Abstract: In a first computer (digital) data obfuscation process, data which is conventionally arranged in a data structure called an array (e.g., a table) and conventionally stored in computer or computer device memory is obfuscated (masked) by logically or mathematically combining the data, entry-by-entry, with a masking value which is computed as a logical or mathematical function of the entry itself or its index in the array, modulo a security value. The complementary unmasking value is a pointer to the entry's address in the table modulo the security value. In a second computer (digital) data obfuscation process, the addresses (location designations) in memory of a data array are themselves obfuscated (masked) by partitioning the array into blocks of entries and shuffling the order of the data entries in each block by a predetermined algorithm, resulting in a shuffled array also differing from the original array in terms of its size (the total number of entries).

Abstract: In the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process is embodied in a computer system or computer software or logic circuitry and is keyless, but highly secure. The process is based on (mathematical) quasi-group operations such as in the known “EDON-R” hash function. But here one or more blank rounds (iterations) of the quasi-group operation are concatenated to the EDON-R hash function operations, to overcome perceived security weaknesses in EDON-R.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are systems, computer-implemented methods, and computer-readable storage media for obfuscating data based on a discrete logarithm. A system practicing the method identifies a clear value in source code, replaces the clear value in the source code with a transformed value based on the clear value and a discrete logarithm, and updates portions of the source code that refer to the clear value such that interactions with the transformed value provide a same result as interactions with the clear value. This discrete logarithm approach can be implemented in three variations. The first variation obfuscates some or all of the clear values in loops. The second variation obfuscates data in a process. The third variation obfuscates data pointers, including tables and arrays. The third variation also preserves the ability to use pointer arithmetic.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, cryptographic hash function processes are embodied in a computer system and may be keyless, but are highly secure. The processes are based on the type of randomness exhibited by the well known game of dominos using a set of tiles arranged by players on a surface. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of executing in computer code or logic circuitry an algorithm which models such a domino game using the message as an input to the domino game algorithm, then executing the domino game algorithm. A state of the game algorithm which models the final layout of the pieces (tiles) gives the hash digest value of the message.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, this disclosure is of cryptographic hash function processes embodied in a computer system and which may be keyless, but are highly secure. The processes are based on the type of randomness exhibited by painting or drawing a picture. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of executing in computer code or logic circuitry an algorithm which models such a picture painting process using the message as an input to the picture painting algorithm, then executing the algorithm. A state of the resulting picture gives the hash digest value of the message. Message expansion or a derivation function (e.g., a pseudo random number generation process) may be applied to the message prior to execution of the picture painting process, for enhanced security.

Abstract: This discloses, in the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process embodied in a computer system and which may be keyless, but is highly secure. The process is based on the type of randomness exhibited by a heap or stack of physical objects such as a heap of pieces of fruit and involves modeling the behavior of such a heap when pieces are removed from the heap. Computation of the hash value (digest) is thereby the result of executing a heap model algorithm using the message as an input to initialize the heap, then executing the heap model algorithm which logically models the process of serially removing objects (pieces of fruit) from the heap at various locations in the modeled heap.

Abstract: The present method is directed, in the computer data security field, to cryptographic sponge and hash function processes which are embodied in a computer system and are typically keyless, but highly secure. The processes are based on the type of randomness exhibited by manipulation of the well known three dimensional Rubik's cube puzzle. Computation of the hash or sponge value (digest) is the result of executing in a model (such as computer code or logic circuitry) an algorithm modeling such a puzzle using the message as an input to the cube puzzle algorithm, then executing the cube puzzle algorithm. A state of the modeled cube puzzle (the final cube puzzle arrangement) after execution gives the sponge or hash digest value of the message.

