Abstract: Implementations are directed to receiving analytical attack graph (AAG) data representative of one or more AAGs, each AAG representing one or more lateral paths between configuration items within an enterprise network, calculating, for each configuration item in a set of configuration items, a process risk value for each impact in a set of impacts achievable within the configuration item, for a first impact, a first process risk value being calculated based on a multi-path formula in response to determining that multiple paths in the AAG lead to the first impact, and, for a second impact, a second process risk value being calculated based on a single-path formula in response to determining that a single path in the AAG leads to the second impact, and determining that at least one process risk value exceeds a threshold process risk value, and in response, adjusting one or more security controls within the enterprise network.

Abstract: A method for implementing a secure multiparty inner product computation between two parties using an SPDZ protocol involves having a first party and a second party compute, for i=1, . . . , k, a vector (I)=(II) based on a vector (x={x1, . . . , xN}), and a vector (w={W1, WN}), respectively, where (I)=(X2i-1X2i) (III)=W2i-1W2i, N is the total number of elements in the vectors k=N/2. The vectors (I), and (III) are securely shared between the parties. The parties then jointly compute SPDZ protocol Add([w2i], [x2i-1]) and Add([w2i], [x2i-1]) to determine shares [w2i-1+x2i] and [w2i+x2i-1] respectively, and then compute, for i=1, . . . , k, inner product shares [di] by performing SPDZ protocol Mult([w2i-1+x2i], [w2i+x2i-1]). SPDZ protocol ([Add d1], . . . , [dk], -(IV), . . . , -(V), -(VI), -, (VII)) is then performed to determine the inner product.