Abstract: The present invention provides a resin composition containing: (A) an ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer having an ethylene content of 20 mol % or more and 50 mol % or less; (B) an ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer having an ethylene content of 30 mol % or more and 60 mol % or less; and (C) an unsaturated aldehyde, a value obtained by subtracting the ethylene content of the ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer (A) from the ethylene content of the ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer (B) being 8 mol % or more, a mass ratio (A/B) of the ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer (A) to the ethylene-vinyl alcohol copolymer (B) being 60/40 or more and 95/5 or less, and the content of the unsaturated aldehyde (C) with respect to a resin content being 0.01 ppm or more and less than 100 ppm.

Abstract: Embodiments of a polyethylene polymer blend having a melt index (I2)<2 g/10 min are provided, wherein the polyethylene polymer blend comprises at least about 50% by wt. of at least one high density polyethylene resin (HDPE) having a density ?0.950 g/cm3, a melt index (I2)<4 g/10 min; a melt flow ratio (I10/I2)?9, and a molecular weight distribution (MWD) of about 2 to about 5; and further comprises about 1% to about 20% by wt. of at least one low density polyethylene resin (LDPE) having a density ?0.930 g/cm3, a melt index (I2) of about 0.1 to about 10 g/min, and an MWD>3.

Abstract: An authentication mechanism uses a trusted people store that can be populated on an individual basis by users of computing devices, and can comprise certificates of entities that the user wishes to allow to act as certification authorities. Consequently, peer-to-peer connections can be made even if neither device presents a certificate or certificate chain signed by a third-party certificate authority, so long as each device present a certificate or certificate chain signed by a device present in the trusted people store. Once authenticated, a remote user can access trusted resources on a host device by having local processes mimic the user and create an appropriate token by changing the user's password or password type to a hash of the user's certificate and then logging the user on. The token can be referenced in a standard manner to determine whether the remote user is authorized to access the trusted resource.

Abstract: In a printing system, an information reception apparatus, such as a printer or the like, is allowed to more assuredly identify a specific user by using organism information of the user. Fingerprint readers read a fingerprint pattern of the user as image data. Pointing device including a keyboard, a mouse and the like is used when forming or editing print data. The print data and the fingerprint pattern subjected to encryption are transmitted from a computer to the printer via a data transmission channel. The fingerprint pattern transmitted from the computer is decoded. After authenticating the user by performing matching between the decoded fingerprint pattern and the fingerprint pattern read by the fingerprint reader, the print data is printed.

Abstract: In a communication system for a secure transfer of information from a source device to a sink device in a communication session in the form of a plurality of packets from the source device to the sink device, a packet structure is used with a key check block field. During the session, the source device can change the session key used to encrypt data (including the key check block) in the packet. The sink device detects a change of session key by decrypting only the key check block field with a plurality of candidate keys. The key that gave a valid decryption is used for decrypting the remainder of the packet.

Abstract: A data storing medium has a digital data area in which encrypted digital data or non-encrypted digital data is written, a control data area in which control data necessary for reproducing recorded digital data is written, and a copyright control information area in which copyright control information necessary for decrypting encrypted digital data is written, wherein the copyright control information area is write-prohibited, and wherein the control data area is write-permitted.

Abstract: A method of exchanging digital public-key verification data whereby a first computing entity (102) enables a second computing entity (104) to obtain probabilistic evidence that a given public-key number n is the product of exactly two odd primes p and q, not known to the second party, whose bit lengths (l(p), l(q)) differ by not more than d bits. The method provides an efficient proof of knowledge protocol for demonstrating Monte-Carlo evidence that a number n is the product of two odd primes of roughly equal size. The evidence is shown “in the dark”, which means that the structure is verified without the prime factors of n disclosed. The cost of a proof amounts to 12klog2 n multiplications of integers of size of n where k is the number of the iterations in the proof and relates to an error probability bounded by max(½k, 24/n1/4).

Abstract: Receiver access to a secure communication is determined by the sender. The sender defines an access parameter, such as number of times a message can be decrypted, expiration time of message, or some contingent event that triggers expiration of a message. A send configuration module defines the encryption method, encryption key length, and the control parameter(s). A key management module serves to implement the send configuration parameters during a communication. Upon receiving a message the receiver module contacts the key management module to request a decryption key. The key management module returns the decryption key or a ‘denied’ message. Once the message is decrypted at the receiver, the key and the decrypted source are deleted from the receiver computer. The message is displayed in a bit-mapped window.

Abstract: The method of secure computing concerns the security of a debugger/emulator tool commonly employed in program development. A private encryption key is used to encrypt at least verification token for the program. A public decryption key corresponding to the private encryption key is stored at the secure computing system. Upon each initialization of the debugger/emulator the secure computer system decrypts the verification token employing public decryption key. This indicates whether the program is secure or nonsecure. If the program is secure, then the debugger/emulator is operated in a process mode permitting access to the program while prohibiting access to at least one security feature. If the program is nonsecure, then the debugger/emulator is operated in a raw mode permitting access to all features of the secure computing system.