Abstract: A data processing system includes a rich execution environment, a hardware accelerator, a trusted execution environment, and a memory. The REE includes a processor configured to execute an application. A compute kernel is executed on the hardware accelerator and the compute kernel performs computations for the application. The TEE provides relatively higher security than the REE and includes an accelerator controller for controlling operation of the hardware accelerator. The memory has an unsecure portion coupled to the REE and to the TEE, and a secure portion coupled to only the TEE. The secure portion is relatively more secure than the unsecure portion. Data that is to be accessed and used by the hardware accelerator is stored in the secure portion of the memory. In another embodiment, a method is provided for securely executing an application is the data processing system.

Abstract: A data processing system has a processor and a system memory. The system memory may be a dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). The processor includes an embedded memory. The system memory is coupled to the processor and is organized in a plurality of pages. A portion of the code or data stored in the plurality of memory pages is selected for permutation. A permutation order is generated and the memory pages containing the portion of code or data is permuted using a permutation order. The permutation order and/or a reverse permutation order to recover the original order may be stored in the embedded memory. Permuting the memory pages with a permutation order stored in the embedded memory prevents the code or data from being read during a freeze attack on the system memory in a way that is useful to an attacker.

Abstract: A data processing system includes a rich execution environment, a hardware accelerator, a trusted execution environment, and a memory. The REE includes a processor configured to execute an application. A compute kernel is executed on the hardware accelerator and the compute kernel performs computations for the application. The TEE provides relatively higher security than the REE and includes an accelerator controller for controlling operation of the hardware accelerator. The memory has an unsecure portion coupled to the REE and to the TEE, and a secure portion coupled to only the TEE. The secure portion is relatively more secure than the unsecure portion. Data that is to be accessed and used by the hardware accelerator is stored in the secure portion of the memory. In another embodiment, a method is provided for securely executing an application is the data processing system.

Abstract: The exemplary embodiments of the invention realize an efficient prevention of massive infiltration of cloned RFID transponders into existing and new RFID systems. Furthermore, reader devices used for authentication of RFID transponders do not need to be on-line and do not need to be equipped with a Security Authentication Module (SAM). This simplifies authentication procedures and reduces costs. According to an exemplary embodiment of the invention a transponder-specific originality signature is stored by a transponder manufacturer on the transponder. The transponder-specific originality signature may, for example, be stored in the non-volatile memory (EEPROM) of the transponder during the fabrication of the transponder. This transponder-specific originality signature can be checked at any time in a convenient way, which provides an indication of originality of said transponder.

Abstract: The exemplary embodiments of the invention realize an efficient prevention of massive infiltration of cloned RFID transponders into existing and new RFID systems. Furthermore, reader devices used for authentication of RFID transponders do not need to be on-line and do not need to be equipped with a Security Authentication Module (SAM). This simplifies authentication procedures and reduces costs. According to an exemplary embodiment of the invention a transponder-specific originality signature is stored by a transponder manufacturer on the transponder. The transponder-specific originality signature may, for example, be stored in the non-volatile memory (EEPROM) of the transponder during the fabrication of the transponder. This transponder-specific originality signature can be checked at any time in a convenient way, which provides an indication of originality of said transponder.