Abstract: A structure for magnetic flux sensor conditioning is presented which partitions an input analog signal of unknown integrity into two: susceptible and insusceptible. The structure scrutinizes the susceptible signal partition, in view of additional guard sensor information, through a mixed-signal processing side-chain that employs a non-invasive physical magnetic attack detection algorithm. The side-chain either validates, or replaces with a best estimate, the susceptible signal partition, depending upon the absence or presence of attack, respectively. The structure finally recombines the scrutinized susceptible signal partition with the insusceptible signal partition. The result is an analog magnetic flux sensor signal that is robust against skillful, surreptitious, spoofing attacks. If unmitigated, such attacks may induce catastrophic consequences into systems relying upon the magnetic flux sensor.

Abstract: A structure for magnetic flux sensor conditioning is presented which partitions an input analog signal of unknown integrity into two: susceptible and insusceptible. The structure scrutinizes the susceptible signal partition, in view of additional guard sensor information, through a mixed-signal processing side-chain that employs a non-invasive physical magnetic attack detection algorithm. The side-chain either validates, or replaces with a best estimate, the susceptible signal partition, depending upon the absence or presence of attack, respectively. The structure finally recombines the scrutinized susceptible signal partition with the insusceptible signal partition. The result is an analog magnetic flux sensor signal that is robust against skillful, surreptitious, spoofing attacks. If unmitigated, such attacks may induce catastrophic consequences into systems relying upon the magnetic flux sensor.