Abstract: Systems and methods for factory management of secured component verification in an Information Handling System (IHS) are described. In an embodiment, an IHS may include: a host processor; a security processor coupled to the host processor; and a memory coupled to the security processor, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the host processor, cause the security processor to: obtain system information associated with the IHS from the security processor, sign the system information into a Secured Component Verification (SCV) certificate, issue the SCV to a cloud-based verification server. The verification server compares the system information with a stored golden copy of the system information, determines whether the comparison matches, and generates control information based upon the comparison. The host processor receives the control information from the cloud-based verification server, and controls the operation of the IHS based on the control information.

Abstract: A system for secure booting of an information handling system stores a Root of Trust private key in a hardware security module (HSM). A HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility receives inputs such as bin files for each firmware volume associated with a boot sequence. The HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility loads the correct extensions for the firmware volume, generates a certificate signing request (CSR) and generates a certificate based on the CSR. The certificates can be provided to a boot sequence for processing in a trusted firmware implementation without a certificate creation utility consuming the Hardware Root of Trust private key as a file that could be compromised.

Abstract: A system for secure booting of an information handling system stores a Root of Trust private key in a hardware security module (HSM). A HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility receives inputs such as bin files for each firmware volume associated with a boot sequence. The HSM-Integrated certificate creation utility loads the correct extensions for the firmware volume, generates a certificate signing request (CSR) and generates a certificate based on the CSR. The certificates can be provided to a boot sequence for processing in a trusted firmware implementation without a certificate creation utility consuming the Hardware Root of Trust private key as a file that could be compromised.

Abstract: An electronic assembly perform data storage operations on behalf of a set of storage processors (SPs). The electronic assembly includes an enclosure, and a set of peripheral component interconnect express (PCIe) switches which installs within the enclosure. The set of PCIe switches is constructed and arranged to connect to the set of SPs while the set of SPs is external to the enclosure. The electronic assembly further includes a set of data storage devices which installs within the enclosure. The set of data storage devices is constructed and arranged to persistently store data on behalf of the set of SPs via PCIe-based communications through the set of PCIe switches.

Abstract: A chassis having a cover moveable between open and closed positions and circuitry for detecting whether the cover is in the open or the closed position. The circuitry includes a transmitter of optical energy disposed at a fixed position within the chassis for transmitting pulses of optical energy at a predetermined frequency and a receiver for optical energy disposed at a fixed position within the chassis. A reflector is mounted to an inner surface of the cover and is disposed in a path to intercept and then reflect the intercepted transmitted energy to the receiver when the cover is moved to the closed position and being disposed away from the path to prevent the transmitted energy to be intercepted and then reflected to the receiver when the cover is moved to the open position.