Abstract: A request may be received from an application for a performance of an operation associated with a cryptographic key that is stored at a secure enclave. A plugin of the secure enclave may be identified from the request for performance of the operation. The operation associated with the cryptographic key may be performed by using the plugin of the secure enclave to generate an output within the secure enclave. The output generated within the secure enclave and based on the plugin may be provided to the application.

Abstract: Values and a sequence of operations associated with generating a key may be received. A determination may be made as to whether the sequence of operations associated with the key matches an authorized sequence of operations. The key may be outputted when the received sequence of operations matches the authorized sequence of operations and the key may not be outputted when the received sequence of operations does not match the authorized sequence of operations.

Abstract: A container from a first root of trust associated with a first root entity may be received. The container may correspond to a mapping of a resource of an integrated circuit that is associated with the first root entity. The container may be verified based on a key that corresponds to the first root of trust and that is stored in the integrated circuit at manufacturing of the integrated circuit. An identification may be made that an assignment of the resource from the container corresponds to assigning the resource from the first root of trust to a new root of trust. A new key corresponding to the new root of trust may be generated. Information corresponding to the new key may be stored into a memory of the integrated circuit. Furthermore, the new key may be used to delegate the resource to a subsequent container.

Abstract: Authentication information at a first portion of encrypted data may be identified. A cryptographic key may be derived based on a combination of an identification of the first portion of the received encrypted data and a master key. Additional authentication information may be generated based on a combination of the derived cryptographic key and another portion of the received encrypted data. The encrypted data may be verified by comparing the authentication information at the first portion of the received encrypted data with the generated additional authentication information. In response to verifying the received encrypted data, a second cryptographic key may be derived based on a combination of an identification of the another portion of the encrypted data and the master key. The other portion of the received encrypted data may be decrypted by using the second cryptographic key.

Abstract: A secret key value that is inaccessible to software is scrambled according to registers consisting of one-time programmable (OTP) bits. A first OTP register is used to change the scrambling of the secret key value whenever a lifecycle event occurs. A second OTP register is used to undo the change in the scrambling of the secret key. A third OTP register is used to affect a permanent change to the scrambling of the secret key. The scrambled values of the secret key (whether changed or unchanged) are used as seeds to produce keys for cryptographic operations by a device.

Abstract: A cryptographic key may be received or generated at a self-encrypting key management service application where the cryptographic key is received from another application provided on a server associated with the self-encrypting key management service application. The cryptographic key may be stored at a secure enclave corresponding to the self-encrypting key management service application. A request for a performance of a cryptographic operation associated with the cryptographic key may be received from the other application provided on the server. The cryptographic key at the secure enclave corresponding to the self-encrypting key management service application may be retrieved. The cryptographic operation may be performed with the cryptographic key to generate an output that is provided to the other application.

Abstract: A first entity may provide a request to transmit data from the first entity to a second entity. The first entity may receive a session key from the second entity in response to the request where the session key is encrypted by a second key that is based on a combination of a public key and a location associated with the second entity. A location associated with the first entity may be identified. Furthermore, a first key may be generated based on a combination of the location associated with the first entity and a private key that corresponds to the public key. The first key may decrypt data encrypted by the second key when the location associated with the first entity corresponds to the location associated with the second entity.

Abstract: A container corresponding to executable code may be received. In response to receiving the container, a container manager resident in a memory of a computation environment may be executed to verify the container. The container manager may be verified by a boot loader of the computation environment. Permissions of the container to access the resources of a computation environment may be determined after the verification of the container by the container manager. Access to one or more resources of the computation environment may be provided by transferring control to the one or more resources from the container manager to the container based on the permissions of the container for the resources of the computation environment.

Abstract: Encrypted data transmitted from a second entity to a first entity may be received. The encrypted data may be encrypted by a location based public key based on a public key and a location associated with the second entity. A location associated with the first entity may be identified. A location based private key may be generated based on a private key that corresponds to the public key and the location associated with the first entity. Furthermore, the encrypted data may be decrypted with the location based private key when the location associated with the first entity matches the location associated with the second entity.

