Abstract: A method for protecting an electronic device executing a program against fault injection and type confusion attacks likely to affect a variable (Z) intended to be used by the program. The method includes calculating integrity check data (X, Y) of variable (Z), dependent on a type (T) of the variable (Z), and a value (V) of the variable (Z) stored in an execution stack (P1) and/or of a first addressing datum (A) stored in a first index register (ind1). The first addressing datum (A) adapted to locate the value (V) stored in the execution stack (storing the integrity check data (X, Y) on the variable (Z) in at least one control stack (P2, P3) different to the execution stack (P1). Storing in a second index register (ind2), a unique second addressing datum (A2) adapted to locate the integrity check data (X, Y) in the or each control stack (P2, P3).

Abstract: The present invention relates to a method for protecting an electronic device (1) executing a program against fault injection and type confusion attacks likely to affect a variable (Z) intended to be used by the program, the method being characterized in that it comprises steps of: calculating integrity check data (X, Y) of variable (Z), the integrity check data dependent on: a type (T) of the variable (Z), and a value (V) of the variable (Z) stored in an execution stack (P1) and/or of a first addressing datum (A) stored in a first index register (ind1), the first addressing datum (A) being adapted to locate the value (V) stored in the execution stack (P1), storing the integrity check data (X, Y) on the variable (Z) in at least one control stack (P2, P3) different to the execution stack (P1), storage, in a second index register (ind2), of a unique second addressing datum (A2) adapted to locate the integrity check data (X, Y) in the or each control stack (P2, P3).