Abstract: Embodiments of systems and methods disclosed herein include an embedded secret provisioning system that is based on a shared-derivative mechanism. Embodiments of this mechanism use a trusted third-party topology, but only a single instance of a public-private key exchange is required for initialization. Embodiments of the system and methods are secure and any of the derived secret keys are completely renewable in untrusted environments without any reliance on asymmetric cryptography. The derived secrets exhibit zero knowledge attributes and the associated zero knowledge proofs are open and available for review. Embodiments of systems and methods can be implemented in a wide range of previously-deployed devices as well as integrated into a variety of new designs using minimal roots-of-trust.

Abstract: Embodiments as described herein provide systems and methods for sharing secrets between a device and another entity. The shared secret may be generated on the device as a derivative of a secret value contained on the device itself in a manner that will not expose the secret key on the device and may be sent to the entity. The shared secret may also be stored on the device such that it can be used in future secure operations on the device. In this manner, a device may be registered with an external service such that a variety of functionality may be securely accomplished, including, for example, the generation of authorization codes for the device by the external service based on the shared secret or the symmetric encryption of data between the external service and the device using the shared secret.

Abstract: Embodiments of systems and methods disclosed herein include renewable secure boot systems for renewing and booting a target device. Systems and methods include techniques by which a secure boot may be implemented in a renewable fashion on a reprogrammable device. More specifically, in certain embodiments, systems and methods are described where target devices securely receive an encrypted boot image and one or more authorization codes from a third party. The one or more authorization codes are derivatives of a target device hardware secret, allowing the authorization codes to be changed at will, thus increasing flexibility and security of the system.

Abstract: Systems and methods in which multiple key servers operate cooperatively to securely provide authorization codes to requesting devices. In one embodiment, a server cloud receives a device authorization code request and selects an “A server”. The “A server” requests authorization from one or more “B servers” and authorizes the “B servers” to respond. The “B servers” provide authorization to the “A server”, and may provide threshold key inputs to enable decryption of device authorization codes. The “A server” cannot provide the requested device authorization code without authorization from the “B server(s)”, and the “B server(s)” cannot provide the requested server authorization code and threshold inputs without a valid request from the “A server”. After the “A server” receives authorization from the “B server(s)”, it can provide the initially requested device authorization code to the requesting device.

Abstract: Embodiments of systems and methods disclosed herein provide a simple and effective method for authentication and key exchange that is secure from man-in-the-middle attacks and is characterized by perfect forward secrecy. More specifically, in certain embodiments, the systems and methods are disclosed that enable secure communications between a local device and a remote device(s) via a protocol that uses a Central Licensing Authority that shares derived secrets with the endpoints, without sharing the secrets themselves. The derived secrets may be comprised of public information, taking the form of nonces, in order to protect the system against replay-style attacks. Each endpoint can generate its own nonce with sufficient entropy such that neither endpoint is dependent on the trustworthiness of the other.

Abstract: Systems and methods are described which utilize a recursive security protocol for the protection of digital data. These may include encrypting a bit stream with a first encryption algorithm and associating a first decryption algorithm with the encrypted bit stream. The resulting bit stream may then be encrypted with a second encryption algorithm to yield a second bit stream. This second bit stream is then associated with a second decryption algorithm. This second bit stream can then be decrypted by an intended recipient using associated keys.

Abstract: Embodiments of systems and methods which provide highly specific control over the execution of general-purpose code block are disclosed. These embodiments may allow the exact circumstances under which a given code block is allowed to execute to be determined with specificity. Such a control mechanism may be coupled with embodiments of a data hiding system and method, based for example, on an ordered execution of a set of code segments implemented via recursive execution. When embodiments of these systems and methods are utilized together an unencumbered generality as well as a level of protection against attack that surpasses many other security systems may be obtained.

Abstract: Embodiments of systems and methods disclosed herein may isolate the working set of a process such that the data of the working set is inaccessible to other processes, even after the original process terminates. More specifically, in certain embodiments, the working set of an executing process may be stored in cache and for any of those cache lines that are written to while in secure mode those cache lines may be associated with a secure descriptor for the currently executing process. The secure descriptor may uniquely specify those cache lines as belonging to the executing secure process such that access to those cache lines can be restricted to only that process.