Abstract: A method of training chip select for a memory module. The method includes programming a memory controller into a mode wherein a command signal is active for a programmable time period. The method then programs a programmable delay line of the chip select with a delay value and performs initialization of the memory module. A read command is then sent to the memory module to toggle a state of the chip select. A number of data strobe signals sent by the memory module in response to the read command are counted. A determination is made whether the memory module is in a pass state or an error state based on a result of the counting.

Abstract: A method of operating a speech recognition system includes converting a spoken utterance by a user into an electrical voice signal by use of a local microphone associated with a local electronic device. The electrical voice signal is transmitted to a remote voice recognizer. The remote voice recognizer is used to transcribe the electrical voice signal and to produce a confidence score. The confidence score indicates a level of confidence that the transcription of the electrical voice signal substantially matches the words of the spoken utterance. The transcription of the electrical voice signal and the confidence score are transmitted from the remote voice recognizer to the local electronic device. The electrical voice signal, the transcription of the electrical voice signal, and the confidence score are used at the local device to train a local voice recognizer.

Abstract: A request to generate a first key may be received. A device generated key that is stored in a memory may be received in response to the request. Furthermore, a first entity identification (ID) that is stored in the memory may be received. The first key may be generated based on the first entity ID and the device generated key that are stored in the memory.

Abstract: A base key that is stored at a device may be received. A network identification may further be received. A device identification key may be generated based on a combination of the network identification and the base key. Furthermore, the device identification key may be used to authenticate the device with a network that corresponds to the network identification.

Abstract: A request associated with one or more privileges assigned to a first entity may be received. Each of the one or more privileges may correspond to an operation of an integrated circuit. Information corresponding to the first entity and stored in a memory that is associated with the integrated circuit may be identified. Furthermore, the memory may be programmed to modify the information stored in the memory that is associated with the integrated circuit in response to the request associated with the one or more privileges assigned to the first entity.

Abstract: A symmetric key that is stored at a device may be received. A public key from a remote entity may also be received at the device. Furthermore, a derived key may be generated based on a one way function between the symmetric key that is stored at the device and the public key that is received from the remote entity. The derived key may be encrypted with the public key and transmitted to the remote entity. The encryption of the derived key with the public key may provide secure transmission of the derived key to an authorized remote entity with a private key that may be used to decrypt the encrypted derived key.

Abstract: A request associated with a revocation of a key may be received. A hash value corresponding to the key that is stored in a memory may be identified. Furthermore, the hash value that is stored in the memory may be corrupted in response to the request associated with the revocation of the key.

Abstract: A container corresponding to executable code may be received. The container may be executed in a secure computation environment by performing one or more operations specified by the executable code of the container. An instruction to terminate the executing of the container may be received from a high level operating system (HLOS) that is external to the secure computation environment. A determination may be made as to whether the container is associated with a preemption privilege and the executing of the container may be terminated after receiving the instruction from the HLOS based on the determination of whether the container is associated with the preemption privilege.

Abstract: A first instruction to store an entity identification (ID) in a memory of a device may be received. The entity ID may be stored in the memory in response to receiving the first instruction. Furthermore, a second instruction to store a value based on a key in the memory of the device may be received. A determination may be made as to whether the value based on the key that is to be stored in the memory corresponds to the entity ID that is stored in the memory. The value based on the key may be stored in the memory of the device when the value based on the key corresponds to the entity ID.

Abstract: A method of training a command signal for a memory module. The method includes programming a memory controller into a mode where a single bit of an address signal is active for a single clock cycle. The method then programs a programmable delay line of the address signal with a delay value and performs initialization of the memory module. The memory module is then placed in a write leveling mode. A write leveling procedure is then performed and a response to the write leveling procedure is determined from the memory module. A determination is made whether the memory module is in a pass state or an error state based on the response.

Abstract: Encrypted data transmitted from a second entity to a first entity may be received. The encrypted data may be encrypted by a location based public key based on a public key and a location associated with the second entity. A location associated with the first entity may be identified. A location based private key may be generated based on a private key that corresponds to the public key and the location associated with the first entity. Furthermore, the encrypted data may be decrypted with the location based private key when the location associated with the first entity matches the location associated with the second entity.