Abstract: A method for the secure application of a cryptographic algorithm of the RSA type in an electronic component obtains the value of a public exponent e from a given set of probable values, without a priori knowledge of that value. Having determined the value for the public exponent e, the application of countermeasures using the value of e, to block error attacks and side channel attacks, particularly of the DPA and SPA type, are carried out on the application of a private operation of the cryptographic algorithm.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, cryptographic hash function processes embodied in a computer system and which are typically keyless, but are highly secure. The processes are based on the type of randomness exhibited by well known table “cue sports” games such as billiards, snooker, and pool played on a billiards table involving the players striking one of a plurality of balls with a cue, the struck ball then hitting other balls, the raised sides of the table, and in some cases one or more balls going into pockets in the corners and/or sides of the table. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of providing a model (such as expressed in computer code) of such a game algorithm and using the message as an input to the game algorithm, then executing the game algorithm. A state of the game after one or several “shots” gives the hash digest value of the message.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process embodied in a computer system and which is typically keyless, but is highly secure. The process is based on the type of randomness exhibited by the well known gambling game of roulette played on a roulette wheel involving dropping a ball onto a partitioned spinning wheel. The ball loses momentum and drops into one of the partitions (pockets) of the wheel. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of executing in a model (such as computer code or logic circuitry) such a game algorithm using the message as an input to the game algorithm, then executing the game algorithm. A state of the game (the final ball location) after a ball (or several balls) are played gives the hash digest value of the message.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process embodied in a computer system and which is typically keyless, but is highly secure. The process is based on the type of randomness exhibited by well known table “cue sports” games such as billiards, snooker, and pool played on a billiards table involving the players striking one of a plurality of balls with a cue, the struck ball then hitting other balls, the raised sides of the table, and in some cases one or more balls going into pockets in the corners and/or sides of the table. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of providing a model (such as expressed in computer code) of such a game algorithm and using the message as an input to the game algorithm, then executing the game algorithm. A state of the game after a “shot” gives the hash digest value.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process embodied in a computer system and which is typically keyless, but is highly secure. The process is based on the type of chaos introduction exhibited by a game process such as the well known shuffling of a deck of playing cards. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of executing in a model (such as computer code or logic circuitry) a game algorithm that models the actual game such as a playing card shuffling algorithm using the message as an input to the algorithm, then executing the card shuffling algorithm on the input. A state (order) of the modeled deck of cards after a shuffle (or multiple shuffles) gives the hash digest value.

Abstract: In the field of computer data security, a hash process which is typically keyless and embodied in a computing apparatus is highly secure in terms of being resistant to attack. The hash process uses computer code (software) polymorphism, wherein computation of the hash value for a given message is partly dependent on the content (data) of the message. Hence the computer code changes dynamically while computing each hash value.

Abstract: In the computer data security field, a cryptographic hash function process embodied in a computer system and which is typically keyless, but is highly secure. The process is based on the type of randomness exhibited by well known tetromino stacking games. Computation of the hash value (digest) is the result of executing such a “piling on” (tetromino stacking game) algorithm using the message as an input (a seed) to a pseudo random number generator which generates the game pieces (shapes) from the resulting random numbers, then executing the game algorithm.

Abstract: The invention relates to a cryptographic method secured against a covert channel attack. According to the invention, in order to carry out a selected block of instructions as a function of an input variable amongst N predefined instruction blocks, a common block is carried out on the predefined N instruction blocks, a predefined number of times, the predefined number being associated with the selected instruction block.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for handling data between two memory areas of an electronic component having at least one working memory area for carrying out operations on the component, which bring into play at least some of the data. The same memory areas are used for executing an operation, whatever the operation to be executed is, in such a manner that each operation has a hidden signal trace that is identical in terms of location leakage outside the component.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method of electronically signing a message m, characterized in that it uses: p a prime integer, q a prime integer divider of (p?1), g, an element of order q of the set Zp of integers modulo p, H and G, hash functions, x a private key and y, for example y=g?x mod p, a public key of the set Zp, to carry out the following steps, consisting in: E1: generating k, a random number k of the set Zq of integers modulo q, and calculating u=gk mod p, h=H(u), z=hx mod p and v=hk mod p, E2: calculating c=G (m, g, h, y, z, u, v) and s=k+c.x mod q, and E3: producing an electronic signature of the message m equal to (z, s, c). The invention also relates to a verification method and a signature scheme associated with the signature method.

Abstract: A method for dynamically authenticating an executable program, that is the continuation of the instructions defined thereby, is performed repeatedly during the very execution of the program. The method for making secure an electronic portable object through execution of a program supplied by another insecure electronic object uses, inter alia, a secret key protocol.

Abstract: A method for the secure application of a cryptographic algorithm of the RSA type in an electronic component obtains the value of a public exponent e from a given set of probable values, without a priori knowledge of that value. Having determined the value for the public exponent e, the application of countermeasures using the value of e, to block error attacks and side channel attacks, particularly of the DPA and SPA type, are carried out on the application of a private operation of the cryptographic algorithm.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for implementing in an electronic component a cryptographic algorithm using calculating means. The invention is characterized in that it consists in carrying out the following steps: a) selecting a value e among a specific number of values eI, ei being integers, b) checking if ei verifies a predetermined relationship: if so, then e=ei, and storing e for use in calculating said cryptographic algorithm.