Abstract: The disclosure herein describes integrity verification of a checksum of a canister data structure using built-in checksum verification capability. A kernel image is accessed, and a canister data structure is allocated in a section of memory. The canister data structure is loaded with canister data from the kernel image, wherein the loading is based on an interpreter obtained from the kernel image, wherein the canister data includes address relocation data and a checksum of the canister data. A binary image of the canister data structure is assembled, wherein the assembling includes at least performing reverse relocation on the canister data structure using the address relocation data. A checksum is generated based on the assembled binary image, and the checksum of the canister data is verified using the generated checksum. The integrity of the canister data structure is confirmed based on the verification.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to centralized volume encryption key management for edge devices with trusted platform modules (TPM)s. In some examples, a TPM measures platform configuration register (PCR) values during a gateway boot process of a gateway device, including a PCR value for an extractor PCR. The extractor PCR refers to a PCR for an extractor application of the gateway device. The extractor application unseals a volume encryption key using the PCR value for the extractor PCR and a sealing authorization policy. The extractor application itself is verified as a result of measuring and using the PCR value for the extractor PCR.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to centralized volume encryption key management for edge devices with trusted platform modules (TPM)s. In some aspects a volume encryption key is generated for a gateway device. A sealing authorization policy is also generated for the gateway device. The sealing authorization policy is generated based on a predetermined platform configuration register (PCR) mask and expected PCR values. The volume encryption key and the sealing authorization policy are transmitted from the management service to the gateway device to provision the gateway device with the volume encryption key.

Abstract: The disclosure herein describes integrity verification of a checksum of a canister data structure using built-in checksum verification capability. A kernel image is accessed, and a canister data structure is allocated in a section of memory. The canister data structure is loaded with canister data from the kernel image, wherein the loading is based on an interpreter obtained from the kernel image, wherein the canister data includes address relocation data and a checksum of the canister data. A binary image of the canister data structure is assembled, wherein the assembling includes at least performing reverse relocation on the canister data structure using the address relocation data. A checksum is generated based on the assembled binary image, and the checksum of the canister data is verified using the generated checksum. The integrity of the canister data structure is confirmed based on the verification.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to centralized volume encryption key management for edge devices with trusted platform modules (TPM)s. In some aspects a volume encryption key is generated for a gateway device. A sealing authorization policy is also generated for the gateway device. The sealing authorization policy is generated based on a predetermined platform configuration register (PCR) mask and expected PCR values. The volume encryption key and the sealing authorization policy are transmitted from the management service to the gateway device to provision the gateway device with the volume encryption key.

Abstract: Emulation software executes upon an operating system of a computer and creates an emulated computer. Bootstrapping code is read into this emulated computer from a sector (such as a master boot record) of a mass storage device. Instructions in the bootstrapping code are executed by an instruction emulator (also using an emulated CPU, emulated memory and an emulated hard disk) and these instructions and behavior are collected as each instruction executes. Access to the actual hard disk may be allowed. The collected information is then compared to a virus signature or behavior rules indicating malware and a conclusion is drawn as to whether the bootstrapping code includes malicious software.

Abstract: The present invention relates to a 5-(1,3-diaryl-1H-pyrazol-4-ylmethylene)-thiazolidine-2,4-dione derivative or its pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof, a method for preparing the same and an anticancer agent composition comprising the same as an active ingredient.