Abstract: A system including a host device and an integrated circuit. The host device includes a host memory, the host memory storing configuration data. The integrated circuit device includes an integrated circuit and a direct memory access circuitry. The direct memory access circuitry pulls the configuration data from the host memory. The direct memory access circuitry also programs the integrated circuit based on the configuration data.

Abstract: A programmable logic device verifies that configuration data permissibly programs the programmable logic device. The programmable logic device includes a programmable fabric having partitions to be programmed by the configuration data, a secure device manager that may generate masks based on the configuration data, and a local sector manager. The masks determine that the configuration data is configured to permissibly program the permitted partitions or that the permitted partitions have been permissibly programmed. The local sector manager applies the masks to generate an interleaved result, compares the interleaved result to an expected result, and sends an indication that the configuration data is configured to permissibly program the permitted partitions or permissibly programmed the permitted partitions in response to determining that the interleaved result is the expected result, or sends an alert to stop programming in response to determining that the interleaved result is not the expected result.

Abstract: The disclosed systems and methods may secure the fuse programming process in programmable devices to reduce or eliminate malicious discovery of data (e.g., the encryption key, the configuration bitstream) stored in nonvolatile memory via side-channel attacks. A processor may generate a randomized fuse list and the fuses may be blown in the randomized order. Additionally or alternatively, the processor may randomize the wait time between programming of each fuse. Further, the processor may generate a simplified fuse list including only fuses to be blown. The disclosed security systems and methods may be used individually or in combination to prevent determination of sensitive data, such as the encryption key, by monitoring, for example, power consumption in side-channel attacks.

Abstract: An integrated circuit (IC) device configured for multiple return material authorizations (RMAs) is provided. The IC device includes an asset and a return material authorization (RMA) counter fuse including a first fuse, a second fuse, and a third fuse. The IC device enters an RMA state in response to blowing the first fuse, a second state in response to blowing the second fuse, and the RMA state in response to blowing the third fuse.

Abstract: An integrated circuit device includes a first partition and a second partition. The integrated circuit device also includes a Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) system that controls at least a portion of the integrated circuit device via logic signals. The JTAG system includes a JTAG interface that receives logic signals and a first JTAG hub instantiated in the first partition communicatively coupled to the JTAG interface. The integrated circuit device further includes a second JTAG hub instantiated in the second partition communicatively coupled to the first JTAG hub via a bridge.

Abstract: A programmable logic device verifies that configuration data permissibly programs the programmable logic device. The programmable logic device includes a programmable fabric having partitions to be programmed by the configuration data, a secure device manager that may generate masks based on the configuration data, and a local sector manager. The masks determine that the configuration data is configured to permissibly program the permitted partitions or that the permitted partitions have been permissibly programmed. The local sector manager applies the masks to generate an interleaved result, compares the interleaved result to an expected result, and sends an indication that the configuration data is configured to permissibly program the permitted partitions or permissibly programmed the permitted partitions in response to determining that the interleaved result is the expected result, or sends an alert to stop programming in response to determining that the interleaved result is not the expected result.

Abstract: Integrated circuit devices and methods include utilizing security features including authenticating incoming data by receiving one or more hash blocks each including multiple hash sub-blocks. Authenticating also includes receiving encrypted data including multiple data sub-blocks. Authenticating also includes authenticating a first hash block of the one or more hash blocks using a root hash of an integrated circuit device. Authenticating further includes authenticating each of the multiple data sub-blocks using a corresponding hash sub-block of the multiple hash sub-blocks.

Abstract: The disclosed systems and methods may secure the fuse programming process in programmable devices to reduce or eliminate malicious discovery of data (e.g., the encryption key, the configuration bitstream) stored in nonvolatile memory via side-channel attacks. A processor may generate a randomized fuse list and the fuses may be blown in the randomized order. Additionally or alternatively, the processor may randomize the wait time between programming of each fuse. Further, the processor may generate a simplified fuse list including only fuses to be blown. The disclosed security systems and methods may be used individually or in combination to prevent determination of sensitive data, such as the encryption key, by monitoring, for example, power consumption in side-channel attacks.