Abstract: Provided herein are methods for discovery of epitope specific monoclonal antibodies to pathogens directly from immune sera for immunotherapeutic use. Further provided herein are methods to determine molecular structure of antibodies targeting an antigen from convalescent or vaccinated individuals for the purpose of rational vaccine design.

Abstract: Coronavirus S ectodomain trimers stabilized in a prefusion conformation, nucleic acid molecules and vectors encoding these proteins, and methods of their use and production are disclosed. In several embodiments, the coronavirus S ectodomain trimers and/or nucleic acid molecules can be used to generate an immune response to coronavirus in a subject. In additional embodiments, the therapeutically effective amount of the coronavirus S ectodomain trimers and/or nucleic acid molecules can be administered to a subject in a method of treating or preventing coronavirus infection.

Abstract: An import address table (IAT) and dynamic linked libraries (DLLs) security mender process is configured to store nominal IAT table entries and in-process binary images, from either a priori data and/or from computed values. Particular IAT table entries and in-process binary images are fetched for comparison with expected values. These particular IAT table entries and/or in-process binary images are then overwritten with nominal values for the IAT table entries and in-process binary images. The IAT-DLL security mender runs in parallel with the operating system and has access to its IAT and inline code in system memory.

Abstract: To authenticate a user of a communications network, credentials from the user are centrally receiving. An authentication sequence is retrieved from a plurality of retrievable authentication sequences, and the retrieved authentication sequence is performed to authenticate the user based on the received credentials.

Abstract: A user network station transmits a cookie that includes a user identifier and an augmenting factor transformed with one key of a first asymmetric crypto-key or with a symmetric crypto-key. An authenticating entity network station recovers the augmenting factor from the transformed augmenting factor included in the transmitted cookie, with the other key of the first asymmetric crypto-key or with the symmetric crypto-key, and transmits a customized login page corresponding to the user identifier. The user network station transmits a factor responsive to the transmitted customized login page. The authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted factor and the recovered augmenting factor, and validates the generated first key portion based on a second key portion of one key of a second asymmetric crypto-key associated with the user and on the other key of the second asymmetric crypto-key, to thereby authenticate the user.

Abstract: A user network station transmits a cookie including a user identifier and an augmenting factor transformed with one key of a first asymmetric crypto-key or with a symmetric crypto-key. A authenticating entity network station recovers the augmenting factor from the transformed augmenting factor with the other key of the first asymmetric crypto-key or with the symmetric crypto-key, and transmits a customized login page corresponding to the user identifier included in the received cookie. The user network station transmits a factor responsive to the transmitted customized login page. The authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted factor, and validates the generated first key portion based on a second key portion of one key of a second asymmetric crypto-key associated with the user and on the other key of the second asymmetric crypto-key, and the recovered augmenting factor, to thereby authenticate the user.

Abstract: To establish credentials, a user network station transmits a first value. An authenticating entity network station generates a first key portion based on the transmitted first value and a second value unknown to the user, splits one of a private key and a public key of a user asymmetric crypto-key into the first key portion and a second key portion, stores the second key portion of the one key so as to be accessible only to the authenticating entity network device, generates a cookie including the second value, transmits the generated cookie to the user network station, and destroys the transmitted first value, the second value, the one key, and the first key portion of the one key. The first value represents a first and the second value included in the transmitted cookie represents a second user credential useable to authenticate the user.

Abstract: To authenticate a user having an associated asymmetric crypto-key having a private/public key pair (D,E) based on a one-time-password, the user partially signs a symmetric session key with the first portion D1 of the private key D. The authenticating entity receives the partially signed symmetric session key via the network and completes the signature with the second private key portion D2 to recover the symmetric session key. The user also encrypts a one-time-password with the symmetric session key. The authenticating entity also receives the encrypted one-time-password via the network, and decrypts the received encrypted one-time-password with the recovered symmetric session key to authenticate the user.

Abstract: A secure firmware update method includes receiving a firmware update image, for example, firmware code including corrected or updated functionality. Next, the firmware update image and the source of the firmware update image are authenticated. After the firmware update image and the source of the firmware update image have been authenticated, the current firmware image is replaced by the firmware update image. If either of the new firmware image or the firmware update module is not authorized, the memory remains locked; thereby, preventing the unauthorized firmware image from being flashed into the memory. An electronic device includes a processor and a memory. The memory maintains instructions that when executed by the processor, causes the processor to receive a firmware update image. Next, the instructions cause the processor to authenticate the firmware update image and the source of the image.

Abstract: Structures and methods for non-intrusive testing of communication signals exchanged between two circuit boards via an intermediate interconnect board. In one aspect hereof, the functional signal normally exchanged between the circuits is latched during the exchange of test signals and the latched functional signal is utilized within the circuit that normally receives the functional signal to continue normal operations. In another aspect hereof, the test signals are exchanged over a dedicated test signal path between the two circuits. In another aspect hereof, the test signals are exchanged over the functional signal paths as out of band signals.

Abstract: A status arbiter includes a first input operative to receive at least one of a server public key and an agent public key. A second input is operative to receive a secure confirmation signal, where the secure confirmation signal may include an encrypted signal indicating of the state of an underlying device. An authenticating means for determining the state of the underlying device is coupled to the private key input, which provides for the release of digital credentials indicating that the underlying device is secure. A secure device operating method includes receiving an authentication request. Next, providing a device credential in response to the authentication request, where the device credential is provided in response to a secure confirmation signal indicating that the underlying device is authorized to perform the authentication request.

Abstract: Structures and methods for non-intrusive testing of communication signals exchanged between two circuit boards via an intermediate interconnect board. In one aspect hereof, test signals are exchanged between the two circuit boards without requiring active circuits on the interconnect board. In another aspect hereof, the functional signal normally exchanged between the circuits is latched during the exchange of test signals and the latched functional signal is utilized within the circuit that normally receives the functional signal to continue normal operations. In another aspect hereof, the test signals are exchanged over a dedicated test signal path between the two circuits. In another aspect hereof, the test signals are exchanged over the functional signal paths as out of band signals.