Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Spatial regions potentially occupied by a robot (or other machinery) or portion thereof and a human operator during performance of all or a defined portion of a task or an application are computationally estimated. These “potential occupancy envelopes” (POEs) may be based on the states (e.g., the current and expected positions, velocities, accelerations, geometry and/or kinematics) of the robot and the human operator. Once the POEs of human operators in the workspace are established, they can be used to guide or revise motion planning for task execution.

Abstract: Systems and methods monitor a workspace for safety purposes using sensors distributed about the workspace. The sensors are registered with respect to each other, and this registration is monitored over time. Occluded space as well as occupied space is identified, and this mapping is frequently updated. Based on the mapping, a constrained motion plan of machinery can be generated to ensure safety.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Systems and methods monitor a workspace for safety purposes using sensors distributed about the workspace. The sensors are registered with respect to each other, and this registration is monitored over time. Occluded space as well as occupied space is identified, and this mapping is frequently updated. Based on the mapping, a constrained motion plan of machinery can be generated to ensure safety.

Abstract: Embodiments of the present invention provide automated robotic system identification and stopping time and distance estimation, significantly improving on existing ad-hoc methods of robotic system identification. Systems and methods in accordance herewith can be used by end users, system integrators, and the robot manufacturers to estimate the dynamic parameters of a robot on an application-by-application basis.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Systems and methods for optimizing factory scheduling, layout or both which represent active factory elements (human and machine) as computational objects and simulate factory operation to optimize a solution. This enables the efficient assembly of customized products, accommodates variable demand, and mitigates unplanned events (floor blockages, machines/IMRs/workcell/workers downtime, variable quantity, location, and destination of supply parts).

Abstract: Image sensors distributed about a workcell including industrial machinery are registered using a registration object and an information tag associated therewith. The tag contains information specifying the location of the object and/or the pose of the object. This information is acquired along with images of the registration object, and the sensors are registered based at least in part on the images and the acquired information.

Abstract: Safety systems in distributed factory workcells intercommunicate or communicate with a central controller so that when a person, robot or vehicle passes from one workcell or space into another on the same factory floor, the new workcell or space need not repeat the tasks of analysis and classification and can instead immediately integrate the new entrant into the existing workcell or space-monitoring schema. The workcell or space can also communicate attributes such as occlusions, unsafe areas, movement speed, and object trajectories, enabling rapid reaction by the monitoring system of the new workcell or space.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Various approaches to ensuring safe operation of industrial machinery in a workcell include disposing multiple image sensors proximate to the workcell and acquiring, with at least some of the image sensors, the first set of images of the workcell; registering the sensors to each other based at least in part on the first set of images and, based at least in part on the registration, converting the first set of images to a common reference frame of the sensors; determining a transformation matrix for transforming the common reference frame of the sensors to a global frame of the workcell; registering the sensors to the industrial machinery; acquiring the second set of images during operation of the industrial machinery; and monitoring the industrial machinery during operation thereof based at least in part on the acquired second plurality of images, transformation, and registration of the sensors to the industrial machinery.

Abstract: One or more computational strategies is used to reduce the complexity of handling detected point clusters appearing at a portal of a monitored workcell. If the other side of the portal is a second, adjacent workcell, the monitoring system for a first workcell predicts when a human in that workcell may pass through the portal to a second workcell and alerts the monitoring system for the second workcell. The prediction may be based on absolute proximity of a human to the portal or movement toward it. Other strategies are employed if the workcells overlap, or if the portal leads to an unmonitored space.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Various embodiments for enforcing safe operation of machinery performing an activity in a three-dimensional (3D) workspace includes computationally generating a 3D spatial representation of the workspace; computationally mapping 3D regions of the workspace corresponding to space occupied by the machinery and a human; and based thereon, restricting operation of the machinery in accordance with a safety protocol during physical performance of the activity.

Abstract: Various embodiments for enforcing safe operation of machinery performing an activity in a three-dimensional (3D) workspace includes computationally generating a 3D spatial representation of the workspace; computationally mapping 3D regions of the workspace corresponding to space occupied by the machinery and a human; and based thereon, restricting operation of the machinery in accordance with a safety protocol during physical performance of the activity.

Abstract: Systems and methods for determining safe zones in a workspace calculate safe actions in real time based on all sensed relevant objects and on the current state of the machinery (e.g., a robot) in the workspace. Various embodiments forecast, in real time, both the motion of the machinery and the possible motion of a human within the space, and continuously update the forecast as the machinery operates and humans move in the workspace.