respective test signals. Each of the test signals is a combination of multiple GNSS navigational signals which are generated using a set of ranging codes. The processing circuitry selects respective sets of ranging codes for the signal generators, such that the sets of ranging codes are separately insufficient to lock a GNSS receiver and are jointly sufficient to lock a GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A system for testing a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver includes signal generators, antennas coupled to respective signal generators and having overlapping antenna radiation patterns, and processing circuitry. The signal generators generate respective test signals. Each of the test signals is a combination of multiple GNSS navigational signals which are generated using a set of ranging codes. The processing circuitry selects respective sets of ranging codes for the signal generators, such that the sets of ranging codes are separately insufficient to lock a GNSS receiver and are jointly sufficient to lock a GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A duplicate peak detector acquires and tracks a first correlation peak for a data sequence associated with a navigation satellite in a satellite navigation signal. During tracking of the first correlation peak, a second correlation peak is acquired and tracked for the same data sequence. Respective values of at least one tracking variable of the two correlation peaks are analyzed, and based on the analysis it is determined whether the first and second correlation peaks are associated with the same navigation signal or different navigation signals. If the first correlation peak and the second correlation peak are associated with the same navigation signal, tracking of one of the correlation peaks is discontinued.

Abstract: A system and method for detecting a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attack on a protected vehicle. The method includes receiving at least one GNSS signal; identifying a plurality of characteristics associated with at least one received GNSS signal; analyzing the plurality of characteristics; and determining, based on the analysis of the identified characteristics, whether the at least one GNSS signal is a spoofed signal.

Abstract: An attack detector for detecting attacks on a satellite navigation system obtains navigation messages extracted from satellite navigation signals and/or additional parameters of the satellite navigation signal from source devices. The obtained navigation messages and/or parameters are analyzed to detect satellite navigation spoofing attacks. An indicator is issued when an attack is detected.

Abstract: A system and method for generating a temporal map of radio frequency (RF) signals detected from a vehicle. The method includes: detecting a plurality of RF signals over a predetermined spectrum of frequencies at a first longitude, a first latitude and a first altitude; analyzing the plurality of RF signals to determine at least a first parameter associated with at least a first RF signal of the plurality of RF signals; and adding to the temporal map the first RF signal frequency, the at least a first parameter associated with the first RF signal, the first longitude, the first latitude and the first altitude.

Abstract: A duplicate peak detector acquires and tracks a first correlation peak for a data sequence associated with a navigation satellite in a satellite navigation signal. During tracking of the first correlation peak, a second correlation peak is acquired and tracked for the same data sequence. Respective values of at least one tracking variable of the two correlation peaks are analyzed, and based on the analysis it is determined whether the first and second correlation peaks are associated with the same navigation signal or different navigation signals. If the first correlation peak and the second correlation peak are associated with the same navigation signal, tracking of one of the correlation peaks is discontinued.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A duplicate peak detector acquires and tracks a first correlation peak for a data sequence associated with a navigation satellite in a satellite navigation signal. During tracking of the first correlation peak, a second correlation peak is acquired and tracked for the same data sequence. Respective values of at least one tracking variable of the two correlation peaks are analyzed, and based on the analysis it is determined whether the first and second correlation peaks are associated with the same navigation signal or different navigation signals. If the first correlation peak and the second correlation peak are associated with the same navigation signal, tracking of one of the correlation peaks is discontinued.

Abstract: A system and method for generating a temporal map of radio frequency (RF) signals detected from a vehicle. The method includes: detecting a plurality of RF signals over a predetermined spectrum of frequencies at a first longitude, a first latitude and a first altitude; analyzing the plurality of RF signals to determine at least a first parameter associated with at least a first RF signal of the plurality of RF signals; and adding to the temporal map the first RF signal frequency, the at least a first parameter associated with the first RF signal, the first longitude, the first latitude and the first altitude.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A system and method for detecting a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attack on a protected vehicle. The method includes receiving at least one GNSS signal; identifying a plurality of characteristics associated with at least one received GNSS signal; analyzing the plurality of characteristics; and determining, based on the analysis of the identified characteristics, whether the at least one GNSS signal is a spoofed signal.

Abstract: A system and method for detecting a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attack on a protected vehicle. The method includes receiving at least one GNSS signal; identifying a plurality of characteristics associated with at least one received GNSS signal; analyzing the plurality of characteristics; and determining, based on the analysis of the identified characteristics, whether the at least one GNSS signal is a spoofed signal.

Abstract: A system and method for generating a temporal map of radio frequency (RF) signals detected from a vehicle. The method includes: detecting a plurality of RF signals over a predetermined spectrum of frequencies at a first longitude, a first latitude and a first altitude; analyzing the plurality of RF signals to determine at least a first parameter associated with at least a first RF signal of the plurality of RF signals; and adding to the temporal map the first RF signal frequency, the at least a first parameter associated with the first RF signal, the first longitude, the first latitude and the first altitude.

Abstract: A system and method for generating a temporal map of radio frequency (RF) signals detected from a vehicle. The method includes: detecting a plurality of RF signals over a predetermined spectrum of frequencies at a first longitude, a first latitude and a first altitude; analyzing the plurality of RF signals to determine at least a first parameter associated with at least a first RF signal of the plurality of RF signals; and adding to the temporal map the first RF signal frequency, the at least a first parameter associated with the first RF signal, the first longitude, the first latitude and the first altitude.

Abstract: A system and method for detecting a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attack on a protected vehicle. The method includes receiving at least one GNSS signal; identifying a plurality of characteristics associated with at least one received GNSS signal; analyzing the plurality of characteristics; and determining, based on the analysis of the identified characteristics, whether the at least one GNSS signal is a spoofed signal.